Una casa, una història: patrimoni arquitectònic i humà d'una casa de la Selva del Camp

Treball de recerca realitzat per una alumna d'ensenyament secundari i guardonat amb un Premi CIRIT per fomentar l'esperit científic del Jovent l'any 2009. El treball té com a objecte de recerca un habitatge del municipi de la Selva del Camp. Aquest, es centra tant en els aspectes artístics i decoratius, com en l’anàlisi de l’evolució patrimonial i l’ús social de l’edifici entre els segles XVIII-XX. En la recerca s’ha analitzat, per una banda, el procés de transformació de l’edifici des de l’any 1749 i els elements artístics que encara s’hi conserven com pintures neoclàssiques, treballs de ferro forjat, etc., els quals fan que sigui una de les cases més emblemàtiques del Carrer Major de la Selva. D’altra banda, s’ha indagat en les diferents generacions que, des de mitjan segle XVIII, n’han tingut la propietat i el paper que aquestes famílies han jugat dins la societat selvatana. La casa, en aquests anys, ha pertanyut a dues famílies i al Sindicat Agrícola. La primera, els Fortuny, terratinents i amb càrrecs al govern municipal; l'altra, els Carnicer, comerciants d'avellanes dels quals jo en sóc descendent. De 1910 a 1920 la casa fou al seu del Sindicat Agrícola i a partir de textos de Puig i Ferreter s’ha pogut descriure l’ambient que s'hi vivia i les activitats que s’hi duien a terme. Alhora, el fet d’analitzar les diferents funcions que l’edifici ha tingut al llarg d’aquests anys (residència familiar, corredoria de comerç, premsa d’oli, seu del Centre Republicà o del Sindicat Agrícola) ha permès explicar la història de la vila de la Selva a partir de la d’aquest edifici.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Uso de e-books en bibliotecas universitarias de Estados Unidos: datos para salir del"Big Mess"

Reseña de: 2012 survey of ebook usage in U.S. academic libraries: third annual survey. LJ/SLJ Library Research Syndicate (LRS). [New York, N.Y.]: Library Journal, 2012. 93 p. Disponible en línea en: [consulta: 14 nov. 2012].

De Andrew Carnegie a OverDrive, Amazon y ¿algo más? Biblioteca pública y préstamo de libros digitales en Estados Unidos

Ressenya de: 2012 survey of ebook usage in U.S. public libraries: third annual survey. LJ/SLJ Library Research Syndicate (LRS). [New York, N.Y.]: Library Journal, 2012. 108 p. Disponible en línia a: [Consulta: 27 feb. 2013].