Credit risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model: a fast wavelet expansion approximation

To measure the contribution of individual transactions inside the total risk of a credit portfolio is a major issue in financial institutions. VaR Contributions (VaRC) and Expected Shortfall Contributions (ESC) have become two popular ways of quantifying the risks. However, the usual Monte Carlo (MC) approach is known to be a very time consuming method for computing these risk contributions. In this paper we consider the Wavelet Approximation (WA) method for Value at Risk (VaR) computation presented in [Mas10] in order to calculate the Expected Shortfall (ES) and the risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model framework. We decompose the VaR and the ES as a sum of sensitivities representing the marginal impact on the total portfolio risk. Moreover, we present technical improvements in the Wavelet Approximation (WA) that considerably reduce the computational effort in the approximation while, at the same time, the accuracy increases.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet (II). The evolution of its structure

This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet

This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.

Towards a theory of the credit-risk balance sheet (II). The evolution of its structure

This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Cotton manufacturers as bankers: the textile trade and credit in spain, 1840-1913

[cat] La historiografia ha assenyalat que en el segle XIX el crèdit que els fabricants cotoners catalans oferien als seus clients era de caràcter informal i, per tant, impossible de ser transferit al sistema bancari. Això hauria tingut un efecte negatiu en la rendibilitat de les empreses cotoneres. A partir de l’anàlisi de diversos arxius empresarials, així com de fonts judicials i notarials, aquest treball confirma aquesta descripció dels fets però proposa una interpretació més optimista. Els fabricants feien de banquers dels seus clients perquè eren els millor situats per a exercir aquesta funció. Havien construït una bona estructura d’informació, gestionaven eficientment el risc creditici i obtenien beneficis d’aquesta activitat.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Cotton manufacturers as bankers: the textile trade and credit in spain, 1840-1913

[cat] La historiografia ha assenyalat que en el segle XIX el crèdit que els fabricants cotoners catalans oferien als seus clients era de caràcter informal i, per tant, impossible de ser transferit al sistema bancari. Això hauria tingut un efecte negatiu en la rendibilitat de les empreses cotoneres. A partir de l’anàlisi de diversos arxius empresarials, així com de fonts judicials i notarials, aquest treball confirma aquesta descripció dels fets però proposa una interpretació més optimista. Els fabricants feien de banquers dels seus clients perquè eren els millor situats per a exercir aquesta funció. Havien construït una bona estructura d’informació, gestionaven eficientment el risc creditici i obtenien beneficis d’aquesta activitat.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Solvencia en un Reaseguro Finite Risk

One of the characteristics of the finite risk reinsurance is the existence of an found of experience, which is constituted by the premiums charged by the reinsurer, together with his financial incomes, and his objective is to finance the claims to be satisfied to the insurer in the specified period. The objective of this work is to design a model that allows us to determinate the reserve that the found of experience should have in every annual period in order to guarantee its dynamic solvency, taking into the experience of the claims of the reinsurer"s portfolio and of each insurance company.

Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI

Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.

Market Index Biases and Minimum Risk Indices

Markets, in the real world, are not efficient zero-sum games where hypotheses of the CAPM are fulfilled. Then, it is easy to conclude the market portfolio is not located on Markowitz"s efficient frontier, and passive investments (and indexing) are not optimal but biased. In this paper, we define and analyze biases suffered by passive investors: the sample, construction, efficiency and active biases and tracking error are presented. We propose Minimum Risk Indices (MRI) as an alternative to deal with to market index biases, and to provide investors with portfolios closer to the efficient frontier, that is, more optimal investment possibilities. MRI (using a Parametric Value-at-Risk Minimization approach) are calculated for three stock markets achieving interesting results. Our indices are less risky and more profitable than current Market Indices in the Argentinean and Spanish markets, facing that way the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Two innovations must be outlined: an error dimension has been included in the backtesting and the Sharpe"s Ratio has been used to select the"best" MRI