The externalisation of the asylum function in the European Union

This paper aims to identify and assess the main items in the strategy followed by the EU and its member states on the externalisation of their asylum function. First, it analyses the European harmonisation of the return to safe third countries and to countries of first asylum, which is carried out by means of readmission agreements. Second, it refers to the strategies defined by the Hague and the Stockholm programs concerning the External Aspects of the European Union Asylum Policy, on the detention centres for illegal immigrants abroad, and on the proposals for delocalisation of asylum applications processing centres beyond the EU borders. Finally, this paper considers whether the strategy of externalisation of the function of asylum sometimes lacks legitimacy, and to what extent there is a fair balance between the interests of the states and the protection of the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers.

The European Union and refugees: towards more restrictive asylum policies in the European Union?

Several scholars have argued that European countries have decided to cooperate on asylum and migration matters at the EU level in order to develop more restrictive policies. In particular, it has been argued that European states have ‘venue-shopped’ to a new policy-venue in order to escape national constraints. This paper puts this argument to the test by assessing the extent to which the development of EU cooperation on asylum matters has indeed led to the adoption of more restrictive asylum standards. The paper argues that, actually, EU asylum cooperation has led to an overall increase in protection standards for asylum-seekers and refugees. This outcome is explained by two main factors: the increasing ‘judicialisation’ of asylum in the EU and institutional changes in the EU asylum policy area that have strengthened the role of more ‘refugee-friendly’ institutions.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

The underestimation of compliance to direct help requests explained by adaptive sampling

Helping behavior is any intentional behavior that benefits another living being or group (Hogg & Vaughan, 2010). People tend to underestimate the probability that others will comply with their direct requests for help (Flynn & Lake, 2008). This implies that when they need help, they will assess the probability of getting it (De Paulo, 1982, cited in Flynn & Lake, 2008) and then they will tend to estimate one that is actually lower than the real chance, so they may not even consider worth asking for it. Existing explanations for this phenomenon attribute it to a mistaken cost computation by the help seeker, who will emphasize the instrumental cost of “saying yes”, ignoring that the potential helper also needs to take into account the social cost of saying “no”. And the truth is that, especially in face-to-face interactions, the discomfort caused by refusing to help can be very high. In short, help seekers tend to fail to realize that it might be more costly to refuse to comply with a help request rather than accepting. A similar effect has been observed when estimating trustworthiness of people. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2010) showed that people also tend to underestimate it. This bias is reduced when, instead of asymmetric feedback (getting feedback only when deciding to trust the other person), symmetric feedback (always given) was provided. This cause could as well be applicable to help seeking as people only receive feedback when they actually make their request but not otherwise. Fazio, Shook, and Eiser (2004) studied something that could be reinforcing these outcomes: Learning asymmetries. By means of a computer game called BeanFest, they showed that people learn better about negatively valenced objects (beans in this case) than about positively valenced ones. This learning asymmetry esteemed from “information gain being contingent on approach behavior” (p. 293), which could be identified with what Fetchenhauer and Dunning mention as ‘asymmetric feedback’, and hence also with help requests. Fazio et al. also found a generalization asymmetry in favor of negative attitudes versus positive ones. They attributed it to a negativity bias that “weights resemblance to a known negative more heavily than resemblance to a positive” (p. 300). Applied to help seeking scenarios, this would mean that when facing an unknown situation, people would tend to generalize and infer that is more likely that they get a negative rather than a positive outcome from it, so, along with what it was said before, people will be more inclined to think that they will get a “no” when requesting help. Denrell and Le Mens (2011) present a different perspective when trying to explain judgment biases in general. They deviate from the classical inappropriate information processing (depicted among other by Fiske & Taylor, 2007, and Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and explain this in terms of ‘adaptive sampling’. Adaptive sampling is a sampling mechanism in which the selection of sample items is conditioned by the values of the variable of interest previously observed (Thompson, 2011). Sampling adaptively allows individuals to safeguard themselves from experiences they went through once and turned out to lay negative outcomes. However, it also prevents them from giving a second chance to those experiences to get an updated outcome that could maybe turn into a positive one, a more positive one, or just one that regresses to the mean, whatever direction that implies. That, as Denrell and Le Mens (2011) explained, makes sense: If you go to a restaurant, and you did not like the food, you do not choose that restaurant again. This is what we think could be happening when asking for help: When we get a “no”, we stop asking. And here, we want to provide a complementary explanation for the underestimation of the probability that others comply with our direct help requests based on adaptive sampling. First, we will develop and explain a model that represents the theory. Later on, we will test it empirically by means of experiments, and will elaborate on the analysis of its results.