10 resultados para Vocational interests.
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.
Resumo:
The paper is divided into four sections. The first offers a critical assessment of explanations of both rationalist and constructivist approaches currently dominating European studies and assesses the notion of path dependence. The second and third sections analyse the role of both material interests and polity ideas in EU enlargement to Turkey, and conclude that explanations exclusively based on either strategic calculations or values and identities have significant shortcomings. The fourth section examines the institutional path of Turkey's candidacy to show how the course of action begun at Helsinki restricted the range of possible and legitimate options three years later in Copenhagen.
Resumo:
A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.
Resumo:
We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.
Resumo:
This article discusses the lessons learned from developing and delivering the Vocational Management Training for the European Tourism Industry (VocMat) online training programme, which was aimed at providing flexible, online distance learning for the European tourism industry. The programme was designed to address managers ‘need for flexible, senior management level training which they could access at a time and place which fitted in with their working and non-work commitments. The authors present two main approaches to using the Virtual Learning Environment, the feedback from the participants, and the implications of online Technology in extending tourism training opportunities
Resumo:
Regulació dels Grup d'interès en la governança europea és crucial per a una comprensió completa de com s'exerceix el poder a la Unió Europea (UE) i per a una descripció més precisa de com funciona el sistema polític de la UE (i dels seus principis subjacents). Un dels temes principals aquí és com els interessos privats o particulars comprometre amb un interès general o públic encarnat en una forma o altra per aquells que actuen per a la UE. Donada la varietat de temes sensibles en joc, no és d'estranyar que la qüestió de la regulació es troba amb una resistència considerable, sobre tot en la Comissió. No obstant això, els recents obstacles a la integració europea han tingut l'efecte de rellançar un debat que fa que l'ètica i la transparència de les peces centrals de l'agenda. Dinàmiques polítiques actuals semblen donar testimoni d'una creixent receptivitat de la UE a les reivindicacions del moviment ALTER-EU que busca un entorn molt més regulat per cabilderos i funcionaris comunitaris.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the factors in_uencing grade performance in two different high school tracks (academic and vocational), including the effect of the amount of work achieved while studying. The empirical strategy analyzes grade progression through the outcomes, passing, repeating and dropping out, conditioning on previous outcomes, and dealing with the endogeneity introduced by the working variable. The analysis is based on a unique Spanish data with information on schooling and labor histories. Findings show that working reduces performance in both tracks, mainly during the first year, although the ffects are less detri- mental in the vocational path. Additionally, good performance in compulsory education, at- tending a private high school, or having high-educated parents improve outcomes, particularly in academic high school.
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntaryinitiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressuregroups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs.Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporategovernance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. Weshow that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in thefirm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful socialactivists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value.These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known socialactivists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders likeCalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.
Resumo:
Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. Variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, political processes and ideological attitudes are the most common explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add to this literature by examining the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. In addition to this, we consider the role of additional aspects, such as intermunicipal cooperation as a potential alternative to privatization in order to exploit scale economies or scope economies. We consider two relevant services: solid waste collection and water distribution. Results from our estimates show that privatization (that is, contracting out to a private firm) is less common for water distribution than for solid waste collection. Higher transaction costs in water distribution are consistent with this finding. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. This shows that those political interests able to influence local elections are more important in determining the form of delivery than is the basic ideological stance of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to local privatization.