Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them toincrease the number of voters to whom they appeal when voters have intense preferences for one of the alternatives available. An ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We find conditions under which ambiguous strategies are chosen in equilibrium. These conditions include the case in which there is an outcome that is a majority winner against all other outcomes but is not the most preferred outcome for a majority of voters. It is shown that if the number of candidates or parties increases, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

Side-branch growth in two-dimensional dendrits. Part II: Phase-field model

The development of side-branching in solidifying dendrites in a regime of large values of the Peclet number is studied by means of a phase-field model. We have compared our numerical results with experiments of the preceding paper and we obtain good qualitative agreement. The growth rate of each side branch shows a power-law behavior from the early stages of its life. From their birth, branches which finally succeed in the competition process of side-branching development have a greater growth exponent than branches which are stopped. Coarsening of branches is entirely defined by their geometrical position relative to their dominant neighbors. The winner branches escape from the diffusive field of the main dendrite and become independent dendrites.

Observatorio Barça 2010. La Campaña a la Presodencia del FC Barcelona en prensa deportiva y las redes sociales

El artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la cobertura que los principales periódicos deportivos catalanes (Sport, Mundo Deportivo, El 9 Esportiu y Gol) hicieron de la campaña a la presidencia del FC Barcelona (Barça) de junio de 2010 y que acabó ganando Sandro Rosell. La investigación compara esta cobertura con la información de campaña aparecida en las redes sociales Twitter y Facebook usadas por cada candidatura y analiza si el uso de estas nuevas herramientas 2.0 influyó en la visibilidad de los candidatos en la prensa tradicional.

La construcción de la marca ‘Qatar’ a partir del deporte: ‘sports place branding’ y prensa deportiva catalana

Los grandes eventos deportivos se han utilizado con fines promocionales para los territorios desde el siglo XIX. En este sentido, la Copa del Mundo de la FIFA de 2022, que se celebrará en Qatar, deviene una excusa ideal para el gobierno de la nación para legitimar su posicionamiento internacional, así como para participar activamente en el negocio mundial del fútbol. Además, desde 2011, Qatar Foundation (QF) ejecuta un acuerdo de patrocinio con el FC Barcelona, último campeón de la UEFA Champions League (ECL) y del Mundial de Clubes de la FIFA (2011), que le permitirá desarrollar proyectos sociales vinculados a la marca Barça en todo el mundo. Este artículo tiene el objetivo de analizar el posicionamiento internacional de Qatar, canalizado mediante un proceso de construcción de marca protagonizado por el deporte y proyectado a través de los medios de comunicación qataríes (AlJazzera) y los propios de los territorios donde el gobierno qatarí invierte, como es el caso de Cataluña.