Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Use of alternative and complementary therapies in labor and delivery care: a cross-sectional study of midwives" training in Catalan hospitals accredited as centers for normal birth

Background: The use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) and complementary and alternative therapies (CAT) during pregnancy is increasing. Scientific evidence for CAM and CAT in the field of obstetrics mainly covers pain relief in labor. Midwives are responsible for labor and delivery care: hence, their knowledge of CAM and CAT is important. The aims of this study are to describe the professional profile of midwives who provide care for natural childbirth in Catalan hospitals accredited as centers for normal birth, to assess midwives" level of training in CAT and their use of these therapies, and to identify specific resources for CAT in labor wards. Methods: A descriptive, cross-sectional, quantitative method was used to assess the level of training and use of CAT by midwives working at 28 hospitals in Catalonia, Spain, accredited as public normal birth centers. Results: Just under a third of midwives (30.4%) trained in CAT after completion of basic training. They trained in an average of 5.97 therapies (SD 3.56). The number of CAT in which the midwives were trained correlated negatively with age (r = - 0.284; p < 0.001) and with their time working at the hospital in years (r = - 0.136; p = 0.036). Midwives trained in CAT considered that the following therapies were useful or very useful for pain relief during labor and delivery: relaxation techniques (64.3%), hydrotherapy (84.8%) and the application of compresses to the perineum (75.9%). The availability of resources for providing CAT during normal birth care varied widely from center to center. Conclusions: Age may influence attitudes towards training. It is important to increase the number of midwives trained in CAM for pain relief during childbirth, in order to promote the use of CAT and ensure efficiency and safety. CAT resources at accredited hospitals providing normal childbirth care should also be standardized.

Use of alternative and complementary therapies in labor and delivery care: a cross-sectional study of midwives" training in Catalan hospitals accredited as centers for normal birth

Background: The use of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) and complementary and alternative therapies (CAT) during pregnancy is increasing. Scientific evidence for CAM and CAT in the field of obstetrics mainly covers pain relief in labor. Midwives are responsible for labor and delivery care: hence, their knowledge of CAM and CAT is important. The aims of this study are to describe the professional profile of midwives who provide care for natural childbirth in Catalan hospitals accredited as centers for normal birth, to assess midwives" level of training in CAT and their use of these therapies, and to identify specific resources for CAT in labor wards. Methods: A descriptive, cross-sectional, quantitative method was used to assess the level of training and use of CAT by midwives working at 28 hospitals in Catalonia, Spain, accredited as public normal birth centers. Results: Just under a third of midwives (30.4%) trained in CAT after completion of basic training. They trained in an average of 5.97 therapies (SD 3.56). The number of CAT in which the midwives were trained correlated negatively with age (r = - 0.284; p < 0.001) and with their time working at the hospital in years (r = - 0.136; p = 0.036). Midwives trained in CAT considered that the following therapies were useful or very useful for pain relief during labor and delivery: relaxation techniques (64.3%), hydrotherapy (84.8%) and the application of compresses to the perineum (75.9%). The availability of resources for providing CAT during normal birth care varied widely from center to center. Conclusions: Age may influence attitudes towards training. It is important to increase the number of midwives trained in CAM for pain relief during childbirth, in order to promote the use of CAT and ensure efficiency and safety. CAT resources at accredited hospitals providing normal childbirth care should also be standardized.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Sistema de transmissió encriptat J2EE : Crypto magatzem

El projecte consisteix en una aplicació web que actua com un magatzem central d'arxius, on els usuaris es poden connectar via https des de qualsevol localització, independentment del grau de seguretat que implementi la seva estació, i enviar arxius encriptats o sense encriptar amb les garanties màximes de seguretat i confidencialitat. Els fitxers restarien emmagatzemats a un BBDD on posteriorment, només usuaris acreditats amb una clau AES d'ecriptació/desencriptació els podrien recuperar, també via HTTPS, i procedir a desencriptar-los a nivell local.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Equities and inequality

Most US credit card holders revolve high-interest debt, often combined with substantial (i) asset accumulation by retirement, and (ii) low-rate liquid assets. Hyperbolic discounting can resolve only the former puzzle (Laibson et al., 2003). Bertaut and Haliassos (2002) proposed an 'accountant-shopper'framework for the latter. The current paper builds, solves, and simulates a fully-specified accountant-shopper model, to show that this framework canactually generate both types of co-existence, as well as target credit card utilization rates consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002). The benchmark model is compared to setups without self-control problems, with alternative mechanisms, and with impatient but fully rational shoppers.

Theoretical notes on bubbles and the current crisis

We explore a view of the crisis as a shock to investor sentiment that led to the collapse of abubble or pyramid scheme in financial markets. We embed this view in a standard model of thefinancial accelerator and explore its empirical and policy implications. In particular, we show howthe model can account for: (i) a gradual and protracted expansionary phase followed by a suddenand sharp recession; (ii) the connection (or lack of connection!) between financial and real economicactivity and; (iii) a fast and strong transmission of shocks across countries. We also use the modelto explore the role of fiscal policy.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

Money doctors

We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.

Bubbly collateral and economic activity

This paper develops a model of the bubbly economy and uses it to study the effects of bailoutpolicies. In the bubbly economy, weak enforcement institutions do not allow firms to pledge futurerevenues to their creditors. As a result, "fundamental" collateral is scarce and this impairs the intermediationprocess that transforms savings into capital. To overcome this shortage of "fundamental"collateral, the bubbly economy creates "bubbly" collateral. This additional collateral supports anintricate array of intra- and inter-generational transfers that allow savings to be transformed intocapital and bubbles. Swings in investor sentiment lead to fluctuations in the amount of bubblycollateral, giving rise to bubbly business cycles with very rich and complex dynamics.Bailout policies can affect these dynamics in a variety of ways. Expected bailouts provideadditional collateral and expand investment and the capital stock. Realized bailouts reduce thesupply of funds and contract investment and the capital stock. Thus, bailout policies tend to fosterinvestment and growth in normal times, but to depress investment and growth during crisis periods.We show how to design bailout policies that maximize various policy objectives.

Portfolio delegation under short-selling constraints

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when themanager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previousresults, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjustedcontracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gatherinformation. The risk-averse manager's optimal effort is an increasingfunction of her share in the portfolio's return. This result affectsthe risk-averse investor's optimal contract decision. The first best,purely risk-sharing contract is proved to be suboptimal. Usingnumerical methods we show that the manager's share in the portfolioreturn is higher than the rst best share. Additionally, this deviationis shown to be: (i) increasing in the manager's risk aversion and (ii)larger for tighter short-selling restrictions. When the constraint isrelaxed the optimal contract converges towards the first best risksharing contract.