An alternative way to model merit good arguments

Besley (1988) uses a scaling approach to model merit good arguments in commodity tax policy. In this paper, I question this approach on the grounds that it produces 'wrong' recommendations--taxation (subsidisation) of merit (demerit) goods--whenever the demand for the (de)merit good is inelastic. I propose an alternative approach that does not suffer from this deficiency, and derive the ensuing first and second best tax rules, as well as the marginal cost expressions to perform tax reform analysis.

Reference prices: the spanish way

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of recent regulatory reforms that Spanish Health Authorities have implemented in the pharmaceutical market: the introduction of a reference price system together with the promotion of generic drugs. The main objectives of these two reforms are to increase price competition and, ultimately, reduce pharmaceutical costs. Before the introduction of reference prices, consumers had to pay a fixed copayment of the price of whatever drug purchased. With the introduction of such system, the situation differs in the following way: if (s)he buys the more expensive branded drug, then (s)he pays a sum of two elements: the copayment associated to the reference price plus the difference between the price of this good and the reference price. However, if the consumer decides to buy the generic alternative, with price lower than the reference price, then (s)he has to pay the same copayment as before. We show that the introduction of a reference price system together with the promotion of generic drugs increase price competition and lower pharmaceutical costs only if the reference price is set in a certain interval. Also profits for the duopolists might be reduced. These results are due to the opposing effects that reference prices have on branded and generic producers respectively.

A Retail benchmarking approach to eficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network covera.

Dualizing complexes-The modern way

We give a survey of some recent results on Grothendieck duality. We begin with a brief reminder of the classical theory, and then launch into an overview of some of the striking developments since 2005.

A way to play bankruptcy problems.

The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

On the way to solve lighting problems in underwater imaging

A major obstacle to processing images of the ocean floor comes from the absorption and scattering effects of the light in the aquatic environment. Due to the absorption of the natural light, underwater vehicles often require artificial light sources attached to them to provide the adequate illumination. Unfortunately, these flashlights tend to illuminate the scene in a nonuniform fashion, and, as the vehicle moves, induce shadows in the scene. For this reason, the first step towards application of standard computer vision techniques to underwater imaging requires dealing first with these lighting problems. This paper analyses and compares existing methodologies to deal with low-contrast, nonuniform illumination in underwater image sequences. The reviewed techniques include: (i) study of the illumination-reflectance model, (ii) local histogram equalization, (iii) homomorphic filtering, and, (iv) subtraction of the illumination field. Several experiments on real data have been conducted to compare the different approaches

The analysis of the framing processes of the Basque peace movement: The way Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz changed society

During more than 20 years organisations like Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri had been trying to change the social approach to violence, instilling values of peace and dialogue. This working paper defends the idea that the work of these two organisations is key to understand the end of ETA violence and the lack of support that political violence has in the Basque Country. It develops the Basque peace frame generated by this movement and explains how this frame is present in the different levels of Basque society, changing the way political collective identities are negotiated in the Basque Country. Ultimately, their effort is to propose another way of doing politics, one where nationalism and violence are not intrinsically united, escaping from the polarization and confrontation that were in place during the 80s-90s.

Capital cities of federations. On the way to analysing the normative base of their asymmetrical status

Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.

A Simple Access Pricing Rule to Achieve the Ramsey Outcome in Two-Way Access

In this paper, I consider a general and informationally effcient approach to determine the optimal access rule and show that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. My approach is informationally effcient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique access rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium as long as there exists at least a mild degree of substitutability among networks' services.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Thomas Mann's Death in Venice or Plutarch's way towards Eros

In Death in Venice Thomas Mann refers explicitly to Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus in order to explain the relationship between Gustav von Aschenbach and Tadzio but he hides that his novel also depends on Plutarch's Eroticus. Why? The aim of this article is precisely to reveal the different reasons for such an attitude. Indeed, Plutarch speaks highly of conjugal love in his Eroticus and this way is not followed by Mann in Death in Venice but, at the same, the German writer finds in this Plutarch's philosophical dialogue all the necessary elements to build his story of masculine love and decides not to manage without it.

Billy Budd: from H. Melville to E. M. Forster, or Plutarch's way to Plató

The aim of this article is to propose and lay the foundations of a Plutarch's way ¿not only his Lives but also his Eroticus- to the Platonic content of Billy Budd by B. Britten with a libretto by E. M. Forster in association with Eric Crozier. Plutarch is not quoted in H. Melville¿s novel, but E. M. Forster¿s good knowledge of the texts by the Greek writer and philosopher makes this hypothesis quite credible

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.

A aldraxe proverbial da preguiza nas dúas versións españolas de The Way to Wealth de Benjamin Franklin

A admiración que destilou no seu tempo e durante o século XIX o bo sentido común das obras de Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) plasmouse na tradución dos seus libros a un considerable número de linguas. The Way to Wealth (El camino de la fortuna o Cómo hacerse rico), publicado en 1758, contén máis de cen máximas que instan ao traballo honrado, á orde e ao aforro, condenando calquera sinal de preguiza ou desidia. O noso corpus nútrese dunha selección de trece aforismos que teñen relación precisamente con este vicio que condena á miseria, a preguiza. En cambio, o home de ben que aplique as virtudes contidas en The Way to Wealth, aconselladas a modo de refráns, verá, segundo o autor, prosperar esplendidamente a súa economía. Pretendemos analizar, dende os puntos de vista tradutolóxico e contrastivo, o corpus de dúas traducións españolas deste libriño de Franklin: unha anónima, publicada en Barcelona, en 1891; e a de Alberto Lena de 1999.