Los buscavidas: nómadas del capitalismo

Esta investigación se propone describir los rasgos esenciales de un tipo de personajes que hemos denominado, a efectos de generalización teórica, como “buscavidas”, peregrinos antihéroes del sistema laboral contemporáneo, deficientemente integrados a los valores del capitalismo e irreductibles a sus principios disciplinarios, que podemos hallar en la novelística del s. XX. He escogido a título de ejemplo cuatro novelas emblemáticas: Viaje al fin de la noche (1932), de Louis-Ferdinand Celine (1894-1961); La Conjura de los Necios (1980), de John Kennedy Toole (1937-1969); Factotum (1975), de Charles Bukowski (1920-1994) y Los Hermanos Tanner (1907), de Robert Walser (1878-1956). Asimismo, en el tercer capítulo de esta investigación, tendremos en cuenta la novela El Desaparecido (1927), de Franz Kafka (1883-1924), como un contrapunto iluminador que contribuye a analizar el tejido problemático de las dinámicas laborales en el pasado siglo. Karl Rossman, “el desaparecido”, no pertenece a la categoría de los buscavidas, porque a diferencia de estos, aspira a progresar en su carrera, pero sufre los golpes bajos de un sistema que tiene reservado a su condición de emigrante la misma suerte ingrata.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).

Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Resolving identities: Successive crises in a trading room after 9/11

How do organizations cope with extreme uncertainty? The existing literatureis divided on this issue: some argue that organizations deal best withuncertainty in the environment by reproducing it in the organization, whereasothers contend that the orga nization should be protected from theenvironment. In this paper we study the case of a Wall Street investment bankthat lost its entire office and trading technology in the terrorist attack ofSeptember 11 th. The traders survived, but were forced to relocate to amakeshift trading room in New Jersey. During the six months the traders spentoutside New York City, they had to deal with fears and insecurities insidethe company as well as outside it: anxiety about additional attacks,questions of professional identity, doubts about the future of the firm, andambiguities about the future re-location of the trading room. The firmovercame these uncertainties by protecting the traders identities and theirability to engage in sensemaking. The organization held together through aleadership style that managed ambiguities and created the conditions for newsolutions to emerge.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Financial liberalization, bank crises and growth: Assessing the links

This paper studies the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth. It shows that financial liberalization spurs on average economic growth. Banking crises are harmful for growth, but to a lesser extent in countries with open financial systems and good institutions. The positive effect of financial liberalization is robust to different definitions. While the removal of capital account restrictions is effective by increasing financial depth, equity market liberalization affects growth directly. The empirical analysis is performed through GMM dynamic panel data estimations on a panel of 90 countries observed in the period 1975-1999.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of paymentscrises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disaggregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also shows that high interest rates can be eective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandonment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure.

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents,dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show thatgross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. Whenforeigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flowsare also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domesticagents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchmentin both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for differenttypes of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations drivingcapital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent withcrises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under thepresence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.

An eclectic third generation model of financial and exchange rate crises

[cat] En aquest treball es presenta un model eclèctic que sistematitza la dinàmica de les crisis que s’autoconfimen, usant els principals aspectes de les tres tipologies dels models de crisis canviàries de tercera generació, amb la finalitat de descriure els fets que precipiten la renúncia al manteniment d’una paritat fixada. Les contribucions més notables són les implicacions per a la política econòmica, així com la pèrdua del paper del tipus de canvi com instrument d’ajust macroeconòmic, quan els efectes de balanç són una possibilitat real.

An eclectic third generation model of financial and exchange rate crises

[cat] En aquest treball es presenta un model eclèctic que sistematitza la dinàmica de les crisis que s’autoconfimen, usant els principals aspectes de les tres tipologies dels models de crisis canviàries de tercera generació, amb la finalitat de descriure els fets que precipiten la renúncia al manteniment d’una paritat fixada. Les contribucions més notables són les implicacions per a la política econòmica, així com la pèrdua del paper del tipus de canvi com instrument d’ajust macroeconòmic, quan els efectes de balanç són una possibilitat real.

Pierre Vilar, historiador del capitalismo

La obra histórica de Pierre Vilar ha estado siempre vinculada a su preocupación por el presente y el porvenir de las sociedades humanas. Desde esta perspectiva, Vilar centró gran parte de sus ocupaciones historiográficas en entender el cambio histórico, siendo el nacimiento del capitalismo uno de sus temas centrales al posibilitarle la comprensión globalizadora de la transmutación de un modelo de sociedad a otro. En este sentido, su obra magna sobre Cataluña, serviría para demostrar que ésta tuvo su particular forma de insertarse en el capitalismo y que en medio de las controversias políticas sobre el hecho nacional no había que olvidar tan importante circunstancia.

El capitalismo y sus crisis, ¿qué tipo de crisis?

El capitalismo está hoy atravesando un momento de turbulencias estructurales. Para unos se trata de una crisis económica, para otros de una crisis financiera y, aún para algún otro autor, mas bien debería hablarse de una crisis global de sociedad. ¿Pueden tan diversas opiniones converger en sus análisis? No es tarea fácil ya que cada cual suele hablar desde su propia perspectiva académica, cuando no, incluso circunscrito a un determinado enfoque teórico. Además, la mayoría de los debates han girado en torno a la economía y la corriente principal de la ciencia económica, la teoría neoclásica, por su propia naturaleza es incapaz de aportar más claridad. Los supuestos en los que basa sus modelos y teorías, que tanto cientifismo le han conferido, impiden precisamente captar la dimensión del fenómeno. De ahí salen algunas recetas para intentar paliar nuestros males, como por ejemplo, la sugerencia de que si dejamos actuar a los mercados, su lógica va a conducir a reparar los desajustes que se han venido produciendo. Pero, ¿qué son los mercados? ¿se trata de algo mágico que actúa con finalidad propia y con un objetivo específico?