Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

Libertad contractual y pactos parasociales

L'objecte del present treball és doble. D'una banda tractem d'examinar la naturalesa dels pactes parasocials com una manifestació del principi de llibertat contractual i, per tant, de l'autonomia de la voluntat i, d'una altra, analitzar la conflictivitat que tals pactes estan provocant en relació amb el dret de societats. En tant que tals pactes, quan es perfeccionen entre tots els socis, constituïxen, junt amb els estatuts, el verdader contingut contractual de la societat, en especial quan es tracta de societats tancades, resulta un element d'incertesa que la seua operativitat quede en dubte com ocorre en la pràctica. Pensem en la importància que un pacte parasocial representa per a la protecció dels interessos de les minories i el sentiment de fracàs que es genera quan, pretenent aplicar allò que s'ha pactat per a preservar tals drets, no resulten operatius en tot allò que no haja resultat incorporat als estatuts socials, com a conseqüència de l'existència de dos categories d'obligacions contractuals: unes que, subjectes al dret de societats, representen uns drets i obligacions de categoria superior, que aquelles incloses en els pactes parasocials, que se subjecten al dret contractual. Per això, al final del treball, s'apunta la conveniència de, en la línia iniciada pel legislador quant a la regulació dels protocols familiars, normativitzar el tractament de tals pactes parasocials quan es tracte de defendre els drets de les minories socials. Finalment, la tendència legislativa de resoldre la problemàtica de la dicotomía, dret contractual versus dret societari, suscita una esperança amb el projecte de llei de modificació de la llei 60/2003 de arbitratge, en tramitació parlamentària en estos moments, on es contempla la possibilitat de sotmetre a arbitratge la impugnació d'acords socials.

Doctors without borders: The returns to an occupational license for Soviet immigrant physicians in Israel

Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders arewidespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupationallicense using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated toIsrael. An immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the IsraelMinistry of Health provides an exogenous source of variation inre-licensing outcomes. Instrumental variables and quantile treatmenteffects estimates of the returns to an occupational license indicate excesswages due to occupational entry restrictions and negative selectioninto licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license acquisitionwhich suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians in thenonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrantsface in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower averagequality of service. However, the positive earnings effect of entry restrictionsfar outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings effect that licensinginduces.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Gender inequalities in occupational health related to the unequal distribution of working and employment conditions: a systematic review

Gender inequalities exist in work life, but little is known about their presence in relation to factors examined in occupation health settings. The aim of this study was to identify and summarize the working and employment conditions described as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health in studies related to occupational health published between 1999 and 2010. A systematic literature review was undertaken of studies available in MEDLINE, EMBASE, Sociological Abstracts, LILACS, EconLit and CINAHL between 1999 and 2010. Epidemiologic studies were selected by applying a set of inclusion criteria to the title, abstract, and complete text. The quality of the studies was also assessed. Selected studies were qualitatively analysed, resulting in a compilation of all differences between women and men in the prevalence of exposure to working and employment conditions and work-related health problems as outcomes. Most of the 30 studies included were conducted in Europe (n=19) and had a cross-sectional design (n=24). The most common topic analysed was related to the exposure to work-related psychosocial hazards (n=8). Employed women had more job insecurity, lower control, worse contractual working conditions and poorer self-perceived physical and mental health than men did. Conversely, employed men had a higher degree of physically demanding work, lower support, higher levels of effort-reward imbalance, higher job status, were more exposed to noise and worked longer hours than women did. This systematic review has identified a set of working and employment conditions as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health from the occupational health literature. These results may be useful to policy makers seeking to reduce gender inequalities in occupational health, and to researchers wishing to analyse these determinants in greater depth.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs. contractual innovation

We model the effect of contract standardization on the development of markets andthe law. In a setting in which biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we findthat the introduction of a standard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative toreliance on precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade,but ii) it crowds out the use of open-ended contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shedlight on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth centuryin many countries (even common-law ones) during a period of booming commerce andlong-distance trade.

Sharing Open Source License and Copyright Data with SPDX

Organizations across the globe are creating and distributing products that include open source software. To ensure compliance with the open source licenses, each company needs to evaluate exactly what open source licenses and copyrights are included - resulting in duplicated effort and redundancy. This talk will provide an overview of a new Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) specification. This specification will provide a common format to share information about the open source licenses and copyrights that are included in any software package, with the goal of saving time and improving data accuracy. This talk will review the progress of the initiative; discuss the benefits to organizations using open source and share information on how you can contribute.

FOSS License Selection and Code Management

With nearly 2,000 free and open source software (FLOSS) licenses, software license proliferation¿ can be a major headache for software development organizations trying to speed development through software component reuse, as well as companies redistributing software packages as components of their products. Scope is one problem: from the Free Beer license to the GPL family of licenses to platform-specific licenses such as Apache and Eclipse, the number and variety of licenses make it difficult for companies to ¿do the right thing¿ with respect to the software components in their products and applications. In addition to the sheer number of licenses, each license carries within it the author¿s specific definition of how the software can be used and re-used. Permissive licenses like BSD and MIT make it easy; software can be redistributed and developers can modify code without the requirement of making changes publicly available. Reciprocal licenses, on the other hand, place varying restrictions on re-use and redistribution. Woe to the developer who snags a bit of code after a simple web search without understanding the ramifications of license restrictions.

GPL license compliance

The enormous success of Linux in the consumer electronics industry has unfortunately led to a dramatic increase in license violations in devices. In this talk we will shortly look at the backgrounds of these violations, tooling to help uncover violations and what is needed to prevent future violations from happening.

The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States

Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect stand alone versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation.