Leading indicator properties of US high-yield credit spreads

In this paper we examine the out-of-sample forecast performance of high-yield credit spreads regarding real-time and revised data on employment and industrial production in the US. We evaluate models using both a point forecast and a probability forecast exercise. Our main findings suggest the use of few factors obtained by pooling information from a number of sector-specific high-yield credit spreads. This can be justified by observing that, especially for employment, there is a gain from using a principal components model fitted to high-yield credit spreads compared to the prediction produced by benchmarks, such as an AR, and ARDL models that use either the term spread or the aggregate high-yield spread as exogenous regressor. Moreover, forecasts based on real-time data are generally comparable to forecasts based on revised data. JEL Classification: C22; C53; E32 Keywords: Credit spreads; Principal components; Forecasting; Real-time data.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

The Impact of Monetary Union on EU-15 Sovereign Debt Yield Spreads

With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries' sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the size of the market.

Chaotic dynamics in credit constrained emerging economies

This paper analyzes the role of financial development as a source of endogenous instability in small open economies. By assuming that firms face credit constraints, our model displays a complex dynamic behavior for intermediate values of the parameter representing the level of financial development of the economy. The basic implication of our model is that economies experiencing a process of financial development are more unstable than both very underdeveloped and very developed economies. Our instability concept means that small shocks have a persistent effect on the long run behavior of the model and also that economies can exhibit cycles with a very high period or even chaotic dynamic patterns.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

The Adoption of agricultural credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1935) : solidarity from below?

The spread of agrarian credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1934) was done under a variety of ideological and economic orientations. This article focuses on the construction of a few tools and indicators to explain the characteristics of agricultural credit cooperatives. An analysis of financial operations of rural savings banks is related with socio-political aspects that influenced their development; This analysis helps us to explain the relative success of German credit cooperative models adopted in the context of Spanish agriculture, as happened on European periphery.

Haar wavelets-based approach for quantifying credit portfolio losses

This paper proposes a new methodology to compute Value at Risk (VaR) for quantifying losses in credit portfolios. We approximate the cumulative distribution of the loss function by a finite combination of Haar wavelet basis functions and calculate the coefficients of the approximation by inverting its Laplace transform. The Wavelet Approximation (WA) method is specially suitable for non-smooth distributions, often arising in small or concentrated portfolios, when the hypothesis of the Basel II formulas are violated. To test the methodology we consider the Vasicek one-factor portfolio credit loss model as our model framework. WA is an accurate, robust and fast method, allowing to estimate VaR much more quickly than with a Monte Carlo (MC) method at the same level of accuracy and reliability.

Credit risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model: a fast wavelet expansion approximation

To measure the contribution of individual transactions inside the total risk of a credit portfolio is a major issue in financial institutions. VaR Contributions (VaRC) and Expected Shortfall Contributions (ESC) have become two popular ways of quantifying the risks. However, the usual Monte Carlo (MC) approach is known to be a very time consuming method for computing these risk contributions. In this paper we consider the Wavelet Approximation (WA) method for Value at Risk (VaR) computation presented in [Mas10] in order to calculate the Expected Shortfall (ES) and the risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model framework. We decompose the VaR and the ES as a sum of sensitivities representing the marginal impact on the total portfolio risk. Moreover, we present technical improvements in the Wavelet Approximation (WA) that considerably reduce the computational effort in the approximation while, at the same time, the accuracy increases.

Credit consulting : anàlisi de l'amortització anticipada de crèdits mitjançant el VAD

El projecte que he dut a terme és la implementació d'una pàgina web orientada a aquells usuaris que necessiten assessorament davant d'un crèdit bancari que ja posseeixen o que vulguin realitzar. Aquesta web financera té com a objectiu donar un cop de mà a tota aquella gent que té demanat un crèdit bancari a interès fixe i vol saber en un moment determinat si és convenient o no amortitzar anticipadament tenint en compte variables com: interès del mercat, penalització deguda a l'anticipació, la fiscalitat en el cas de les empreses, anys que queden per acabar de pagar el crèdit, sistema d'amortització financera utilitzat, etc.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.