Productivity in southern European small firms: When and how work organization complements process innovation

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of human capital, advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT), and new work organizational practices on firm productivity, while taking into account the synergies existing between them. This study expands current knowledge in this area in two ways. First, in contrast with previous works, we focus on AMT and not ICT (information and communication technologies). Second, we use a unique employer-employee data set for small firms in a particular area of southern Europe (Catalonia, Spain). Using a small firm data set, allows us to analyse the particular case of small and medium enterprises, since we cannot assume they have the same characteristics as large firms. The results provide evidence in favor of the complementarity hypothesis between human capital, advanced manufacturing technologies, and new work organization practices, although we show that the complementarity effects depend on what type of work organization practices are used by a firm. For small and medium Catalan firms, the only set of work organization practices that improve the benefits of human capital and technology investment are those practices which are more quality oriented, such as quality circles, problem-solving groups or total quality management.

Contextualizing the impact of work organization on employee satisfaction

The paper assesses the relationship between the use of alternative workplace practices (AWP) and job satisfaction. Using a unique employeremployee data set with rich information on both firm and employee characteristics we test whether there is a positive impact of AWPs on job satisfaction (motivation hypothesis) or it is negative (intensification hypothesis). We expand a growing empirical literature focusing on small and medium size firms from a southern European area. Our results show an overall positive effect, depending on the specific practice considered. We also obtain some sort of time-dependence with the effects turning from negative to positive once the practice has been implemented for some time. Keywords: Job satisfaction, work organization, unobserved heterogeneity.

Implementation of zonal control algorithms in adaptive optical systems with sparse control matrices

Miralls deformables més i més grans, amb cada cop més actuadors estan sent utilitzats actualment en aplicacions d'òptica adaptativa. El control dels miralls amb centenars d'actuadors és un tema de gran interès, ja que les tècniques de control clàssiques basades en la seudoinversa de la matriu de control del sistema es tornen massa lentes quan es tracta de matrius de dimensions tan grans. En aquesta tesi doctoral es proposa un mètode per l'acceleració i la paral.lelitzacó dels algoritmes de control d'aquests miralls, a través de l'aplicació d'una tècnica de control basada en la reducció a zero del components més petits de la matriu de control (sparsification), seguida de l'optimització de l'ordenació dels accionadors de comandament atenent d'acord a la forma de la matriu, i finalment de la seva posterior divisió en petits blocs tridiagonals. Aquests blocs són molt més petits i més fàcils de fer servir en els càlculs, el que permet velocitats de càlcul molt superiors per l'eliminació dels components nuls en la matriu de control. A més, aquest enfocament permet la paral.lelització del càlcul, donant una com0onent de velocitat addicional al sistema. Fins i tot sense paral. lelització, s'ha obtingut un augment de gairebé un 40% de la velocitat de convergència dels miralls amb només 37 actuadors, mitjançant la tècnica proposada. Per validar això, s'ha implementat un muntatge experimental nou complet , que inclou un modulador de fase programable per a la generació de turbulència mitjançant pantalles de fase, i s'ha desenvolupat un model complert del bucle de control per investigar el rendiment de l'algorisme proposat. Els resultats, tant en la simulació com experimentalment, mostren l'equivalència total en els valors de desviació després de la compensació dels diferents tipus d'aberracions per als diferents algoritmes utilitzats, encara que el mètode proposat aquí permet una càrrega computacional molt menor. El procediment s'espera que sigui molt exitós quan s'aplica a miralls molt grans.

Entrepreneurship, organization and economic performance among Spanish firms, 1930-1975. The case of the motor industry

Before the Civil War (1936-1939), Spain had seen the emergence offirms of complex organizational forms. However, the conflict andthe postwar years changed this pattern. The argument put forwardin this paper is based on historical experience, the efforts willbe addressed to explain the development of Spanish entrepreneurshipduring the second half of the twentieth century. To illustrate thechange in entrepreneurship and organizational patterns among theSpanish firms during the Francoist regime we will turn to the caseof the motor vehicle industry.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

The organization of research corporations and researcher ability

This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are privatefor-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a Research Corporation formal authority over the choice of projects is jointly exercised by the top management of the member firms. A private for-profit organization cannot commit not to interfere with the project choice of the researchers. However, increasing the number of member firms of the Research Corporation reduces the incentive of member firms to meddle with the research projects of researchers because exercising formal authority over the choice of research projects is a public good. The Research Corporation thus offers researchers greater autonomy than a single firm pursuing an identical research program in its in-house R&D department. This attracts higher ability researchers to the Research Corporation compared to the internal R&D department. The paper uses the theoretical model to analyze the organization of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). The facts of this case confirm the existence of a tension between control over the choice of research projects and the ability of researchers that the organization is able to attract or hold onto.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Self-organization mechanisms for the formation on nearshore crescentic and transverse sand bars

The formation and development of transverse and crescentic sand bars in the coastal marine environment has been investigated by means of a nonlinear numerical model based on the shallow-water equations and on a simpli ed sediment transport parameterization. By assuming normally approaching waves and a saturated surf zone, rhythmic patterns develop from a planar slope where random perturbations of small amplitude have been superimposed. Two types of bedforms appear: one is a crescentic bar pattern centred around the breakpoint and the other, herein modelled for the rst time, is a transverse bar pattern. The feedback mechanism related to the formation and development of the patterns can be explained by coupling the water and sediment conservation equations. Basically, the waves stir up the sediment and keep it in suspension with a certain cross-shore distribution of depth-averaged concentration. Then, a current flowing with (against) the gradient of sediment concentration produces erosion (deposition). It is shown that inside the surf zone, these currents may occur due to the wave refraction and to the redistribution of wave breaking produced by the growing bedforms. Numerical simulations have been performed in order to understand the sensitivity of the pattern formation to the parameterization and to relate the hydro-morphodynamic input conditions to which of the patterns develops. It is suggested that crescentic bar growth would be favoured by high-energy conditions and ne sediment while transverse bars would grow for milder waves and coarser sediment. In intermediate conditions mixed patterns may occur.

Deciphering the global organization of clustering in real complex networks

We uncover the global organization of clustering in real complex networks. To this end, we ask whether triangles in real networks organize as in maximally random graphs with given degree and clustering distributions, or as in maximally ordered graph models where triangles are forced into modules. The answer comes by way of exploring m-core landscapes, where the m-core is defined, akin to the k-core, as the maximal subgraph with edges participating in at least m triangles. This property defines a set of nested subgraphs that, contrarily to k-cores, is able to distinguish between hierarchical and modular architectures. We find that the clustering organization in real networks is neither completely random nor ordered although, surprisingly, it is more random than modular. This supports the idea that the structure of real networks may in fact be the outcome of self-organized processes based on local optimization rules, in contrast to global optimization principles.