Chaotic dynamics in credit constrained emerging economies

This paper analyzes the role of financial development as a source of endogenous instability in small open economies. By assuming that firms face credit constraints, our model displays a complex dynamic behavior for intermediate values of the parameter representing the level of financial development of the economy. The basic implication of our model is that economies experiencing a process of financial development are more unstable than both very underdeveloped and very developed economies. Our instability concept means that small shocks have a persistent effect on the long run behavior of the model and also that economies can exhibit cycles with a very high period or even chaotic dynamic patterns.

Determinants of high-growth firms:why do some countries have more high-growth firms than others?

High-growth firms have been shown to be a key factor for economic growth and structural change. This paper analyses the determinants of the number of high-growth firms in a country for 17 OECD countries between 1999 and 2005, using the Amadeus data set, the GEM data set, and others. The first contribution of this paper is that it is – as far as we know – the first empirical analysis of high-growth firms at the country level on the basis of actual measured growth. Second, we find indicative empirical evidence for three driving forces of high growth, viz. entrepreneurship, institutional settings, and opportunities for growth, all in accordance with theory and empirical findings in related fields of research. Third, the paper gives a tentative explanation of the differences in the average percentage of high-growth firms between countries. Finally, the paper gives some clues for policy makers how to promote high-growth firms. Keywords: high-growth firms, fast growing firms, entrepreneurship, institutional obstacles, opportunities for growth

Regional Determinants of Firm Entry in a Developing Country

Regional policies aiming to attract new firms are largely based on evidence that originates from Europe, the USA and Japan. This may raise doubts about the usefulness of such policies when applied to developing economies. This paper addresses this issue by providing estimates of the determinants of firm entry in the Argentinean provinces. We find that most of the determinants used in previous studies analysing developed countries are still relevant. However, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that reflect the specificities of developing economies. Key words: firm entry, regional economics, Argentina. JEL: R12; R30; C33

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Why are capital flows so much more volatile in emerging than in developed countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks ( crises ) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) the most important one shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.

Firms, destinations, and aggregate fluctuations

This paper uses a database covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregatefluctuations. We set up a simple multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms selling tomultiple markets to motivate a theoretically-founded decomposition of firms' annualsales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific componentcontributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as thecomponents capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country.We then decompose the firm-specific component to provide evidence on two mechanismsthat generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recentliterature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks tolarge firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations; and (ii) aggregate fluctuationscan arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input-output linkages across the economy.Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firmshocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.

The persistence of return on assets: differences between industries and differences between firms

This study offers a statistical analysis of the persistence of annual profits across a sample of firms from different European Union (EU) countries. To this end, a Bayesian dynamic model has been used which enables the annual behaviour of those profits to be broken down into a permanent structural component on the one hand and a transitory component on the other, while also distinguishing between general effects affecting the industry as a whole to which each firm belongs and specific effects affecting each firm in particular. This break down enables the relative importance of those fundamental components to be evaluated. The data analysed come from a sample of 23,293 firms in EU countries selected from the AMADEUS data-base. The period analysed ran from 1999 to 2007 and 21 sectors were analysed, chosen in such a way that there was a sufficiently large number of firms in each country*sector combination for the industry effects to be estimated accurately enough for meaningful comparisons to be made by sector and country. The analysis has been conducted by sector and by country from a Bayesian perspective, thus making the study more flexible and realistic since the estimates obtained do not depend on asymptotic results. In general terms, the study finds that, although the industry effects are significant, more important are the specific effects. That importance varies depending on the sector or the country in which the firm carries out its activity. The influence of firm effects accounts for more than 90% of total variation and display a significantly lower degree of persistence, with adjustment speeds oscillating around 51.1%. However, this pattern is not homogeneous but depends on the sector and country analysed. Industry effects have a more marginal importance, being significantly more persistent, with adjustment speeds oscillating around 10% with this degree of persistence being more homogeneous at both country and sector levels.

Regional determinants of firm entry in a developing country

We analyse the determinants of firm entry in developing countries using Argentina as an illustrative case. Our main finding is that although most of the regional determinants used in previous studies analysing developed countries are also relevant here, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that proxy for the specificities of developing economies (e.g., poverty, informal economy and idle capacity).We also find evidence of a core-periphery pattern in the spatial structure of entry that seems to be mostly driven by differences in agglomeration economies. Since regional policies aiming to attract new firms are largely based on evidence from developed countries, our results raise doubts about the usefulness of such policies when applied to developing economies. JEL classification: R12, R30, C33. Key words: Firm entry, Argentina, count data models.

Fiscal sustainability and fiscal shocks in a dollarized and oil-exporting country: Ecuador

This paper investigates the fiscal sustainability of an emerging, dollarized, oil-exporting country: Ecuador. A cointegrated VAR approach is adopted in testing, first, if the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied in Ecuador and, second, in identifying the permanent and transitory shocks that affect a fiscal policy characterized by inertia and a heavy dependence on oil revenues. Following confirmation that the debt-GDP ratio does not place the Ecuadorian budget under any pressure, we reformulate the model and identify two forces that push the fiscal system out of equilibrium, namely, economic activity and oil revenues implemented in the government budget. We argue that Ecuador needs to recover control of its monetary policy and to promote the diversification of its economy in order that non-oil tax revenues can replace oil revenues as a pushing force. Finally, we calculate quarterly elasticities of tax revenues with respect to Ecuador’s GDP and that of eight Eurozone countries. We illustrate graphically how the Eurozone countries with low positive or high negative elasticities’ levels suffer debt problems after the crisis. This finding emphasizes the pressing need for Ecuador to strengthen the connection between its tax revenues and output, and also suggests that the convergence of these elasticities in the Eurozone might contribute to the success of an eventually future fiscal union.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

External sources of innovation and industry-university interaction:evidence from Spanish firms

This paper is about the firm innovation process and the cooperation of the innovative firms with other firms and public institutions. A special attention is paid to the cooperation with universities. We use the Technological Innovation Survey (TIS) from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spain) in order to obtain data for 4,159 innovative firms. Our results show that firm's cooperation activities are closely linked to the characteristics of the industry and the firm as well as to the origin of public funds for R&D activities. Key words: Innovation, universities, Spanish economy. JEL code: O31, I20, L60

The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.