Energy-weighted sum rules for mesons in hot and dense matter

We study energy-weighted sum rules of the pion and kaon propagator in nuclear matter at finite temperature. The sum rules are obtained from matching the Dyson form of the meson propagator with its spectral Lehmann representation at low and high energies. We calculate the sum rules for specific models of the kaon and pion self-energy. The in-medium spectral densities of the K and (K) over bar mesons are obtained from a chiral unitary approach in coupled channels that incorporates the S and P waves of the kaon-nucleon interaction. The pion self-energy is determined from the P-wave coupling to particle-hole and Delta-hole excitations, modified by short-range correlations. The sum rules for the lower-energy weights are fulfilled satisfactorily and reflect the contributions from the different quasiparticle and collective modes of the meson spectral function. We discuss the sensitivity of the sum rules to the distribution of spectral strength and their usefulness as quality tests of model calculations.

Testing Cayley graph densities

We present a computer-assisted analysis of combinatorial properties of the Cayley graphs of certain finitely generated groups: Given a group with a finite set of generators, we study the density of the corresponding Cayley graph, that is, the least upper bound for the average vertex degree (= number of adjacent edges) of any finite subgraph. It is known that an m-generated group is amenable if and only if the density of the corresponding Cayley graph equals to 2m. We test amenable and non-amenable groups, and also groups for which amenability is unknown. In the latter class we focus on Richard Thompson’s group F.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

Weighted Hardy spaces for the unit disc: approximation properties

In this paper we study basic properties of the weighted Hardy space for the unit disc with the weight function satisfying Muckenhoupt's (Aq) condition, and study related approximation problems (expansion, moment and interpolation) with respect to two incomplete systems of holomorphic functions in this space.

Weighted limits in simplicial homotopy theory

We extend the theory of Quillen adjunctions by combining ideas of homotopical algebra and of enriched category theory. Our results describe how the formulas for homotopy colimits of Bousfield and Kan arise from general formulas describing the derived functor of the weighted colimit functor.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Sharp weighted bounds for fractional integral operators

The relationship between the operator norms of fractional integral operators acting on weighted Lebesgue spaces and the constant of the weights is investigated. Sharp bounds are obtained for both the fractional integral operators and the associated fractional maximal functions. As an application improved Sobolev inequalities are obtained. Some of the techniques used include a sharp off-diagonal version of the extrapolation theorem of Rubio de Francia and characterizations of two-weight norm inequalities.