Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

Are we wasting our talent? Overqualification and overskilling among PhD graduates

Drawing on a very rich data set from a recent cohort of PhD graduates, we examine the correlates and consequences of qualification and skills mismatch. We show that job characteristics such as the economic sector and the main activity at work play a fundamental direct role in explaining the probability of being well matched. However, the effect of academic attributes seems to be mainly indirect, since it disappears once we control for the full set of work characteristics. We detected a significant earnings penalty for those who are both overqualified and overskilled and also showed that being mismatched reduces job satisfaction, especially for those whose skills are underutilized. Overall, the problem of mismatch among PhD graduates is closely related to demand-side constraints of the labor market. Increasing the supply of adequate jobs and broadening the skills PhD students acquire during training should be explored as possible responses.