Gender inequalities in occupational health related to the unequal distribution of working and employment conditions: a systematic review

Gender inequalities exist in work life, but little is known about their presence in relation to factors examined in occupation health settings. The aim of this study was to identify and summarize the working and employment conditions described as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health in studies related to occupational health published between 1999 and 2010. A systematic literature review was undertaken of studies available in MEDLINE, EMBASE, Sociological Abstracts, LILACS, EconLit and CINAHL between 1999 and 2010. Epidemiologic studies were selected by applying a set of inclusion criteria to the title, abstract, and complete text. The quality of the studies was also assessed. Selected studies were qualitatively analysed, resulting in a compilation of all differences between women and men in the prevalence of exposure to working and employment conditions and work-related health problems as outcomes. Most of the 30 studies included were conducted in Europe (n=19) and had a cross-sectional design (n=24). The most common topic analysed was related to the exposure to work-related psychosocial hazards (n=8). Employed women had more job insecurity, lower control, worse contractual working conditions and poorer self-perceived physical and mental health than men did. Conversely, employed men had a higher degree of physically demanding work, lower support, higher levels of effort-reward imbalance, higher job status, were more exposed to noise and worked longer hours than women did. This systematic review has identified a set of working and employment conditions as determinants of gender inequalities in occupational health from the occupational health literature. These results may be useful to policy makers seeking to reduce gender inequalities in occupational health, and to researchers wishing to analyse these determinants in greater depth.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Planificación de aplicaciones best-effort y soft real-time en NOWs

La aparición de nuevos tipos de aplicaciones, como vídeo bajo demanda, realidad virtual y videoconferencias entre otras, caracterizadas por la necesidad de cumplir sus deadlines. Este tipo de aplicaciones, han sido denominadas en la literatura aplicaciones soft-real time (SRT) periódicas. Este trabajo se centra en el problema de la planificación temporal de este nuevo tipo de aplicaciones en clusters no dedicados.

Improving the effort concept: a revision of the traditional approach in the context of controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments

The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explains why, some effici

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies can vary substantially depending on their characteristics. Specifically, the amount and intensity of such subsidies are crucial issues in the design of public schemes supporting private R&D. Public agencies determine the intensities of R&D subsidies for firms in line with their eligibility criteria, although assessing the effects of R&D projects accurately is far from straightforward. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there is an optimal intensity for R&D subsidies through an analysis of their impact on private R&D effort. We examine the decisions of a public agency to grant subsidies taking into account not only the characteristics of the firms but also, as few previous studies have done to date, those of the R&D projects. In determining the optimal subsidy we use both parametric and nonparametric techniques. The results show a non-linear relationship between the percentage of subsidy received and the firms’ R&D effort. These results have implications for technology policy, particularly for the design of R&D subsidies that ensure enhanced effectiveness.

An ex-post view of inequality of opportunity in France and its regions

This paper proposes an ex-post measure of inequality of opportunity in France and its regions by assessing the inequality between individuals exerting the same effort. To this end, we define a fair income that fulfils ex-post equality of opportunity requirements. Unfairness is measured by an unfair Gini based on the distance between the actual income and the fair income. Our findings reveal that the measures of ex-post inequality of opportunity largely vary across regions, and that this is due to di_erences in reward schemes and in the impact of the non responsibility factors of income. We find that most regions have actual incomes closer to fair incomes than to average income, excepted Ile de France where the actual income looks poorly related to effort variables. Finally, we find that income inequality and inequality of opportunity are positively correlated among regions.

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Functional connectivity of reward processing in the brain

Controversial results have been reported concerning the neural mechanisms involved in the processing of rewards and punishments. On the one hand, there is evidence suggesting that monetary gains and losses activate a similar fronto-subcortical network. On the other hand, results of recent studies imply that reward and punishment may engage distinct neural mechanisms. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we investigated both regional and interregional functional connectivity patterns while participants performed a gambling task featuring unexpectedly high monetary gains and losses. Classical univariate statistical analysis showed that monetary gains and losses activated a similar fronto-striatallimbic network, in which main activation peaks were observed bilaterally in the ventral striatum. Functional connectivity analysis showed similar responses for gain and loss conditions in the insular cortex, the amygdala, and the hippocampus that correlated with the activity observed in the seed region ventral striatum, with the connectivity to the amygdala appearing more pronounced after losses. Larger functional connectivity was found to the medial orbitofrontal cortex for negative outcomes. The fact that different functional patterns were obtained with both analyses suggests that the brain activations observed in the classical univariate approach identifi es the involvement of different functional networks in the current task. These results stress the importance of studying functional connectivity in addition to standard fMRI analysis in reward-related studies.

Characterization of Reward Functions in Networks with Costs

In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities for cooperation are restricted and can not be described by a cooperative game. The benefits of a group of players depend on how these players are internally connected. One way to represent this type of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the profits obtainable by the total coalition if links can be used to coordinate agents' actions. The starting point of this paper is the work of Vilaseca et al. where they characterized the reward function. We concentrate on those situations where there exist costs for establishing communication links. Given a reward function and a costs function, our aim is to analyze under what conditions it is possible to associate a cooperative game to it. We characterize the reward function in networks structures with costs for establishing links by means of two conditions, component permanence and component additivity. Finally, an economic application is developed to illustrate the main theoretical result.

The influence of decision-maker effort and case complexity on appealed rulings subject to multi-categorical selection

This study extends the standard econometric treatment of appellate court outcomes by 1) considering the role of decision-maker effort and case complexity, and 2) adopting a multi-categorical selection process of appealed cases. We find evidence of appellate courts being affected by both the effort made by first-stage decision makers and case complexity. This illustrates the value of widening the narrowly defined focus on heterogeneity in individual-specific preferences that characterises many applied studies on legal decision-making. Further, the majority of appealed cases represent non-random sub-samples and the multi-categorical selection process appears to offer advantages over the more commonly used dichotomous selection models.