Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale-Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play "safer" strategies under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms.

Estudi de la configuració magnètica de l'experiment LTP (LISA Technology Package)

La Teoria de la Relativitat General preveu que quan un objecte massiu és sotmès a una certa acceleració en certes condicions ha d’emetre ones gravitacionals. Es tracta d’un tipus d’on altament energètica però que interacciona amb la matèria de manera molt feble i el seu punt d’emissió és força llunyà. Per la qual cosa la seva detecció és una tasca extraordinàriament complicada. Conseqüentment, la detecció d’aquestes ones es creu molt més factible utilitzant instruments situats a l’espai. Amb aquest objectiu, neis la missió LISA (Laser Interferometer Space Antenna). Es tracta aquesta d’una missió conjunta entre la NASA i l’ESA amb llançament previst per 2020-2025. Per reduir els riscs que comporta una primera utilització de tecnologia no testejada, unit a l’alt cost econòmic de la missió LISA. Aquesta missió contindrà instruments molt avançats: el LTP (LISA Technoplogy Package), desenvolupat per la Unió Europea, que provarà la tecnologia de LISA i el Drag Free flying system, que s’encarregarà de provar una sèrie de propulsors (thrusters) utilitzats per al control d’actitud i posició de satèl•lit amb precisió de nanòmetres. Particularment, el LTP, està composat per dues masses de prova separades per 35 centímetres, i d’un interferòmetre làser que mesura la variació de la distància relativa entre elles. D’aquesta manera, el LTP mesurarà les prestacions dels equips i les possibles interferències que afecten a la mesura. Entre les fonts de soroll es troben, entre d’altres, el vent i pressió de radiació solar, les càrregues electrostàtiques, el gradient tèrmic, les fluctuacions de voltatge o les forces internes. Una de les possibles causes de soroll és aquella que serà l’objecte d’estudi en aquest projecte de tesi doctoral: la presència dintre del LTP de camps magnètics, que exerceixen una força sobre les masses de prova, la seva estimació i el seu control, prenent en compte les caracterírstiques magnètiques de l’experiment i la dinàmica del satèl•lit.

Monitorització d'alt nivell per a el computing de l'experiment ATLAS (LHC)

Aquest projecte descriu la fusió de les necessitats diaries de monitorització del experiment ATLAS des del punt de vista del cloud. La idea principal es desenvolupar un conjunt de col·lectors que recullin informació de la distribució i processat de les dades i dels test de wlcg (Service Availability Monitoring), emmagatzemant-la en BBDD específiques per tal de mostrar els resultats en una sola pàgina HLM (High Level Monitoring). Un cop aconseguit, l’aplicació ha de permetre investigar més enllà via interacció amb el front-end, el qual estarà alimentat per les estadístiques emmagatzemades a la BBDD.

Open online courses in Colombia : report of an educational and technological experiment

Based on a discussion of the background, features and limitations of open online courses, this paper describes a technological solution to support their offering, built on online tools that don't require self-managed hosting. This is a proof of concept that intends to highlight the possibilities and obstacles related to this kind of educational practice in a Latin American context.

Action Research : the first steps to start up a pilot experiment in heritage education

Peer-reviewed

Virus infection speeds: theory versus experiment

In order to explain the speed of Vesicular Stomatitis Virus VSV infections, we develop a simple model that improves previous approaches to the propagation of virus infections. For VSV infections, we find that the delay time elapsed between the adsorption of a viral particle into a cell and the release of its progeny has a veryimportant effect. Moreover, this delay time makes the adsorption rate essentially irrelevant in order to predict VSV infection speeds. Numerical simulations are in agreement with the analytical results. Our model satisfactorily explains the experimentally measured speeds of VSV infections

How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain

Using a panel of 48 provinces for four years we empirically analyze a series of temporary policies aimed at curbing fuel consumption implemented in Spain between March and June 2011. The first policy was a reduction in the speed limit in highways. The second policy was an increase in the biofuel content of fuels used in the transport sector. The third measure was a reduction of 5% in commuting and regional train fares that resulted in two major metropolitan areas reducing their overall fare for public transit. The results indicate that the speed limit reduction in highways reduced gasoline consumption by between 2% and 3%, while an increase in the biofuel content of gasoline increased this consumption. This last result is consistent with experimental evidence that indicates that mileage per liter falls with an increase in the biofuel content in gasolines. As for the reduction in transit fares, we do not find a significant effect for this policy. However, in specifications including the urban transit fare for the major cities in each province the estimated cross-price elasticity of the demand for gasoline -used as a proxy for car use- with respect to the price of transit is within the range reported in the literature. This is important since one of the main eficiency justification for subsidizing public transit rests on the positive value of this parameter and most of the estimates reported in the literature are quite dated.

The effects of walking while working on productivity and health: a field experiment

Lack of physical activity can cause health problems and diminish organizational productivity. We conducted a 12-months long field experiment in a financial services company to study the effects of slow-moving treadmills outfitted for office work on employee productivity and health. 43 sedentary volunteers were assigned randomly to two groups to receive treadmill workstations 7 months apart. Employees could opt at will for standard chair-desk arrangement. Biometric measurements were taken quarterly and weekly online performance surveys were administered to study participants and to more than 200 non-participants and their supervisors.In this study we explore three questions concerning the effects of the introduction of treadmills in the workplace. (1) Does it improve overall physical activity? (2) Does it improve health measures? (3) Does it improve performance? The answers are as follows. (1) Yes (net effect of almost half an hour a day). (2) Yes (small gains, one minor decline). (3) No and yes (initial decline followed by increase to recover to initial level within one year) – based on weekly employee self reports.

Supporting life-long competence development using the TENCompetence infrastructure: a first experiment

This paper describes an experiment to explore the effects of the TENCompetence infrastructure for supporting lifelong competence development which is now in development. This infrastructure provides structured, multi-leveled access to learning materials, based upon competences. People can follow their own learning path, supported by a listing of competences and their components, by competence development plans attached to competences and by the possibility to mark elements as complete. We expected the PCM to have an effect on (1) control of participants of their own learning, and (2) appreciation of their learning route, (3) of the learning resources, (4) of their competence development, and (5) of the possibilities of collaboration. In the experiment, 44 Bulgarian teachers followed a distance learning course on a specific teaching methodology for six weeks. Part of them used the TENCompetence infrastructure, part used an infrastructure which was similar, except for the characterizing elements mentioned above. The results showed that in the experimental condition, more people passed the final competence assess-ment, and people felt more in control of their own learning. No differences between the two groups were found on the amount and appreciation of collaboration and on further measures of competence development.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.