Internet Banking in Europe: a comparative analysis

A key strategic issue for banks is the implementation of internet banking. The ‘click and mortar’ model that complements classical branch banking with online facilities is competing with pure internet banks. The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of these two models across countries, so as to examine the role of differences in the banking system and technological progress. A fuzzy cluster analysis on the performance of banks in Finland, Spain, Italy and the UK shows that internet banks are hard to distinguish from banks that follow a click and mortar strategy; country borders are more important. We therefore explain bank performance by a group of selected bank features, country-specific economic and IT indicators over the period 1995-2004. We find that the strategy of banking groups to incorporate internet banks reflects some competitive edge that these banks have in their business models. Extensive technological innovation boosts internet banking.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Clúster creatius en entorns urbans: 22@Bcn i Shoreditch East London

La localització de les empreses de nova economia en zones urbanes, a pesar que el factor distància no sigui important, no deixa de ser considerable pels seus avantatges que els suposa estar situades conjuntament en relació amb les infraestructures, consum, beneficis socioculturals, i facilitat en les transaccions cara a cara. És inevitable que el primer quart del segle vint-i-un estigui lligat a l’economia creativa de forma similar amb que el començament del segle vint estava íntimament lligat a l’economia industrial i la invenció del sistema de producció en massa. La ciutat també va jugar un dels papers més importants per al desenvolupament de “la nova economia industrial” a les albors del segle vint, com ho és la ciutat del coneixement que acull “la nova economia creativa” al segle vint-i-un. És evident que els resultats morfològics, socials, econòmics i urbans són ben diferents en ambdós fenòmens, però l’impacte a les ciutats és molt gran. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és analitzar els mecanismes d’aglomeració (clustering) d’activitats competitives basades en creació de coneixement i de serveis avançats que estan al darrera de desenvolupaments punters a ciutats com Barcelona, el projecte 22@bcn, i East London, el projecte Shoreditch. L’esforç que han posat les autoritats locals en crear l’entorn apropiat per atreure i crear empreses innovadores, com a motor de desenvolupament d’algunes ciutats modernes europees ha resultat en el sorgiment de nuclis o centres urbans molt dinàmics que suposadament estan preparats i acullen punts de creació de coneixement (“Urban Knowledge Hubs”), amb una demanda i llocs de treball altament qualificats. Aquest és el cas dels projectes de Barcelona (22@bcn) i East London (Shoreditch).

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Product differentiation, competitive pressure and the effects of innovation on the success and survivability of firms in oligopoly markets

In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Admission Control for TCP Flows Using Packet Classes and Edge-to-edge Measurements of Aggregates

TCP flows from applications such as the web or ftp are well supported by a Guaranteed Minimum Throughput Service (GMTS), which provides a minimum network throughput to the flow and, if possible, an extra throughput. We propose a scheme for a GMTS using Admission Control (AC) that is able to provide different minimum throughput to different users and that is suitable for "standard" TCP flows. Moreover, we consider a multidomain scenario where the scheme is used in one of the domains, and we propose some mechanisms for the interconnection with neighbor domains. The whole scheme uses a small set of packet classes in a core-stateless network where each class has a different discarding priority in queues assigned to it. The AC method involves only edge nodes and uses a special probing packet flow (marked as the highest discarding priority class) that is sent continuously from ingress to egress through a path. The available throughput in the path is obtained at the egress using measurements of flow aggregates, and then it is sent back to the ingress. At the ingress each flow is detected using an implicit way and then it is admission controlled. If it is accepted, it receives the GMTS and its packets are marked as the lowest discarding priority classes; otherwise, it receives a best-effort service. The scheme is evaluated through simulation in a simple "bottleneck" topology using different traffic loads consisting of "standard" TCP flows that carry files of varying sizes

Edge detection by selection of pieces of level lines

We propose an edge detector based on the selection of wellcontrasted pieces of level lines, following the proposal ofDesolneux-Moisan-Morel (DMM) [1]. The DMM edge detectorhas the problem of over-representation, that is, everyedge is detected several times in slightly different positions.In this paper we propose two modifications of the originalDMM edge detector in order to solve this problem. The firstmodification is a post-processing of the output using a generalmethod to select the best representative of a bundle of curves.The second modification is the use of Canny’s edge detectorinstead of the norm of the gradient to build the statistics. Thetwo modifications are independent and can be applied separately.Elementary reasoning and some experiments showthat the best results are obtained when both modifications areapplied together.

Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models: formulations and heuristics

In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum Capture Problem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lower traveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time will affect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques. Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

Competitive location and pricing on networks

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firms seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximizes profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presentedto solve the model together with computational experience.

Location of hubs in a competitive environment

We offer a formulation that locates hubs on a network in a competitiveenvironment; that is, customer capture is sought, which happenswhenever the location of a new hub results in a reduction of thecurrent cost (time, distance) needed by the traffic that goes from thespecified origin to the specified destination.The formulation presented here reduces the number of variables andconstraints as compared to existing covering models. This model issuited for both air passenger and cargo transportation.In this model, each origin-destination flow can go through either oneor two hubs, and each demand point can be assigned to more than a hub,depending on the different destinations of its traffic. Links(``spokes'' have no capacity limit. Computational experience is provided.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.