Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Implantació EBP Enterprise Buyer Professional

Aquest document vol explicar en què consisteix el sistema EBP, com pot facilitar la gestió de proveïment d'una empresa i quines eines proporciona.

An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century

[cat] En aquest treball presentem un model per explicar el procés d’especialització vitícola assolit als municipis de la província de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX,que cerca entendre com va sorgir històricament un avantatge comparatiu fruit d’un procés que esdevindria un dels punts de partida del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya. Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats pel impuls “Boserupià” de la població en un context d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat “Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es posa de manifest la importància de les dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socioinstitucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat d’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya donà com a resultat unes comunitats rurals menys desiguals fins al 1820, tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentà de nou a partir d'aleshores.

An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century

[cat] En aquest treball presentem un model per explicar el procés d’especialització vitícola assolit als municipis de la província de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX,que cerca entendre com va sorgir històricament un avantatge comparatiu fruit d’un procés que esdevindria un dels punts de partida del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya. Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats pel impuls “Boserupià” de la població en un context d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat “Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es posa de manifest la importància de les dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socioinstitucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat d’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya donà com a resultat unes comunitats rurals menys desiguals fins al 1820, tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentà de nou a partir d'aleshores.

Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality

A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.