The Emergence and Governance of Euroregions: The Case of the Euregio on the Dutch-German Border

Amb una història que data de la dècada de 1950, la EUREGIO és un de les més antigues euroregions a Europa. Es pot considerar com un cas exitós d'una regió transfronterera (CBR) en el sentit que s'ha establert fermament com una agència de fronteres dins del seu tram de la frontera holandesa-alemanya. L'EUREGIO també ha estat una de les protagonistes principals darrere de l'Associació de Regions Frontereres Europees (ARFE), que en les últimes dècades va actuar per difondre el model d'euroregió a tot el territori europeu. Aquest capítol té diversos objectius. En primer lloc, es presenta el cas de la EUREGIO i presenta evidència sobre la seva història, estructura orgànica i polítiques. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les condicions del context en què la EUREGIO ha sorgit i les estructures de govern que es van crear com a resultat. Es fa especial èmfasi en la posició i el paper de l'Euroregió en el context més ampli del marc de governança europea multinivell generat per la política de cohesió de la UE. El capítol conclou amb un intent d'avaluar l'èxit i l'impacte de la EUREGIO i una discussió dels reptes relacionats amb la doble funció de l'EUREGIO com a representant dels interessos de les autoritats locals i les agències de cohesió de la UE posada en pràctica de les polítiques.

Collaboration strategies and technological innovation: a contractual perspective of the relationship between firms and techonological centers

In this paper, a theoretical framework for analyzing the selection of governance structures for implementing collaboration agreements between firms and Technological Centers is presented and empirically discussed. This framework includes Transaction Costs and Property Rights’ theoretical assumptions, though complemented with several proposals coming from the Transactional Value Theory. This last theory is used for adding some dynamism in the governance structure selection. As empirical evidence of this theoretical explanation, we analyse four real experiences of collaboration between firms and one Technological Center. These experiences are aimed to represent the typology of relationships which Technological Centers usually face. Among others, a key interesting result is obtained: R&D collaboration activities do not need to always be organized through hierarchical solutions. In those cases where future expected benefits and/or reputation issues could play an important role, the traditional more static theories could not fully explain the selected governance structure for managing the R&D relationship. As a consequence, these results justify further research about the adequacy of the theoretical framework presented in this paper in other contexts, for example, R&D collaborations between firms and/or between Universities or Public Research Centers and firms.

Environmental Regulations in the Hog Farming Sector: A Comparison of Catalonia, Spain and Manitoba, Canada

This article examines the governance structures for managing the location and operation of Intensive Livestock Farming Operations (ILFOs). The article focuses on the hog sector and compares two very different jurisdictions: the Province of Manitoba, Canada and the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, Spain. Both are regions that have witnessed recent increases in hog production, including increasing spatial concentration of ILFOs and increasing size of those ILFOs. Policy has both fostered and sought to manage the increased production. Following a brief background description of restructuring, the changing legislative framework for Manitoba and Catalonia are described. Keywords: environmental regulations, hog farms, manure management, animal feeding operations. JEL: Q15, Q58, R52, O57

International regimes as knowledge syndicates? Energy and trends of global governance

El poder de l'Estat i la sobirania tradicional s'està deteriorant de manera constant, sobretot en termes de la provisió de certs béns públics fonamentals. Els Estats, en particular, són incapaços de manejar el coneixement i la informació que és essencial per mantenir la competitivitat i la sostenibilitat en una economia interdependent. Estructures fiables de la governança mundial i la cooperació internacional estan lluny de ser establertes. Energia com a problema a les agendes p dels governs, les empreses privades i la societat civil és un exemple manifest d'aquesta dinàmica.. L'actual sistema de governança mundial d'energia implica accions polítiques disperses per actors divers. L'Agència Internacional de l'Energia té un paper destacat, però està debilitat per la seva composició limitada i basada en el coneixement- epistèmic en lloc del material o executiu. Aquest treball sosté que ni la mida ni nombre de membres disponibles estan dificultant la governabilitat mundial d'energia. Més aviat, l'energia és una sèrie de béns públics que es troben als llimbs, on els estats no poden pagar la seva disposició, així com els diversos interessos impedir l'establiment d'una autoritat internacional. Després de la introducció de la teoria del règim internacional i el concepte de coneixement basats en les comunitats epistèmiques, l'article revisa l'estat actual de la governabilitat de l'energia mundia. A continuació es presenta una comparació d'aquesta estructura amb els règims de govern nacional i regional, d'una banda, i amb règims globals ambientals i de salut, de l'altra

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Mixed Hodge structures and vector bundles on the projective Plane I

We describe an equivalence of categories between the category of mixed Hodge structures and a category of vector bundles on the toric complex projective plane which verify some semistability condition. We then apply this correspondence to define an invariant which generalises the notion of R-split mixed Hodge structure and compute extensions in the category of mixed Hodge structures in terms of extensions of the corresponding vector bundles. We also give a relative version of this correspondence and apply it to define stratifications of the bases of the variations of mixed Hodge structure.

The complexity of random ordered structures

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Model structures on the category of small double categories

In this paper we obtain several model structures on DblCat, the category of small double categories. Our model structures have three sources. We first transfer across a categorification-nerve adjunction. Secondly, we view double categories as internal categories in Cat and take as our weak equivalences various internal equivalences defined via Grothendieck topologies. Thirdly, DblCat inherits a model structure as a category of algebras over a 2-monad. Some of these model structures coincide and the different points of view give us further results about cofibrant replacements and cofi brant objects. As part of this program we give explicit descriptions and discuss properties of free double categories, quotient double categories, colimits of double categories, and several nerves and categorifications.

Formal deformations of Poisson structures in low dimensions

In this paper, we study formal deformations of Poisson structures, especially for three families of Poisson varieties in dimensions two and three. For these families of Poisson structures, using an explicit basis of the second Poisson cohomology space, we solve the deformation equations at each step and obtain a large family of formal deformations for each Poisson structure which we consider. With the help of an explicit formula, we show that this family contains, modulo equivalence, all possible formal eformations. We show moreover that, when the Poisson structure is generic, all members of the family are non-equivalent.