The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Los Efectos del sistema electoral europeo en España: los partidos políticos de ámbito no estatal

A lo largo de este artículo se analizan los efectos del sistema electoral europeo en España sobre los partidos políticos de ámbito no estatal. Por un lado, se estudia el funcionamiento de la normativa electoral española, subrayando la sobrerepresentación de unos partidos políticos y la infrarepresentación de otros en función del ámbito territorial organizativo de la formación política. Por otro lado, se presentan datos sistemáticos y comparados que demuestran esta distorsión de la representación política –fruto de la normativa electoral-, y dibujamos la estrategia electoral que los partidos políticos afectados negativamente desarrollan: las coaliciones electorales. Pero, ¿en base a qué criterios se organizan tales coaliciones electorales? El enfoque multivariable –la circunscripción, la magnitud electoral y el número de eurodiputados españoles- nos va permitir responder a esta y otras preguntas. El objetivo es ahondar en el debate sobre la normativa electoral en la arena política europea.

El Comportament electoral dels espanyols al referèndum de la Constitució Europea

Aquest paper tracta dels resultats del referèndum sobre la Constitució Europea que es va celebrar a Espanya el 20 de febrer de 2005. Hi trobem un panorama general del context en el qual se celebrà la consulta, i, a través de l’anàlisi d’enquestes postelectorals, analitza la composició del vot afirmatiu i del negatiu, la posició dels diferents partits polítics i el comportament electoral dels diversos actors socials, dividits per classe social, religió, edat, gènere, territori, etc. També hi ha una anàlisi de l’abstenció i de la participació a Espanya en aquest cas.

The effect of candidate quality on electoral equilibrium: an experimental study

When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.

El Sistema electoral a Austràlia: convivència en la complexitat democràtica

L’objectiu d’aquestes pàgines és descriure el desenvolupament del sistema electoral a Austràlia des de la perspectiva que comporta tant la seva complexitat com flexibilitat. Una complexitat a què s’ha acostumat el ciutadà australià fruit de la naturalesa federal del país. En comptes que les modificacions en les regles del joc democràtic facin perillar la credibilitat del poder polític, Austràlia sempre ha conservat una ferma evolució política a partir dels eixos de buscar la millor representació ciutadana. Aquesta diversitat i sofisticació constant no han portat a la ciutadania a una desinhibició de les regles democràtiques, sinó que s’ha combinat amb una participació electoral obligada dels ciutadans que els implica directament amb el seu sistema polític.

The keys to success: the social, sporting, economic and communications impact of Barcelona'92

This book is a collection of articles which analyze the sporting, social, political, communicative, urban, technological and economic impacts of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.