Asymmetries in the capacity-inflation trade-off

This paper analyzes the joint dynamics of two key macroeconomic variables for the conduct of monetary policy: inflation and the aggregate capacity utilization rate. An econometric procedure useful for estimating dynamic rational expectation models with unobserved components is developed and applied in this context. The method combines the flexibility of the unobserved components approach, based on the Kalman recursion, with the power of the general method of moments estimation procedure. A 'hyb id' Phillips curve relating inflation to the capacity utilization gap and incorporating forward and backward looking components is estimated. The results show that such a relationship in non-linear: the slope of the Phillips curve depends significantly on the magnitude of the capacity gap. These findings provide support for studying the implications of asymmetricmonetary policy rules.

Assessing the viability of power-supply systems: a tentative protocol

This Technical Report presents a tentative protocol used to assess the viability of powersupply systems. The viability of power-supply systems can be assessed by looking at the production factors (e.g. paid labor, power capacity, fossil-fuels) – needed for the system to operate and maintain itself – in relation to the internal constraints set by the energetic metabolism of societies. In fact, by using this protocol it becomes possible to link assessments of technical coefficients performed at the level of the power-supply systems with assessments of benchmark values performed at the societal level throughout the relevant different sectors. In particular, the example provided here in the case of France for the year 2009 makes it possible to see that in fact nuclear energy is not viable in terms of labor requirements (both direct and indirect inputs) as well as in terms of requirements of power capacity, especially when including reprocessing operations.

Impact of antenna correlation on the capacity of multiantenna channels

This paper applies random matrix theory to obtain analytical characterizations of the capacity of correlated multiantenna channels. The analysis is not restricted to the popular separable correlation model, but rather it embraces a more general representation that subsumesmost of the channel models that have been treated in the literature. For arbitrary signal-to-noise ratios (SNR), the characterization is conducted in the regime of large numbers of antennas. For the low- and high-SNR regions, in turn, we uncover compact capacity expansions that are valid for arbitrary numbers of antennas and that shed insight on how antenna correlation impacts the tradeoffs between power, bandwidth and rate.

Optimum power allocation for parallel Gaussian channels with arbitrary input distributions

The mutual information of independent parallel Gaussian-noise channels is maximized, under an average power constraint, by independent Gaussian inputs whose power is allocated according to the waterfilling policy. In practice, discrete signalling constellations with limited peak-to-average ratios (m-PSK, m-QAM, etc) are used in lieu of the ideal Gaussian signals. This paper gives the power allocation policy that maximizes the mutual information over parallel channels with arbitrary input distributions. Such policy admits a graphical interpretation, referred to as mercury/waterfilling, which generalizes the waterfilling solution and allows retaining some of its intuition. The relationship between mutual information of Gaussian channels and nonlinear minimum mean-square error proves key to solving the power allocation problem.

High-SNR power offset in multiantenna communication

The analysis of the multiantenna capacity in the high-SNR regime has hitherto focused on the high-SNR slope (or maximum multiplexing gain), which quantifies the multiplicative increase as function of the number of antennas. This traditional characterization is unable to assess the impact of prominent channel features since, for a majority of channels, the slope equals the minimum of the number of transmit and receive antennas. Furthermore, a characterization based solely on the slope captures only the scaling but it has no notion of the power required for a certain capacity. This paper advocates a more refined characterization whereby, as function of SNRjdB, the high-SNR capacity is expanded as an affine function where the impact of channel features such as antenna correlation, unfaded components, etc, resides in the zero-order term or power offset. The power offset, for which we find insightful closed-form expressions, is shown to play a chief role for SNR levels of practical interest.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Capacity of MIMO Channels: asymptotic evaluation under correlated fading

This paper investigates the asymptotic uniform power allocation capacity of frequency nonselective multiple-inputmultiple-output channels with fading correlation at either thetransmitter or the receiver. We consider the asymptotic situation,where the number of inputs and outputs increase without boundat the same rate. A simple uniparametric model for the fadingcorrelation function is proposed and the asymptotic capacity perantenna is derived in closed form. Although the proposed correlationmodel is introduced only for mathematical convenience, itis shown that its shape is very close to an exponentially decayingcorrelation function. The asymptotic expression obtained providesa simple and yet useful way of relating the actual fadingcorrelation to the asymptotic capacity per antenna from a purelyanalytical point of view. For example, the asymptotic expressionsindicate that fading correlation is more harmful when arising atthe side with less antennas. Moreover, fading correlation does notinfluence the rate of growth of the asymptotic capacity per receiveantenna with high Eb /N0.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Demand elasticity and market power in the spanish electricity market

In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.