An empirical analysis of a merger between a network and low-cost airlines

We use a difference-in-difference estimator to examine the effects of a merger involving three airlines. The novelty lies in the examination of this operation in two distinct scenarios: (1) on routes where two low-cost carriers and (2) on routes where a network and one of the low-cost airlines had previously been competing. We report a reduction in frequencies but no substantial effect on prices in the first scenario, while in the second we report an increase in prices but no substantial effect on frequencies. These results may be attributed to the differences in passenger types flying on these routes.

Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

Merger failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interactionbetween the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informationalasymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation andcoordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree tomerge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partnerto make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goesahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers aremore likely to fail.