LdShake: learning design solutions sharing and co-edition

Two important challenges that teachers are currently facing are the sharing and the collaborative authoring of their learning design solutions, such as didactical units and learning materials. On the one hand, there are tools that can be used for the creation of design solutions and only some of them facilitate the co-edition. However, they do not incorporate mechanisms that support the sharing of the designs between teachers. On the other hand, there are tools that serve as repositories of educational resources but they do not enable the authoring of the designs. In this paper we present LdShake, a web tool whose novelty is focused on the combined support for the social sharing and co-edition of learning design solutions within communities of teachers. Teachers can create and share learning designs with other teachers using different access rights so that they can read, comment or co-edit the designs. Therefore, each design solution is associated to a group of teachers able to work on its definition, and another group that can only see the design. The tool is generic in that it allows the creation of designs based on any pedagogical approach. However, it can be particularized in instances providing pre-formatted designs structured according to a specific didactic method (such as Problem-Based Learning, PBL). A particularized LdShake instance has been used in the context of Human Biology studies where teams of teachers are required to work together in the design of PBL solutions. A controlled user study, that compares the use of a generic LdShake and a Moodle system, configured to enable the creation and sharing of designs, has been also carried out. The combined results of the real and controlled studies show that the social structure, and the commenting, co-edition and publishing features of LdShake provide a useful, effective and usable approach for facilitating teachers' teamwork.

On codes, matroids, and secure multiparty computation from linear secret-sharing schemes

Error-correcting codes and matroids have been widely used in the study of ordinary secret sharing schemes. In this paper, the connections between codes, matroids, and a special class of secret sharing schemes, namely, multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes (LSSSs), are studied. Such schemes are known to enable multiparty computation protocols secure against general (nonthreshold) adversaries.Two open problems related to the complexity of multiplicative LSSSs are considered in this paper. The first one deals with strongly multiplicative LSSSs. As opposed to the case of multiplicative LSSSs, it is not known whether there is an efficient method to transform an LSSS into a strongly multiplicative LSSS for the same access structure with a polynomial increase of the complexity. A property of strongly multiplicative LSSSs that could be useful in solving this problem is proved. Namely, using a suitable generalization of the well-known Berlekamp–Welch decoder, it is shown that all strongly multiplicative LSSSs enable efficient reconstruction of a shared secret in the presence of malicious faults. The second one is to characterize the access structures of ideal multiplicative LSSSs. Specifically, the considered open problem is to determine whether all self-dual vector space access structures are in this situation. By the aforementioned connection, this in fact constitutes an open problem about matroid theory, since it can be restated in terms of representability of identically self-dual matroids by self-dual codes. A new concept is introduced, the flat-partition, that provides a useful classification of identically self-dual matroids. Uniform identically self-dual matroids, which are known to be representable by self-dual codes, form one of the classes. It is proved that this property also holds for the family of matroids that, in a natural way, is the next class in the above classification: the identically self-dual bipartite matroids.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Research work in Tokyo Institute of Technology

Research carried out in Tokyo Institute of Technology. The objective is to determine the influence of Interfacial Transition Zone (ITZ) around Lightweight aggregate in concrete on Chloride ion diffusivity. The ITZ of conventional concretes is the weakest point of concrete. The accumulating water on ITZ zone forms the most permeable area inside the concrete. Hence ITZ paves the way for chloride ion diffusion. The quality of ITZ depends on type and quality of aggregates used, water-cement ratio and also the method used for the production of concrete. It has been used two types of lightweight aggregates will be used, Chinese and Japanese, with different absorption capacities. The idea is to produce concrete with same effective water - cement ratio, using the same aggregates in two different conditions, dry and saturated, and compare the chloride ion diffusivity in these concretes (by diffusion test). A comparison of ITZ thickness of these concretes by SEM and EDAX-maps is also proposed. The chloride ion diffusion of concretes produced with the same effective water – cement ratio and same aggregates (dry and ssd) will depend, mainly, on ITZ.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

What works best for getting the unemployed back to work: employment services or small-business assistance programs? evidence from Romania

Recent empirical evidence has found that employment services and small-business assistance programmes are often successful at getting the unemployed back to work. Â One important concern of policy makers is to decide which of these two programmes is more effective and for whom. Â Using unusually rich (for transition economies) survey data and matching methods, I evaluate the relative effectiveness of these two programmes in Romania. Â While I find that employment services (ES) are, on average, more successful than a small-business assistance programme (SBA), estimation of heterogeneity effects reveals that, compared to non-participation, ES are effective for workers with little access to informal search channels, and SBA works for less-qualified workers and those living in rural areas. Â When comparing ES to SBA, I find that ES tend to be more efficient than SBA for workers without a high-school degree, and that the opposite holds for the more educated workers.

Reversal of opinion: the implications of the work of Acemoglu and Robinson for marxist thought

This paper describes the implications for Marxist thought of the work of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. In the first two periods of this they explained how the rise of democracy brought prosperity to Europe  and why the same process had not worked in Latin America because of the possibility of coups. The implication is that mass poverty can better be alleviated by safeguarding democracy rather than moving to socialism. In the last period A and R have formalized doubts about the efficacy of democracy in this role. The implication here is that Marxists should work to find a system of government that is immune to elite dominance. Hugo Chávez is taken as an example.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain

El objetivo de esta investigación es aportar evidencia sobre las fuentes de las economías de aglomeración para el caso español. De todas las maneras posibles que se han tomado en la literatura para medir las economías de aglomeración, nosotros lo analizamos a partir de las decisiones de localización de las empresas manufactureras. La literatura reciente ha puesto de relieve que el análisis basado en la disyuntiva localización / urbanización (relaciones dentro de un mismo sector) no es suficiente para entender las economías de aglomeración. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre los diferentes sectores sí resultan significativas al examinar por qué las empresas que pertenecen a diferentes sectores se localizan unas al lado de las otras. Con esto en mente, intentamos explicar que relaciones entre diferentes sectores pueden explicar coaglomeración. Para ello, nos centramos en aquellas relaciones entre sectores definidos a partir de los mecanismos de aglomeración de Marshall, es decir, labor market, input sharing y knowledge spillovers. Trabajamos con el labor market pooling en la medida en que los dos sectores utilizan los mismos trabajadores (clasificación de ocupaciones). Con el segundo mecanismo de Marshall, input sharing, introducimos cómo dos sectores tienen una relación de comprador / vendedor. Por último, nos referimos a dos sectores que utilizan las mismas tecnologías en cuanto a los knowledge spillovers. Con el fin de capturar todos los efectos de los mecanismos de aglomeracion en España, en esta investigación trabajamos con dos ámbitos geográficos, los municipios y los mercados de trabajo locales. La literatura existente nunca se ha puesto de acuerdo en cual es el ámbito geográfico en el que mejor trabajan los mecanismos Marshall, por lo que hemos cubierto todas las unidades geográficas potenciales.

Projecte pilot d'innovació docent de l'assignatura Estructura de Computadors I

L'objectiu del projecte ha estat la millora de la qualitat docent de l'assignatura Estructura de Computadors I, impartida a la Facultat d'Informàtica de Barcelona (UPC) dins els estudis d'Enginyeria Informàtica, Enginyeria Tècnica en Informàtica de Sistemes i Enginyeria Tècnica en Informàtica de Gestió. S'ha treballat en quatre línies d'actuació: (i) aplicació de tècniques d'aprenentatge actiu a les classes; (ii) aplicació de tècniques d'aprenentage cooperatiu no presencials; (iii) implantació de noves TIC i adaptació de les ja emprades per tal d'habilitar mecanismes d'autoavaluació i de realimentació de la informació referent a l'avaluació; i (iv) difusió de les experiències derivades de les diferents actuacions. Referent a les dues primeres mesures s'avalua l'impacte de metodologies docents que afavoreixen l'aprenentatge actiu tant de forma presencial com no presencial, obtenint-se clares millores en el rendiment respecte a altres metodologies utilitzades anteriorment enfocades a la realització de classes del tipus magistral, en què únicament es posa a l'abast dels alumnes la documentació de l'assignatura per a què puguin treballar de forma responsable. Les noves metodologies fan especial èmfasi en el treball en grup a classe i la compartició de les experiències fora de classe a través de fòrums de participació. La mesura que ha requerit més esforç en aquest projecte és la tercera, amb el desenvolupament d'un entorn d'interfície web orientat a la correcció automàtica de programes escrits en llenguatge assemblador. Aquest entorn permet l'autoavaluació per part dels alumnes dels exercicis realitzats a l'assignatura, amb obtenció d'informació detallada sobre les errades comeses. El treball realitzat dins d'aquest projecte s'ha publicat en congressos rellevants en l'àrea docent tant a nivell estatal com internacional. El codi font de l'entorn esmentat anteriorment es posa a disposició pública a través d'un enllaç a la web.