Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

The Barcelona Forum: on decentralized governance and conflict prevention 6-8 july 2009

The Barcelona Forum aimed to generate both a theoretical and practical discussion on decentralized governance and its capacity to promote peace, prevent conflict, advance human security and ensure greater governmental accountability. The Forum intended to review the theoretical strength of decentralization as a political tool and discuss how it can be properly implemented. Eight case studies were selected to be covered during the two days in order to draw conclusions and offer proposals for the future implementation of decentralization. The case of Catalonia and the decentralized experience of Spain was given special attention, as an example of successful decentralization. The other cases presented achievements and challenges and prompted discussions on both the validity and universality of decentralization as a way to promote and preserve peace. Topics such as ethnic and territorial divisions, democratic accountability, financial decentralization and distribution, resource sharing, and external implementation of decentralization through peace processes were discussed.

Bringing actors and violent conflict into forced migration literature. A model of the decision to return

Populations displaced as a result of mass violent conflict have become one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns of the last decades. They have also become one salient political issue as a perceived burden (in economic and security terms) and as an important piece in the shift towards a more interventionist paradigm in the international system, based on both humanitarian and security grounds. The saliency of these aspects has detracted attention from the analysis of the interactions between relocation processes and violent conflict. Violent conflict studies have also largely ignored those interactions as a result of the consideration of these processes as mere reaction movements determined by structural conditions. This article takes the view that individual’s agency is retained during such processes, and that it is consequential, calling for the need to introduce a micro perspective. Based on this, a model for the individual’s decision of return is presented. The model has the potential to account for the dynamics of return at both the individual and the aggregate level. And it further helps to grasp fundamental interconnections with violent conflict. Some relevant conclusions are derived for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implications of the politicization of return.

Prevenció de conflictes i governança descentralitzada: alguns comentaris sobre l'estat de la qüestió en la teoria i en la pràctica

Existeix alguna relació entre governabilitat descentralitzada i prevenció de conflictes? El present article intenta respondre a aquesta pregunta presentant la situació actual de la intersecció entre ambdós conceptes. Partint del fet que el conflicte social és inevitable, així com de l’existència de noves amenaces i conflictes i de noves demandes de seguretat basades en les persones (seguretat humana), les nostres societats han d’intentar que els canvis siguin pacífics. A través d’un exhaustiu anàlisis de la bibliografia existent i de l’estudi de diversos casos, aquest article sosté que la governabilitat descentralitzada pot contribuir a aquests esforços transformant conflictes, fomentant el repartiment de poder i augmentant els incentius d’inclusió de grups minoritaris. Tot i la dificultat de mesurar el seu impacte sobre la prevenció de conflictes, s’argumenta que la governabilitat descentralitzada pot tenir un impacte molt positiu en la reducció de les causes que produeixen conflictes gràcies a la seva habilitat per crear war/violence preventors. Més concretament, en aquest article se suggereix que la governabilitat descentralitzada pot influir positivament sobre les causes a curt i mitjà termini.

La prevenció de conflictes de la Unió Europea deu anys després de Göteborg

La Unió Europea (UE) ha fet passos molt significatius des que va adoptar el Programa de Göteborg per a la Prevenció de Conflictes Violents el 2001. Malgrat tot, els obstacles institucionals, una priorització insuficient i la manca d'un compromís polític clar han estat impediments fonamentals perquè la UE concretés les seves ambicions d'erigir-se en un actor global més eficaç en la prevenció de conflictes i la construcció de la pau. La pràctica concreta de la UE encara és el reflex d'una perspectiva de la gestió de les crisis clarament reactiva més que no pas d'un plantejament genuí favorable a la prevenció de conflictes. Aquest document d'actuació, principalment adreçat als qui dicten la política a seguir i les decisions de la UE i dels seus estats membres, exposa que la UE ha de realitzar un canvi que va de la simple gestió de crisis a posar més èmfasi en la prevenció de conflictes, tot augmentant així els seus avantatges comparatius. Això exigeix tenir unes prioritats clares i millorar el sistema d'alarma primerenca de la UE. Cal que la prevenció de conflictes s’integri de forma transversal en totes les polítiques exteriors d'Europa i que constitueixi el nucli del SEAE (el Servei Europeu d'Acció Exterior). Aparentment, el Tractat de Lisboa i el SEAE constitueixen una oportunitat única per a millorar la coherència i l'eficàcia de la UE com a actor globlal. Ara bé, s'està aprofitant aquesta oportunitat fugissera?

State Failure – A Rationale for EU Foreign Policy?

'Estats fallits' ha arribat a ser un lema popular per als acadèmics i els polítics per igual. En opinió dels governs occidentals i les institucions internacionals, els estats fallits no compleixen amb les condicions necessàries per assolir el desenvolupament econòmic i social i alhora proporcionar un terreny fèrtil per als actors violents conflictes i no estatals que participen en la delinqüència internacional. La Unió Europea té una relació de llarga data amb els països de l'Àfrica subsahariana, molts dels quals es caracteritzen per ser fallat. En aquest treball es pretén analitzar si el compromís retòric de la UE per fer front a la insuficiència de l'Estat es tradueix en un enfocament coherent davant les causes profundes de la fragilitat de l'Estat i pregunta pels factors que expliquen el compromís de la UE amb els problemes que enfronten aquests estats. Mitjançant la comparació de les polítiques europees cap a la República Democràtica del Congo, Sierra Leone i la República Centreafricana, s'argumenta que la resposta de la UE als Estats fallits es desenvolupa d'una manera incoherent esbiaixada cap a les situacions de conflicte en lloc de ser guiat per una preocupació més general per fragilitat . L'anàlisi suggereix que la participació de la UE es deu principalment a interessos coincidents en els Estats membres i de la UE.

The Impact of prevention measures and organisational factors on occupational injuries

This paper analyses the impact of a series of managerial and organisational factors on occupational injuries. These consist of occupational safety measures, as regards both the intensity and the orientation of risk prevention in companies, and the adoption of certain work organisation practices, quality management and the use of flexible production technologies. We estimate a negative binomial regression based on a sample of 213 Spanish industrial establishments, defining a constant random parameter to take account of non-observable heterogeneity. Our results show that occupational safety measures, the intensive use of quality management tools and the empowerment of workers all help to reduce the number of injuries. We have also confirmed the presence of synergies between the organisational factors analysed and the development of an occupational safety strategy featuring participation and the extension of prevention to all levels of the organisation.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Creating the Gorizia-Goriska euroregion: an European cross-border administrative model for integrated socio-economic development in the upper adriatic. Crossborder co-operation as a tool for trans-national integration and conflict resolution

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Ethnicity and conflict : an empirical study

This paper examines the impact of ethnic divisions on conflict. The analysis relies on a theoretical model of conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2010) in which equilibrium conflict is shown to be accurately described by a linear function of just three distributional indices of ethnic diversity: the Gini coefficient, the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index, and a measure of polarization. Based on a dataset constructed by James Fearon and data from Ethnologue on ethno-linguistic groups and the "linguistic distances" between them, we compute the three distribution indices. Our results show that ethnic polarization is a highly significant correlate of conflict. Fractionalization is also significant in some of the statistical exercises, but the Gini coefficient never is. In particular, inter-group distances computed from language and embodied in polarization measures turn out to be extremely important correlates of ethnic conflict.