The role of interbank markets in monetary policy: A model with rationing

This paper analyses the impact of asymmetric information in the interbankmarket and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetarypolicy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfectionsinduce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two majorimplications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to theuser cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect)and, second, it shows that banks liquidity positions condition their reaction tomonetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect).

Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Structural changes in the US economy: is there a role for monetary policy?

This paper investigates the contribution of monetary policy to the changes in outputgrowth and inflation dynamics in the US. We identify a policy shock and a policy rule ina time-varying coefficients VAR using robust sign restrictions. The transmission of policyshocks has been relatively stable. The variance of the policy shock has decreased over time,but policy shocks account for a small fraction of the level and of the variations in inflationand output growth volatility and persistence. We find little evidence of a significant increasein the long run response of the interest rate to inflation. A more aggressive inflation policyin the 1970s would have produced large output growth costs.

Structural changes in the US economy: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?

This paper investigates the relationship between time variations in output and inflation dynamics and monetary policy in the US. There are changes in the structural coefficients and in the variance of the structural shocks. The policy rules in the 1970s and 1990s are similar as is the transmission of policy disturbances. Inflation persistence is only partly a monetary phenomena. Variations in the systematic component of policy have limited effects on the dynamics of output and inflation. Results are robust to alterations in the auxiliary assumptions.

Identifying monetary policy shocks in Japan

It is sometimes argued that the central banks influence the private economy in the short run through controlling a specific component of high powered money, not its total amount. Using a structural VAR approach, this paper evaluates this claim empirically, in the context of the Japanese economy. I estimate a model based on the standard view that the central bank controls the total amount of high powered money, and another model based on the alternative view that it controls only a specific component. It is shown that the former yields much more sensible estimates than thelatter.

Spanish monetary policy: A structural VAR analysis

Some past studies analyzed Spanish monetary policy with the standard VAR. Their problem is that this method obliges researchers to impose a certain extreme form of the short run policy rule on their models. Hence, it does not allow researchers to study the possibility of structural changes in this rule, either. This paper overcomes these problems by using the structural VAR. I find that the rule has always been that of partial accommodation. Prior to 1984, it was quite close to money targeting. After 1984, it became closer to the interest rate targeting, with more emphasis on the exchange rate.

Monetary policy misspecification in VAR models

We examine the effects of extracting monetary policy disturbances with semi-structural and structural VARs, using data generated bya limited participation model under partial accommodative and feedback rules. We find that, in general, misspecification is substantial: short run coefficients often have wrong signs; impulse responses and variance decompositions give misleadingrepresentations of the dynamics. Explanations for the results and suggestions for macroeconomic practice are provided.

Monetary policy shocks and transmission in Italy: A VAR analysis

This paper provides updated empirical evidence about the real and nominal effects of monetary policy in Italy, by using structural VAR analysis. We discuss different empirical approaches that have been used in order to identify monetary policy exogenous shocks. We argue that the data support the view that the Bank of Italy, at least in the recent past, has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how different macroeconomic variables react to such shocks.

Why did London become the main money market? Monetary Policy, Arbitrage and European Money Market Integration in 18th century

How did the leading capital market start to attract international bullion? Why did London become the main money market? Monetary regulations, including the charges for minting money and the restrictions on bullion exchange, have played the key role in defining the direction of the flow of international bullion. Countries that abolished minting charges and permitted the free movement of bullion were able to attract international bullion, and countries that applied minting taxes suffered an outflow of bullion. In these cases monetary authorities tried to limit bullion movement through prohibitions on domestic bullion exchange at a free price, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bullion exports. The paper illustrates the logic of international monetary flow in the 18th century, using empirical evidence for England, France and Spain. The first section defines and measures monetary policy, and the second section introduces minting charges into the arbitrage equation in order to explain the logic of bullion flow between the pairs of nations England-France, England-Spain and France-Spain. The conclusion emphasises the importance of monetary policy in the creation of leading money markets.

The Monetary policy rules in EU-15: before and after the euro

The objective of this paper is to identify empirically the logic behind short-term interest rates setting

The Monetary policy rules in Europe: heterogeneity and common patters

The objective of this study is the empirical identification of the monetary policy rules pursued in individual countries of EU before and after the launch of European Monetary Union. In particular, we have employed an estimation of the augmented version of the Taylor rule (TR) for 25 countries of the EU in two periods (1992-1998, 1999-2006). While uniequational estimation methods have been used to identify the policy rules of individual central banks, for the rule of the European Central Bank has been employed a dynamic panel setting. We have found that most central banks really followed some interest rate rule but its form was usually different from the original TR (proposing that domestic interest rate responds only to domestic inflation rate and output gap). Crucial features of policy rules in many countries have been the presence of interest rate smoothing as well as response to foreign interest rate. Any response to domestic macroeconomic variables have been missing in the rules of countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes and the rules consisted in mimicking of the foreign interest rates. While we have found response to long-term interest rates and exchange rate in rules of some countries, the importance of monetary growth and asset prices has been generally negligible. The Taylor principle (the response of interest rates to domestic inflation rate must be more than unity as a necessary condition for achieving the price stability) has been confirmed only in large economies and economies troubled with unsustainable inflation rates. Finally, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the rule-implied target rate can be interpreted as policy shocks (these deviation often coincided with actual turbulent periods).

The Monetary policy rules and the inflation process in open emerging

This paper has three objectives. First, it aims at revealing the logic of interest rate setting pursued by monetary authorities of 12 new EU members. Using estimation of an augmented Taylor rule, we find that this setting was not always consistent with the official monetary policy. Second, we seek to shed light on the inflation process of these countries. To this end, we carry out an estimation of an open economy Philips curve (PC). Our main finding is that inflation rates were not only driven by backward persistency but also held a forward-looking component. Finally, we assess the viability of existing monetary arrangements for price stability. The analysis of the conditional inflation variance obtained from GARCH estimation of PC is used for this purpose. We conclude that inflation targeting is preferable to an exchange rate peg because it allowed decreasing the inflation rate and anchored its volatility.

How does monetary policy change? evidence on inflation targeting countries

We examine the evolution of monetary policy rules in a group of inflation targeting countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom) applying moment- based estimator at time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. Using this novel flexible framework, our main findings are threefold. First, monetary policy rules change gradually pointing to the importance of applying time-varying estimation framework. Second, the interest rate smoothing parameter is much lower that what previous time-invariant estimates of policy rules typically report. External factors matter for all countries, albeit the importance of exchange rate diminishes after the adoption of inflation targeting. Third, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods, when central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the U.K. or in Australia at the beginning of 1980s. Contrary to common wisdom, the response becomes less aggressive after the adoption of inflation targeting suggesting the positive effect of this regime on anchoring inflation expectations. This result is supported by our finding that inflation persistence as well as policy neutral rate typically decreased after the adoption of inflation targeting.

Is monetary policy in new members states asymmetric?

Estimated Taylor rules became popular as a description of monetary policy conduct. There are numerous reasons why real monetary policy can be asymmetric and estimated Taylor rule nonlinear. This paper tests whether monetary policy can be described as asymmetric in three new European Union (EU) members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), which apply an inflation targeting regime. Two different empirical frameworks are