The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Valoración de credit default swaps: una aplicación del modelo de Hull-White al mercado español

En este trabajo se presenta una aplicación empírica del modelo de Hull-White (2000) al mercado de renta fija español. Este modelo proporciona la expresión por el cálculo de los pagos hechos por el comprador de un credit default swap (CDS), bajo la hipótesis de que no existe riesgo de contrapartida. Se supone, además, que la curva cupón cero, la tasa de recuperación constante y el momento del suceso de crédito son independientes. Se utilizan bonos del Banco Santander Central Hispano para mesurar la probabilidad neutra al riesgo de quiebra y, bajo hipótesis de no arbitraje, se calculan las primas de un CDS, por un bono subyacente con la misma calificación crediticia que la entidad de referencia. Se observa que las primas se ajustan bien a los spreads crediticios del mercado, que se acostumbran a utilizar como alternativa a las mismas.

Chaotic dynamics in credit constrained emerging economies

This paper analyzes the role of financial development as a source of endogenous instability in small open economies. By assuming that firms face credit constraints, our model displays a complex dynamic behavior for intermediate values of the parameter representing the level of financial development of the economy. The basic implication of our model is that economies experiencing a process of financial development are more unstable than both very underdeveloped and very developed economies. Our instability concept means that small shocks have a persistent effect on the long run behavior of the model and also that economies can exhibit cycles with a very high period or even chaotic dynamic patterns.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

The Adoption of agricultural credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1935) : solidarity from below?

The spread of agrarian credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1934) was done under a variety of ideological and economic orientations. This article focuses on the construction of a few tools and indicators to explain the characteristics of agricultural credit cooperatives. An analysis of financial operations of rural savings banks is related with socio-political aspects that influenced their development; This analysis helps us to explain the relative success of German credit cooperative models adopted in the context of Spanish agriculture, as happened on European periphery.

Leading indicator properties of US high-yield credit spreads

In this paper we examine the out-of-sample forecast performance of high-yield credit spreads regarding real-time and revised data on employment and industrial production in the US. We evaluate models using both a point forecast and a probability forecast exercise. Our main findings suggest the use of few factors obtained by pooling information from a number of sector-specific high-yield credit spreads. This can be justified by observing that, especially for employment, there is a gain from using a principal components model fitted to high-yield credit spreads compared to the prediction produced by benchmarks, such as an AR, and ARDL models that use either the term spread or the aggregate high-yield spread as exogenous regressor. Moreover, forecasts based on real-time data are generally comparable to forecasts based on revised data. JEL Classification: C22; C53; E32 Keywords: Credit spreads; Principal components; Forecasting; Real-time data.

Haar wavelets-based approach for quantifying credit portfolio losses

This paper proposes a new methodology to compute Value at Risk (VaR) for quantifying losses in credit portfolios. We approximate the cumulative distribution of the loss function by a finite combination of Haar wavelet basis functions and calculate the coefficients of the approximation by inverting its Laplace transform. The Wavelet Approximation (WA) method is specially suitable for non-smooth distributions, often arising in small or concentrated portfolios, when the hypothesis of the Basel II formulas are violated. To test the methodology we consider the Vasicek one-factor portfolio credit loss model as our model framework. WA is an accurate, robust and fast method, allowing to estimate VaR much more quickly than with a Monte Carlo (MC) method at the same level of accuracy and reliability.

Credit risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model: a fast wavelet expansion approximation

To measure the contribution of individual transactions inside the total risk of a credit portfolio is a major issue in financial institutions. VaR Contributions (VaRC) and Expected Shortfall Contributions (ESC) have become two popular ways of quantifying the risks. However, the usual Monte Carlo (MC) approach is known to be a very time consuming method for computing these risk contributions. In this paper we consider the Wavelet Approximation (WA) method for Value at Risk (VaR) computation presented in [Mas10] in order to calculate the Expected Shortfall (ES) and the risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model framework. We decompose the VaR and the ES as a sum of sensitivities representing the marginal impact on the total portfolio risk. Moreover, we present technical improvements in the Wavelet Approximation (WA) that considerably reduce the computational effort in the approximation while, at the same time, the accuracy increases.

Credit consulting : anàlisi de l'amortització anticipada de crèdits mitjançant el VAD

El projecte que he dut a terme és la implementació d'una pàgina web orientada a aquells usuaris que necessiten assessorament davant d'un crèdit bancari que ja posseeixen o que vulguin realitzar. Aquesta web financera té com a objectiu donar un cop de mà a tota aquella gent que té demanat un crèdit bancari a interès fixe i vol saber en un moment determinat si és convenient o no amortitzar anticipadament tenint en compte variables com: interès del mercat, penalització deguda a l'anticipació, la fiscalitat en el cas de les empreses, anys que queden per acabar de pagar el crèdit, sistema d'amortització financera utilitzat, etc.

Conflicto de intereses: agencias de rating, reguladores, países y empresas

Les agencies de qualificació de riscos son una peça fonamental en el engranatge del sistema financer internacional. Arreu de la crisi financera es detecten conflictes d’interès entre aquestes i la resta de agents econòmics, generat per un canvi en el model de cobro. El document explica com s’ha generat aquest problema, la resposta del mercat i de les pròpies agencies de rating i exposa també les noves propostes regulatòries per a corregir-lo.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.