Corporate governance and corporate social performance

By integrating the agency and stakeholder perspectives, this study aims to provide a systematic understanding of the firm- and institutional-level corporate governance factors that affect corporate social performance (CSP). We analyze a large global panel dataset and reveal that CSP is positively associated with board independence, but negatively with ownership concentration. These results underscore the idea that the benefits of CSP do not flow to shareholders to the same extent as the costs and that the allocation of resources to CSP is lower when shareholders are powerful. Furthermore, these findings indicate that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, not only focused on defending shareholder interests. We also find that CSP is negatively related to investor protection and shareholder-oriented environments, while it is positively related to egalitarian environments. Finally, we jointly analyze firm-level drivers and institutional contexts.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

Agency cost of government ownership: a study of voluntary audit comitte formation in China

In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntaryinitiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressuregroups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs.Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporategovernance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. Weshow that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in thefirm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful socialactivists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value.These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known socialactivists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders likeCalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.

Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.

Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.

Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.

International regimes as knowledge syndicates? Energy and trends of global governance

El poder de l'Estat i la sobirania tradicional s'està deteriorant de manera constant, sobretot en termes de la provisió de certs béns públics fonamentals. Els Estats, en particular, són incapaços de manejar el coneixement i la informació que és essencial per mantenir la competitivitat i la sostenibilitat en una economia interdependent. Estructures fiables de la governança mundial i la cooperació internacional estan lluny de ser establertes. Energia com a problema a les agendes p dels governs, les empreses privades i la societat civil és un exemple manifest d'aquesta dinàmica.. L'actual sistema de governança mundial d'energia implica accions polítiques disperses per actors divers. L'Agència Internacional de l'Energia té un paper destacat, però està debilitat per la seva composició limitada i basada en el coneixement- epistèmic en lloc del material o executiu. Aquest treball sosté que ni la mida ni nombre de membres disponibles estan dificultant la governabilitat mundial d'energia. Més aviat, l'energia és una sèrie de béns públics que es troben als llimbs, on els estats no poden pagar la seva disposició, així com els diversos interessos impedir l'establiment d'una autoritat internacional. Després de la introducció de la teoria del règim internacional i el concepte de coneixement basats en les comunitats epistèmiques, l'article revisa l'estat actual de la governabilitat de l'energia mundia. A continuació es presenta una comparació d'aquesta estructura amb els règims de govern nacional i regional, d'una banda, i amb règims globals ambientals i de salut, de l'altra

The Emergence and Governance of Euroregions: The Case of the Euregio on the Dutch-German Border

Amb una història que data de la dècada de 1950, la EUREGIO és un de les més antigues euroregions a Europa. Es pot considerar com un cas exitós d'una regió transfronterera (CBR) en el sentit que s'ha establert fermament com una agència de fronteres dins del seu tram de la frontera holandesa-alemanya. L'EUREGIO també ha estat una de les protagonistes principals darrere de l'Associació de Regions Frontereres Europees (ARFE), que en les últimes dècades va actuar per difondre el model d'euroregió a tot el territori europeu. Aquest capítol té diversos objectius. En primer lloc, es presenta el cas de la EUREGIO i presenta evidència sobre la seva història, estructura orgànica i polítiques. En segon lloc, s'analitzen les condicions del context en què la EUREGIO ha sorgit i les estructures de govern que es van crear com a resultat. Es fa especial èmfasi en la posició i el paper de l'Euroregió en el context més ampli del marc de governança europea multinivell generat per la política de cohesió de la UE. El capítol conclou amb un intent d'avaluar l'èxit i l'impacte de la EUREGIO i una discussió dels reptes relacionats amb la doble funció de l'EUREGIO com a representant dels interessos de les autoritats locals i les agències de cohesió de la UE posada en pràctica de les polítiques.

Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

Credit lines: The other side of corporate liquidity

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage ofcredit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings oncorporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and thataverage undrawn credit is of the same order of magnitude as cash holdings. We test thetrade-off theory of liquidity according to which firms target an optimum level of liquidity,computed as the sum of cash and undrawn credit lines. We provide support for the existenceof a liquidity target, but also show that the reasons why firms hold cash and credit linesare very different. While the precautionary motive explains well cash holdings, the optimumlevel of credit lines appears to be driven by the restrictions imposed by the credit line itself,in terms of stated purpose and covenants. In support to these findings, credit line drawdownsare associated with capital expenditures, acquisitions, and working capital.

Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Generating global brand equity through corporate social responsibility to key stakeholders

In this paper we argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) to various stakeholders(customers, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and community) has a positive effect on globalbrand equity (BE). In addition, policies aimed at satisfying community interests help reinforcecredibility to social responsible polices with other stakeholders. We test these theoreticalcontentions using panel data comprised of 57 global brands originating from 10 countries (USA,Japan, South Korea, France, UK, Italy, Germany, Finland, Switzerland and the Netherlands) forthe period 2002 to 2008. Our findings show that CSR to each of the stakeholder groups has apositive impact on global BE. In addition, global brands that follow local social responsibilitypolicies over communities obtain strong positive benefits in terms of the generation of BE, as itenhances the positive effects of CSR to other stakeholders, particularly to customers. Therefore,for managers of global brands it is particularly productive for generating brand value to combineglobal strategies with the satisfaction of the interests of local communities.