Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits

We develop an equilibrium search-matching model with risk-neutral agentsand two-sided ex-ante heterogeneity. Unemployment insurance has thestandard effect of reducing employment, but also helps workers to get a suitable job. The predictions of our simple modelare consistent with the contrasting performance of the labor market in Europeand US in terms of unemployment, productivity growth and wage inequality.To show this, we construct two fictitious economies with calibratedparameters which only differ by the degree of unemployment insurance andassume that they are hit by a common technological shock which enhancesthe importance of mismatch. This shock reduces the proportion of jobs whichworkers regards as acceptable in the economy with unemployment insurance(Europe). As a result, unemployment doubles in this economy.In the laissez-faire economy (US), unemployment remains constant,but wage inequality increases more and productivity grows less due to largermismatch. The model can be used to address a number of normative issues.