Mentoring, educational services, and economic incentives longer-term evidence on risky behaviors from a randomized trial

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long- term impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards to attend program activities, complete high-school and enroll in post-secondary education on youths' engagement in risky behaviors, such as substance abuse, criminal activity, and teenage childbearing. Outcomes were measured at three different points in time, when youths were in their late-teens, and when they were in their early- and their latetwenties. Overall the program was unsuccessful at reducing risky behaviors. Heterogeneity matters in that perverse effects are concentrated among certain subgroups, such as males, older youths, and youths from sites where youths received higher amount of stipends. We claim that this evidence is consistent with different models of youths' behavioral response to economic incentives. In addition, beneficial effects found in those sites in which QOP youths represented a large fraction of the entering class of 9th graders provides hope for these type of programs when operated in small communities and supports the hypothesis of peer effects.

El comportamiento penalmente relevante en el delito de defraudación tributaria: una propuesta político-criminal

El sistema tributario es fundamental en el Estado social y democrático de Derecho, pues el ejercicio y efectivo disfrute de muchos derechos fundamentales depende del correcto funcionamiento de la actividad tributaria. Además de esto, la situación económica actual demanda una adecuada política en contra del fraude tributario, lo que necesariamente implica analizar si el modelo penal vigente es el más adecuado para enfrentar el fraude fiscal. Teniendo en cuenta que muchas de las características de la criminalidad tributaria no son exclusivas de un país, pues ésta trasciende habitualmente las fronteras de los países por medio del recurso a empresas multinacionales o la localización de empresas en “paraísos fiscales”, el análisis del fraude tributario no debe limitarse al examen jurídico del modelo legislativo español, debiendo trascender a un estudio de política criminal que vincula consideraciones criminológicas y jurídicas. En consecuencia, en esta investigación se propone un análisis que no se reduce a los debates exclusivamente jurídicos. Se busca, además, efectuar un examen que tenga por fundamento una perspectiva criminológica y de Law in action a fin de evaluar críticamente la respuesta a la criminalidad tributaria por parte del modelo de regulación penal vigente en España. Esta orientación permitirá una más amplia comprensión del fenómeno de la criminalidad tributaria, así como de las categorías jurídicas adecuadas político criminalmente para su prevención. Este estudio interdisciplinario nos conducirá, al final de la investigación, tanto a proponer la interpretación del modelo de legislación penal vigente, como una reforma al mismo que pretenda solucionar algunos de los problemas de prevención que a lo largo de la investigación se señalan.

Ideas, Possibilities and Limitations of Sustainable Economic Policy – the Example of Ecological Economics

A mesura que el suport del creixement econòmic constitueix un objectiu fonamental de la formulació de polítiques econòmiques, cal assenyalar que aquest tipus de creixement està limitat naturalment per un planeta finit. Aquest article argumenta que, des del punt de vista de la justícia intergeneracional, la realització d'un concepte de desmaterialització i, com a efecte, d'una economia que no creix (en el sentit de dissociació absoluta del creixement econòmic i consum d'energia i materials) es pot justificar. Per tant, el creixement pot ser també entesa com la millora de la qualitat de vida sobretot en comptes d'ampliar quantitats escarpats de sortida. Per tant, una dràstica reducció del cabal de material es necessita, sobretot en els països d'alts ingressos. Després de presentar alguns crítica de les propostes, en el focus d'aquest article es dibuixen en els arguments de per què la política econòmica en el futur han de ser etiquetats com "ecològic" i, a continuació, les opcions de posar en acció les idees del teòric presentat marc en tasques manejables polítiques seran discutides. En aquest cas, s'argumentarà que l'enfocament clàssic de internalització d'efectes externs sovint seguides de decisions de política econòmica ortodoxa no és completament capaç de reflectir canvis ecològics en les estructures de preus dels mercats. Per tant, formal (industrial i l'establiment de la política de consum) i institucions informals (llars) representen punts clau de la política econòmica sostenible, assenyalant l'individu com així com la responsabilitat col · lectiva per omplir aquest buit substancial.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support

The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.

Ecological and Economic Impacts within the Environmental Input-Output Framework

The environmental input-output approach reveals the channels through which the environmental burdens of production activities are transmitted throughout the economy. This paper uses the input-output framework and analyses the changes in Spanish emission multipliers during the period 1995-2000. By decomposing the global changes in multipliers into different components, it is possible to evaluate separately the economic and ecological impacts captured by the environmental input-output model. Specifically, in this study we distinguish between the effects on multipliers caused by changes in emission coefficients (the ecological impacts) and the effects on multipliers caused by changes in technical coefficients (the economic impacts). Our results show a significant improvement in the ecological impacts of production activities, which contributed negatively to changes in emission multipliers. They also show a deterioration in the economic impacts, which contributed positively to changes in emission multipliers. Together, these two effects lead to a small reduction in global multipliers during the period of analysis. Our results also show significant differences in the individual behaviour of different sectors in terms of their contribution to multiplier changes. Since there are considerable differences in the way individual sectors affect the changes in emission levels, and in the intensity of these effects, this means that the final effects will basically depend on the activity considered. Keywords: emission multipliers, multipliers' changes, ecological impacts, economic impacts.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On dictatorship, economic development and stability

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake: an economic approach

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.