Surface collective oscillations of metal clusters and spheres: Random-phase-approximation sum-rules approach

Using the once and thrice energy-weighted moments of the random-phase-approximation strength function, we have derived compact expressions for the average energy of surface collective oscillations of clusters and spheres of metal atoms. The L=0 volume mode has also been studied. We have carried out quantal and semiclassical calculations for Na and Ag systems in the spherical-jellium approximation. We present a rather thorough discussion of surface diffuseness and quantal size effects on the resonance energies.

Sum rules and short-range correlations in nuclear matter at finite temperature

The nucleon spectral function in nuclear matter fulfills an energy weighted sum rule. Comparing two different realistic potentials, these sum rules are studied for Greens functions that are derived self-consistently within the T matrix approximation at finite temperature.

Sum rules and correlations in asymmetric nuclear matter

The neutron and proton single-particle spectral functions in asymmetric nuclear matter fulfill energy-weighted sum rules. The validity of these sum rules within the self-consistent Green's function approach is investigated. The various contributions to these sum rules and their convergence as a function of energy provide information about correlations induced by the realistic interaction between the nucleons. The study of the sum rules in asymmetric nuclear matter exhibits the isospin dependence of the nucleon-nucleon correlations.

Energy-weighted sum rules for mesons in hot and dense matter

We study energy-weighted sum rules of the pion and kaon propagator in nuclear matter at finite temperature. The sum rules are obtained from matching the Dyson form of the meson propagator with its spectral Lehmann representation at low and high energies. We calculate the sum rules for specific models of the kaon and pion self-energy. The in-medium spectral densities of the K and (K) over bar mesons are obtained from a chiral unitary approach in coupled channels that incorporates the S and P waves of the kaon-nucleon interaction. The pion self-energy is determined from the P-wave coupling to particle-hole and Delta-hole excitations, modified by short-range correlations. The sum rules for the lower-energy weights are fulfilled satisfactorily and reflect the contributions from the different quasiparticle and collective modes of the meson spectral function. We discuss the sensitivity of the sum rules to the distribution of spectral strength and their usefulness as quality tests of model calculations.

Dynamic structure function in 3-4He mixtures

Relevant features of the dynamic structure function S(q,¿) in 3-4He mixtures at zero temperature are investigated starting from known properties of the ground state. Sum rules are used to fix rigorous constraints to the different contributions to S(q,¿), coming from 3He and 4He elementary excitations, as well as to explore the role of the cross term S(3,4)(q,¿). Both the low-q (phonon-roton 4He excitations and 1p-1h 3He excitations) and high-q (deep-inelastic-scattering) ranges are discussed.

Structure and far-infrared edge modes of quantum antidots at zero magnetic field

We have investigated edge modes of different multipolarity sustained by quantum antidots at zero magnetic field. The ground state of the antidot is described within a local-density-functional formalism. Two sum rules, which are exact within this formalism, have been derived and used to evaluate the energy of edge collective modes as a function of the surface density and the size of the antidot.

Nuclear incompressibility in the quasilocal density functional theory

We explore the ability of the recently established quasilocal density functional theory for describing the isoscalar giant monopole resonance. Within this theory we use the scaling approach and perform constrained calculations for obtaining the cubic and inverse energy weighted moments (sum rules) of the RPA strength. The meaning of the sum rule approach in this case is discussed. Numerical calculations are carried out using Gogny forces and an excellent agreement is found with HF+RPA results previously reported in literature. The nuclear matter compression modulus predicted in our model lies in the range 210230 MeV which agrees with earlier findings. The information provided by the sum rule approach in the case of nuclei near the neutron drip line is also discussed.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Learning the ropes and embracing the rules: CFSP institutions as arenas for learning and strategic socialisation

The aim of this article is to analyse those situations in which learning and socialisation take place within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in particular, at the level of experts in the Council Working Groups. Learning can explain the institutional development of CFSP and changes in the foreign policies of the Member States. Some scope conditions for learning and channels of institutionalisation are identified. Socialisation, resulting from learning within a group, is perceived as a strategic action by reflective actors. National diplomats, once they arrive in Brussels, learn the new code of conduct of their Working Groups. They are embedded in two environments and faced with two logics: the European one in the Council and the national one in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The empirical evidence supports the argument that neither rational nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes.