Aplicació J2EE de Gestió d'Importacions i Exportacions

El projecte ve motivat per cobrir les necessitats de gestió de les empreses de tipus pyme on el seu negoci radica en la compra venda de mercaderies en diferents països, i mitjançant diferents sub - empreses satèl·lits, amb el únic fi de tenir un guany global superior.

Guillem Masó, mercader de Sant Joan de les Abadesses: bestiar, draps i crèdit en una vila monàstica al darrer quart del segle XIV

El present treball es fonamenta amb el contingut del llibre particular o extraordinari del mercader Guillem Masó, de Sant Joan de les Abadesses, actiu durant la segona meitat del segle XIV. La majoria d’assentaments que conté el volum fan referència a tractes de bestiar, amb la inclusió de diverses tipologies o variants en els contractes, des de la simple compravenda fins a comandes-parceria. L’activitat del mercader Masó, tanmateix, no se centra exclusivament en aquests negocis. S’intueix una diversificació de les seves activitats que es vinculen, fonamentalment, amb la producció i comercialització de draps de llana i de lli. El context social i econòmic de la vila de Sant Joan durant aquest període afavoreix la presència d’aquests empresaris tèxtils que, per a aconseguir els seus objectius, s’introdueixen en els ressorts del poder civil de la vila i en els dels gremis i confraries que regulen i controlen els processos de fabricació dels productes

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Contribution to Asterisk Open Source Project

With this final master thesis we are going to contribute to the Asterisk open source project. Asterisk is an open source project that started with the main objective of develop an IP telephony platform, completely based on Software (so not hardware dependent) and under an open license like GPL. This project was started on 1999 by the software engineer Mark Spencer at Digium. The main motivation of that open source project was that the telecommunications sector is lack of open solutions, and most of the available solutions are based on proprietary standards, which are close and not compatible between them. Behind the Asterisk project there is a company, Digum, which is the project leading since the project was originated in its laboratories. This company has some of its employees fully dedicated to contribute to the Asterisk project, and also provide the whole infrastructure required by the open source project. But the business of Digium isn't based on licensing of products due to the open source nature of Asterisk, but it's based on offering services around Asteriskand designing and selling some hardware components to be used with Asterisk. The Asterisk project has grown up a lot since its birth, offering in its latest versions advanced functionalities for managing calls and compatibility with some hardware that previously was exclusive of proprietary solutions. Due to that, Asterisk is becoming a serious alternative to all these proprietaries solutions because it has reached a level of maturity that makes it very stable. In addition, as it is open source, it can be fully customized to a givenrequirement, which could be impossible with the proprietaries solutions. Due to the bigness that is reaching the project, every day there are more companies which develop value added software for telephony platforms, that are seriously evaluating the option of make their software fully compatible withAsterisk platforms. All these factors make Asterisk being a consolidated project but in constant evolution, trying to offer all those functionalities offered by proprietaries solutions. This final master thesis will be divided mainly in two blocks totally complementaries. In the first block we will analyze Asterisk as an open source project and Asterisk as a telephony platform (PBX). As a result of this analysis we will generate a document, written in English because it is Asterisk project's official language, which could be used by future contributors as an starting point on joining Asterisk. On the second block we will proceed with a development contribution to the Asterisk project. We will have several options in the form that we do the contribution, such as solving bugs, developing new functionalities or start an Asterisk satellite project. The type of contribution will depend on the needs of the project on that moment.

The First privatization : selling SOEs and privatizing public monopolies in fascist Italy, 1922-1925

[cat] El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.

The First privatization : selling SOEs and privatizing public monopolies in fascist Italy, 1922-1925

[cat] El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

The Commons and anti-commons problems in the tourism economy

Countries specialised in tourism tend to face two problems with contradictory effects: the commons and the anti-commons, which lead to tourism over- and under-production, respectively. This paper develops a two-period model to analyse the joint effects of both problems on a small and remote tourism economy. Congestion and the complementariness between foreign transport and local tourism services are key features in this type of markets. As a result, direct selling and the presence of foreign tour-operators emerge as possible market arrangements with different implications in terms of welfare and public intervention. Four main results are obtained. First, in the direct selling situation the optimal policy depends on the relative importance of the problems. Second, the existence of tour-operators always leads to tourism over-production. Third, the presence of a single tour-operator does not solve the congestion problem. Lastly, the switch from several tour-operators to a single one is welfare reducing.

The ‘Dragon’ and the ‘Elephant’ and Global Imbalances

Global financial imbalances receive a great deal of attention in relation to the emerging economies China and India. This chapter analyzes this relation, but argues first that they are actually re-balancing the existing structural inequality in the world economy, in which for so long only the Western economies and Japan dominated economic growth and international trade, moving towards a more multi-polar world economy. China in particular, with its rapid export-led growth, has indeed been part and parcel of the emerging financial imbalances, feeding the ‘over-consumption’ in the US and using its accumulating international reserves in buying US-treasury bonds. Finance therefore is moving to the economy that ‘least needs it’. This imbalance can only be redressed if the US (and some of the other OECD countries) start saving more and consuming less (and become more competitive), with China further stimulating domestic demand (which it already did in response to the crisis). China and to a lesser extend India, as emerging large economies and a more important roles in global markets, also contribute to new imbalances, such as the influence of the insatiable appetite for resources (carbon-hydrates, minerals and bio-mass) of these relatively energy-inefficient economies, while at the same time attracting an increasing share of FDI towards them. The chapter finally raises the issue that these three mentioned imbalances make it more difficult for developing countries (except for those who are resource-rich) to get access to the necessary development finance.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.