Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Selection response of growth rate in rabbits for meat production

Genetic and environmental trends in 2 lines of rabbit (B and R) selected on individual weight gain (WG) from weaning (4 wk) to slaughter (11 wk) were estimated using mixed model methodology. Line B was derived from the California breed and line R was a synthetic of stock of different origin. The data were collected from a single herd and comprised 7 718 individuals in line B and 9 391 in line R, the lines having 12 and 9 generations of selection respectively. Realized responses in the 2 lines were 2.7% and 2.2% of the initial mean per year respectively and showed that selection on WG was effective but was less than expected. Selection on slaughter weight (SW) and effects of selection on other economic traits are discussed. It is concluded that selection on either WG or SW is a simple method for improving growth rate in rabbit sire line stocks.

Motivation, Test Scores, and Economic Success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determined by test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitive ability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitive ability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scores and economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstrate these points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicity its scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controlling for conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with future earnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated, though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSY participants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-based incentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effort invested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by their scores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance- based incentives.

Motivation, test scores and economic success

This paper argues that low-stakes test scores, available in surveys, may be partially determinedby test-taking motivation, which is associated with personality traits but not with cognitiveability. Therefore, such test score distributions may not be informative regarding cognitiveability distributions. Moreover, correlations, found in survey data, between high test scoresand economic success may be partially caused by favorable personality traits. To demonstratethese points, I use the coding speed test that was administered without incentives to NationalLongitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) participants. I suggest that due to its simplicityits scores may especially depend on individuals' test-taking motivation. I show that controllingfor conventional measures of cognitive skills, the coding speed scores are correlated with futureearnings of male NLSY participants. Moreover, the coding speed scores of highly motivated,though less educated, population (potential enlists to the armed forces) are higher than NLSYparticipants' scores. I then use controlled experiments to show that when no performance-basedincentives are provided, participants' characteristics, but not their cognitive skills, affect effortinvested in the coding speed test. Thus, participants with the same ability (measured by theirscores on an incentivized test) have significantly different scores on tests without performance-based incentives.

Ecological and Economic Impacts within the Environmental Input-Output Framework

The environmental input-output approach reveals the channels through which the environmental burdens of production activities are transmitted throughout the economy. This paper uses the input-output framework and analyses the changes in Spanish emission multipliers during the period 1995-2000. By decomposing the global changes in multipliers into different components, it is possible to evaluate separately the economic and ecological impacts captured by the environmental input-output model. Specifically, in this study we distinguish between the effects on multipliers caused by changes in emission coefficients (the ecological impacts) and the effects on multipliers caused by changes in technical coefficients (the economic impacts). Our results show a significant improvement in the ecological impacts of production activities, which contributed negatively to changes in emission multipliers. They also show a deterioration in the economic impacts, which contributed positively to changes in emission multipliers. Together, these two effects lead to a small reduction in global multipliers during the period of analysis. Our results also show significant differences in the individual behaviour of different sectors in terms of their contribution to multiplier changes. Since there are considerable differences in the way individual sectors affect the changes in emission levels, and in the intensity of these effects, this means that the final effects will basically depend on the activity considered. Keywords: emission multipliers, multipliers' changes, ecological impacts, economic impacts.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On dictatorship, economic development and stability

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake: an economic approach

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.