Edge matching puzzles as hard SAT/CSP benchmarks

Recently, edge matching puzzles, an NP-complete problem, have rececived, thanks to money-prized contests, considerable attention from wide audiences. We consider these competitions not only a challenge for SAT/CSP solving techniques but also as an opportunity to showcase the advances in the SAT/CSP community to a general audience. This paper studies the NP-complete problem of edge matching puzzles focusing on providing generation models of problem instances of variable hardness and on its resolution through the application of SAT and CSP techniques. From the generation side, we also identify the phase transition phenomena for each model. As solving methods, we employ both; SAT solvers through the translation to a SAT formula, and two ad-hoc CSP solvers we have developed, with different levels of consistency, employing several generic and specialized heuristics. Finally, we conducted an extensive experimental investigation to identify the hardest generation models and the best performing solving techniques.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Rethinking economy-wide rebound measures: an unbiased proposal

In spite of having been first introduced in the last half of the ninetieth century, the debate about the possible rebound effects from energy efficiency improvements is still an open question in the economic literature. This paper contributes to the existing research on this issue proposing an unbiased measure for economy-wide rebound effects. The novelty of this economy-wide rebound measure stems from the fact that not only actual energy savings but also potential energy savings are quantified under general equilibrium conditions. Our findings indicate that the use of engineering savings instead of general equilibrium potential savings downward biases economy-wide rebound effects and upward-biases backfire effects. The discrepancies between the traditional indicator and our proposed measure are analysed in the context of the Spanish economy.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Hierarchical conditional random fields for parts based models matching

A parts based model is a parametrization of an object class using a collection of landmarks following the object structure. The matching of parts based models is one of the problems where pairwise Conditional Random Fields have been successfully applied. The main reason of their effectiveness is tractable inference and learning due to the simplicity of involved graphs, usually trees. However, these models do not consider possible patterns of statistics among sets of landmarks, and thus they sufffer from using too myopic information. To overcome this limitation, we propoese a novel structure based on a hierarchical Conditional Random Fields, which we explain in the first part of this memory. We build a hierarchy of combinations of landmarks, where matching is performed taking into account the whole hierarchy. To preserve tractable inference we effectively sample the label set. We test our method on facial feature selection and human pose estimation on two challenging datasets: Buffy and MultiPIE. In the second part of this memory, we present a novel approach to multiple kernel combination that relies on stacked classification. This method can be used to evaluate the landmarks of the parts-based model approach. Our method is based on combining responses of a set of independent classifiers for each individual kernel. Unlike earlier approaches that linearly combine kernel responses, our approach uses them as inputs to another set of classifiers. We will show that we outperform state-of-the-art methods on most of the standard benchmark datasets.

Matching entre servidor de recursos y consumidores

L'objectiu del TFC consisteix en desenvolupar una aplicació que permeti, per una banda, la definició d'una oferta de recursos; per altra banda el uns usuaris-consumidors puguéssin apuntar-se a dites ofertes i, finalment,

Probabilistic sonar scan matching for an AUV

This paper proposes MSISpIC, a probabilistic sonar scan matching algorithm for the localization of an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV). The technique uses range scans gathered with a Mechanical Scanning Imaging Sonar (MSIS), the robot displacement estimated through dead-reckoning using a Doppler velocity log (DVL) and a motion reference unit (MRU). The proposed method is an extension of the pIC algorithm. An extended Kalman filter (EKF) is used to estimate the robot-path during the scan in order to reference all the range and bearing measurements as well as their uncertainty to a scan fixed frame before registering. The major contribution consists of experimentally proving that probabilistic sonar scan matching techniques have the potential to improve the DVL-based navigation. The algorithm has been tested on an AUV guided along a 600 m path within an abandoned marina underwater environment with satisfactory results

Analytical expressions for the flame front speed in the downward combustion of thin solid fuels and comparison to experiments

We derive analytical expressions for the propagation speed of downward combustion fronts of thin solid fuels with a background flow initially at rest. The classical combustion model for thin solid fuels that consists of five coupled reaction-convection-diffusion equations is here reduced into a single equation with the gas temperature as the single variable. For doing so we apply a two-zone combustion model that divides the system into a preheating region and a pyrolyzing region. The speed of the combustion front is obtained after matching the temperature and its derivative at the location that separates both regions.We also derive a simplified version of this analytical expression expected to be valid for a wide range of cases. Flame front velocities predicted by our analyticalexpressions agree well with experimental data found in the literature for a large variety of cases and substantially improve the results obtained from a previous well-known analytical expression