Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Development of a population-based cost-effectiveness model of chronic graft versus host disease in Spain

Chronic graft-versus-host disease (cGvHD) is the leading cause of late nonrelapse mortality (transplant-related mortality) after hematopoietic stem cell transplant. Given that there are a wide range of treatment options for cGvHD, assessment of the associated costs and efficacy can help clinicians and health care providers allocate health care resources more efficiently. OBJECTIVE: The purpose of this study was to assess the cost-effectiveness of extracorporeal photopheresis (ECP) compared with rituximab (Rmb) and with imatinib (Imt) in patients with cGvHD at 5 years from the perspective of the Spanish National Health System. METHODS: The model assessed the incremental cost-effectiveness/utility ratio of ECP versus Rmb or Imt for 1000 hypothetical patients by using microsimulation cost-effectiveness techniques. Model probabilities were obtained from the literature. Treatment pathways and adverse events were evaluated taking clinical opinion and published reports into consideration. Local data on costs (2010 Euros) and health care resources utilization were validated by the clinical authors. Probabilistic sensitivity analyses were used to assess the robustness of the model. RESULTS: The greater efficacy of ECP resulted in a gain of 0.011 to 0.024 quality-adjusted life-year in the first year and 0.062 to 0.094 at year 5 compared with Rmb or Imt. The results showed that the higher acquisition cost of ECP versus Imt was compensated for at 9 months by greater efficacy; this higher cost was partially compensated for ( 517) by year 5 versus Rmb. After 9 months, ECP was dominant (cheaper and more effective) compared with Imt. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of ECP versus Rmb was 29,646 per life-year gained and 24,442 per quality-adjusted life-year gained at year 2.5. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis confirmed the results. The main study limitation was that to assess relative treatment effects, only small studies were available for indirect comparison. CONCLUSION: ECP as a third-line therapy for cGvHD is a more cost-effective strategy than Rmb or Imt.

An alternative way to model merit good arguments

Besley (1988) uses a scaling approach to model merit good arguments in commodity tax policy. In this paper, I question this approach on the grounds that it produces 'wrong' recommendations--taxation (subsidisation) of merit (demerit) goods--whenever the demand for the (de)merit good is inelastic. I propose an alternative approach that does not suffer from this deficiency, and derive the ensuing first and second best tax rules, as well as the marginal cost expressions to perform tax reform analysis.

A Multisectorial model of prices: the SAM approach

Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) are normally used to analyse the income generation process. They are also useful, however, for analysing the cost transmission and price formation mechanisms. For price contributions, Roland-Holst and Sancho (1995) used the SAM structure to analyse the price and cost linkages through a representation of the interdependence between activities, households and factors. This paper is a further analysis of the cost transmission mechanisms, in which I add the capital account to the endogenous components of the Roland-Holst and Sancho approach. By doing this I reflect the responses of prices to the exogenous shocks in savings and investment. I also present an additive decomposition of the global price effects into categories of interdependence that isolates the impact on price levels of shocks in the capital account. I use a 1994 Social Accounting Matrix to make an empirical application of the Catalan economy. Keywords: social accounting matrix, cost linkages, price transmission, capital account. JEL Classification: C63, C69, D59.

The Total fiscal cost of indirect taxation: an approximation using Catalonia's recent input-output table

In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Air services on thin routes: Regional versus low-cost airlines

An examination of the impact in the US and EU markets of two major innovations in the provision of air services on thin routes - regional jet technology and the low-cost business model - reveals significant differences. In the US, regional airlines monopolize a high proportion of thin routes, whereas low-cost carriers are dominant on these routes in Europe. Our results have different implications for business and leisure travelers, given that regional services provide a higher frequency of flights (at the expense of higher fares), while low-cost services offer lower fares (at the expense of lower flight frequencies). Keywords: air transportation; regional jet technology; low-cost business model; thin markets. JEL Classification Numbers: L13; L2; L93.

Cost del tractament del SIDA i d'Hepatitis C per a l'Estat : Comparació de la despesa d'una persona en llibertat vs. un pres

Un dels principals motius que ens va impulsar en l’elecció del tema és que es tracta d’untema que pot despertar curiositat entre la població.Un altre motiu, es que varem trobar que està íntimament relacionat amb els estudis queestem cursant, donat que afecta als pressupostos de l’estat i a la seva restricciópressupostària, i per tant, està directament relacionat amb la macroeconomia. En el nostrecas, reduirem l’àmbit d’estudi al territori català, de manera que estudiarem aquestes duesmalalties dins la despesa en sanitat pública catalana. A demés, estan finançades amb elsnostres impostos, i per tant la seva despesa afecta a la restricció pressupostària delsciutadans.L’elecció d’aquestes malalties no ha estat feta a l’atzar. Inicialment, varem pensar enestudiar els costos dels interns penitenciaris que patien aquestes malalties. Com que laSIDA i d’hepatitis C són les malalties més freqüents dins la presó, i les que tenen unscostos més característics donada la complexitat dels seus tractaments, varem pensar queserien prou representatives.No obstant, a mesura que ens anàvem endinsant en el tema, ens varem adonar que tambéseria molt interessant comparar el cost de les malalties amb el de les persones no recluses, iesbrinar si hi havia algun tipus de cost diferencial. És per això que varem decidir analitzaraquestes dues malalties tant dins com fora.Un altre factor que ens ha impulsat en l’elecció del tema és el fet que el nombre d’interns ales presons té un ritme de creixement constant que s’ha accelerat en els últims anys,sobretot degut a l’augment de la immigració. Això implica un augment progressiu de ladespesa, que es tradueix en una necessitat d’ingressos majors per tal de poder equilibrar larestricció de la qual parlàvem abans.També varem voler anar una mica més lluny i analitzar el pes d’aquestes malalties dins dela despesa que la generalitat ha establert per a la sanitat pública. Com les dues son MDO (malalties de declaració obligatòria ) estan finançades completament pel sector públic.L’objectiu era veure si representaven un cost tant elevat com pensàvem.OBJECTIUS DEL TREBALL:· Demostrar l’elevat cost que suposen certes malalties per l’estat.· Manifestar els canvis en el cost de les malalties amb l’evolució delstractaments.· Analitzar els costos sanitaris extres que es produeixen a les presons.· Destacar l’augment accelerat del nombre d’interns i l’augment del cost sanitarique això suposa. METODOLOGIA: Per tal de poder realitzar l’estudi comparatiu, hem hagut de calcular manualment els costosde les malalties, tot informant-nos del preu dels medicament, les dosis, el cost de lesconsultes externes,etc. A més, per a calcular el cost del tractament dins la presó, ens hemhagut d’informar dels aspectes més generals que envolten a un pres, per poder veure sirealment existeix un cost diferencial respecte la malaltia a l’exterior. Per obtenir aquestesdiverses informacions, ens hem hagut de posar en contacte amb el personal que treballa ala presó que hem pres com a model d’estudi.Així, podem dividir les nostres fonts d’informació en 3 categories:• Obtenció d’informació directament amb el personal de la presó:– Entrevista amb la directora d’infermeria de la Secretaria de ServeisPenitenciaris, Rehabilitació i Justícia Juvenil– Entrevista amb la Cap d’infermeria del Centre Quatre Camins.• Informació a partir de mostres facilitades pels propis funcionaris de la presó• Informació a partir d’estudis sobre el tema i de dades oficials, concretament lesdades oficials sobre els Pressupostos de la Generalitat.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Calibration of stochastic volatility models via second order approximation: the Heston model case

Using a suitable Hull and White type formula we develop a methodology to obtain asecond order approximation to the implied volatility for very short maturities. Using thisapproximation we accurately calibrate the full set of parameters of the Heston model. Oneof the reasons that makes our calibration for short maturities so accurate is that we alsotake into account the term-structure for large maturities. We may say that calibration isnot "memoryless", in the sense that the option's behavior far away from maturity doesinfluence calibration when the option gets close to expiration. Our results provide a wayto perform a quick calibration of a closed-form approximation to vanilla options that canthen be used to price exotic derivatives. The methodology is simple, accurate, fast, andit requires a minimal computational cost.

Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims haveheterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care bythe injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observeat all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-bestcannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on thefirst-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-bestsolution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as duecare. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing theoptimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannotverify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is nodifference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and arule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate thefindings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Lawlegal systems.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).