Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Debt enforcement and relational contracting

We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance ofrelational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeatedcredit relationships in which borrowers can default. In the weak enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In the strong enforcement treatmentdefaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewerrelationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships doemerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findingssuggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of thirdpartydebt enforcement.

Contracting externalities and multiple equilibria in sectors: Theory and evidence

We consider an economy where the production technology has constantreturns to scale but where in the descentralized equilibrium thereare aggregate increasing returns to scale. The result follows froma positive contracting externality among firms. If a firms issurrounded by more firms, employees have more opportunitiesoutside their own firm. This improves employees' incentives toinvest in the presence of ex post renegotiation at the firm level,at not cost. Our leading result is that if a region is sparselypopulated or if the degree of development in the region is lowenough, there are multiple equilibria in the level of sectorialemployment. From the theoretical model we derive a non-linearfirst-order censored difference equation for sectoral employment.Our results are strongly consistent with the multiple equilibriahypothesis and the existence of a sectoral critical scale (belowwich the sector follows a delocation process). The scale of theregions' population and the degree of development reduce thecritical scale of the sector.

Reinventar la metròpoli: Barcelona i el model de la Greater London Authority

La dècada de 1980 va significar un punt i a part per als governs metropolitans. Després de viure una època daurada durant els 60 i 70, la reestructuració del sistema politicoeconòmic va comportar que les estructures de govern metropolità fossin qüestionades i fins i tot suprimides. Quan tot semblava indicar que restarien només com a record, la lògica de competència entre grans ciutats i la necessitat de reinventar-se en base a un desenvolupament sostenible va suposar un inesperat renaixement de la política metropolitana. Si fins aleshores la seva necessitat s'havia justificat bàsicament des d'un punt de vista funcional, seguint pautes tecnòcrates i burocratitzades, la nova metropolítica se centra en la competitivitat i en la sostenibilitat, alhora que posa èmfasi en assajar mètodes de governança. Londres, ciutat que presenta certs paral·lelismes històrics amb Barcelona, ha estat una ciutat pionera i de la seva experiència es pot aprendre per la capital catalana

Contracting with free software communities

Industry and large Agencies needs ¿agile¿ programming resources, to reinforce their own development staff and take advantage of innovative approaches produced by ¿fresh minds¿ all over the world. At the same time they may be reluctant to engage in classical software development call for tenders and contracts. Such contracts are often ¿trusted¿ by large ICT firms, which will deliver according to their own rigid frameworks (often based on alliances with proprietary software vendors), may propose comfortable quality assurances, but will cover their (real) risks and liability with high contingency costs and will charge for any change request in case the original specifications have not fixed all possible issues. Introducing FLOSS in business implies a new contracting philosophy, based on incentives rather than penalties and liability. Based on 2011 experience with a large Space Agency, Patrice-Emmanuel Schmitz pictures the needed legal instruments for a novel approach.