A Comparison of the poverty impact of transfers, taxes and market income across five OECD Countries

This paper compares the poverty reduction impact of income sources, taxes and transfers across five OECD countries. Since the estimation of that impact can depend on the order in which the various income sources are introduced into the analysis, it is done by using the Shapley value. Estimates of the poverty reduction impact are presented in a normalized and un-normalized fashion, in order to take into into account the total as well as the per dollar impacts. The methodology is applied to data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database.

Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.

Intergovernmental Transfers and Elementary Education: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Whether providing additional resources to local communities leads to improved public services and better outcomes more generally, given existing management capacity and incentive and accountability structures, is an unresolved yet important question for public policy. This paper uses a regression-discontinuity design to evaluate the effect of unrestricted fiscal transfers on local spending (including on education), schooling and learning in Brazil. Results show that transfers increase local public spending almost one for one with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or other revenue sources. Extra per capita transfers of 1000 Reais lead to about 0.42 additional years of elementary schooling and student literacy rates increase by about 5.6 percentage points on average. Part of this effect arises through higher teacher-student ratios in municipal elementary school systems. Results also suggest that additional resources have stronger effects in more rural and less developed parts of Brazil.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Do interregional transfers improve the economic performance of poor regions? The case of Spain

The 17 regional governments of Spain receive grants from both thecentral government and the European Union. The grants are generallyredistributive and are intended to stimulate economic activity inthe poorer regions. We evaluate the effectiveness of the grants bycomparing the economic performance of the regions before and afterthe implementation of the grant programs using a differences--in--differences approach. We find that these policies have not beeneffective at stimulating private investment or improving the overalleconomies of the poorer regions.

The long-run and intergenerational education impacts of intergovernmental transfers

This paper provides regression discontinuity evidence on long-run and intergenerational education impacts of a temporary increase in federal transfers to local governments in Brazil. Revenues and expenditures of the communities benefiting from extra transfers temporarily increased by about 20% during the 4 year period from 1982 to the end of 1985. Schooling and literacy gains for directly exposed cohorts established in previous work that used the 1991 census are attenuated but persist in the 2000 and 2010 censuses. Children and adolescents of the next generation --born after the extra funding had disappeared-- show gains of about 0.08 standard deviation across the entire score distribution of two nationwide exams at the end of the 2000s. While we find no evidence of persistent improvements in school resources, we document discontinuities in education levels, literacy rates and incomes of test takers' parents that are consistent with intergenerational human capital spillovers.

Desenvolupament d'un sistema de transferència de software per una placa entrenadora

El departament d’electrònica i telecomunicacions de la Universitat de Vic ha dissenyat un conjunt de plaques entrenadores amb finalitat educativa. Perquè els alumnes puguin utilitzar aquestes plaques com a eina d’estudi, és necessari disposar d’un sistema de gravació econòmic i còmode. La major part dels programadors, en aquest cas, no compleixen amb aquests requeriments. L’objectiu d’aquest projecte és dissenyar un sistema de programació que utilitzi la comunicació sèrie i que no requereixi d'un hardware ni software específics. D’aquesta manera, obtenim una placa autònoma i un programador gratuït, de muntatge ràpid i simple d’utilitzar. El sistema de gravació dissenyat s’ha dividit en tres blocs. Per una banda, un programa que anomenem “programador” encarregat de transferir codi de programa des de l’ordinador al microcontrolador de la placa entrenadora. Per altra banda, un programa anomenat “bootloader”, situat al microcontrolador, permet rebre aquest codi de programa i emmagatzemar-lo a les direccions de memòria de programa corresponents. Com a tercer bloc, s’implementa un protocol de comunicació i un sistema de control d’errors per tal d’assegurar una correcta comunicació entre el “programador” i el “bootloader”. Els objectius d’aquest projecte s’han complert i per les proves realitzades, el sistema de programació ha funcionat correctament.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

FOSS issues in technology transfers from the University to the Industry

FOSS has always been particularly welcome in Universities. Its spirit corresponds generally with the academic state of mind, and royalty-free technologies are particularly appreciated where money is usually lacking.But at the opposite side of the spectrum, the universities¿ TTO¿s (Technology Transfer Officers) are supposed to ¿valorize¿ the production of research departments and to enable profit making cooperations with the industry. How should FOSS licensing be tackled in such context?