The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Inflation and factor shares

We use results from the literature on the determinants of price-cost margins to derive an equation relating labor's share of national income to the inflation rate (as well as to the output gap, the unemployment rate and the capital stock per worker). The equation is tested with a panel of 15 OECD countries. We obtain a robust positive relationship between inflation and the labor share. Our results suggest that disinflation is not distributively neutral, provide empirical support for the distinct concern about price stability shown by trade unions and employers' organizations, and help explaining the negative impact of inflation on growth.

Smith and Rawls share a room

We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems.

The Total fiscal cost of indirect taxation: an approximation using Catalonia's recent input-output table

In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.

Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures

We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).

Sleep 4 less

Treball de recerca realitzat per alumnes d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. Aquest treball es tracta en la creació d’un projecte empresarial, és a dir, d’una planificació estratègica que afecta a tots els àmbits de la empresa al llarg d’un període de temps i que té per objectiu analitzar la viabilitat, examinar els objectius i descobrir els inconvenients del mateix. En concret s’ha projectat és un hostal ‘low cost’. Alhora de comprovar la viabilitat del projecte, s’han hagut de realitzar els tests corresponents per saber si tindria èxit o no. I tots han demostrat un resultat factible, ja que, encara que van sorgir problemes amb l’acceptació d’aquest nou estil, concretament en el fet d’haver de compartir habitació amb altres persones, al poder oferir altres tipus d’habitacions i en el cas de compartir habitació donar molta seguretat, els anàlisis ens han donat uns resultats acceptables. S’han realitzat també quadres financers, préstecs, calculat les despeses d’inici d’empresa i de manteniment, publicitat, despeses de personal, i finalment aquest també han donat un resultat de viabilitat positiu.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population

Pensions together with savings and investments during active life are key elements of retirement planning. Motivation for personal choices about the standard of living, bequest and the replacement ratio of pension with respect to last salary income must be considered. This research contributes to the financial planning by helping to quantify long-term care economic needs. We estimate life expectancy from retirement age onwards. The economic cost of care per unit of service is linked to the expected time of needed care and the intensity of required services. The expected individual cost of long-term care from an onset of dependence is estimated separately for men and women. Assumptions on the mortality of the dependent people compared to the general population are introduced. Parameters defining eligibility for various forms of coverage by the universal public social care of the welfare system are addressed. The impact of the intensity of social services on individual predictions is assessed, and a partial coverage by standard private insurance products is also explored. Data were collected by the Spanish Institute of Statistics in two surveys conducted on the general Spanish population in 1999 and in 2008. Official mortality records and life table trends were used to create realistic scenarios for longevity. We find empirical evidence that the public long-term care system in Spain effectively mitigates the risk of incurring huge lifetime costs. We also find that the most vulnerable categories are citizens with moderate disabilities that do not qualify to obtain public social care support. In the Spanish case, the trends between 1999 and 2008 need to be further explored.

The Wage-Productivity gap revisited: is the labour share neutral to employment?

This paper challenges the prevailing view of the neutrality of the labour income share to labour demand, and investigates its impact on the evolution of employment. Whilst maintaining the assumption of a unitary long-run elasticity of wages with respect to productivity, we demonstrate that productivity growth affects the labour share in the long run due to frictional growth (that is, the interplay of wage dynamics and productivity growth). In the light of this result, we consider a stylised labour demand equation and show that the labour share is a driving force of employment. We substantiate our analytical exposition by providing empirical models of wage setting and employment equations for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US over the 1960-2008 period. Our findings show that the timevarying labour share of these countries has significantly influenced their employment trajectories across decades. This indicates that the evolution of the labour income share (or, equivalently, the wage-productivity gap) deserves the attention of policy makers.

Series enlazadas de empleo asalariado y rentas del trabajo regionales (RegDat versión 2.2)

I construct "homogeneous" series of salaried employment, employee compensation and total labor income for Spain and its regions covering the period 1955-2008. I also estimate labor's share in regional and national GVA and construct an indicator of the average cost of labor including both employees and non-salaried workers.

The Complementarity between segment disclosure and earnings quality, and its effect on cost of capital

We investigate the role of earnings quality in determining the levels of segment disclosure, and whether and how better quality earnings and segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Using a large US sample for the period 2001-2006, we find a positive relation between earnings quality and levels of segment disclosures. We also find that firms providing better quality segment information, contingent upon good earnings quality, enjoy lower cost of capital. We base our empirical tests on a self created index of segment disclosure. Our results contribute to a better understanding of (1) the incentives for providing segment disclosures, and (2) how accounting quality (quality of segment information and earnings quality) is related to the cost of capital.

An empirical analysis of a merger between a network and low-cost airlines

We use a difference-in-difference estimator to examine the effects of a merger involving three airlines. The novelty lies in the examination of this operation in two distinct scenarios: (1) on routes where two low-cost carriers and (2) on routes where a network and one of the low-cost airlines had previously been competing. We report a reduction in frequencies but no substantial effect on prices in the first scenario, while in the second we report an increase in prices but no substantial effect on frequencies. These results may be attributed to the differences in passenger types flying on these routes.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.