Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Inteligencia competitiva: corpus teórico y prácticas.

Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar un estado de la cuestión del principal corpus teórico de la inteligencia competitiva (IC). La literatura actual está compuesta por trabajos realizados por profesionales y por académicos. Este hecho y su origen multidisciplinar están originando cierta dispersión de temas vinculados a los procesos de IC y a su organización, que requieren de cierta unificación. Se exponen las temáticas detectadas: terminología, organización de la función, descripción de los procesos, evaluación,modelos existentes, y factores facilitadores e inhibidores de las prácticas de IC. Por último, se señala la necesidad de seguir con trabajos empíricos que validen el constructo existente, y de profundizar en dos líneas de investigación: la integración de los marcos teóricos existentes y la identificación de los factores facilitadores e inhibidores de las prácticas.

The Strategic Adaptation of Party Organizations to New Information and Communication Technologies : A Study of Catalan and Spanish Parties

Aquest document se centra en els casos dels dos principals partits espanyols (PP i PSOE) i catalans (PSC i CDC) en el període immediatament després de les eleccions generals espanyoles de maig de 2008, quan aquests celebraren els seus congressos. En general, es poden distingir tres tipus d'actors: en primer lloc, els ciberactivistes que tracten d'obtenir el reconeixement formal de la seva activitat en els seus partits. Així com, els líders del partit que poden intentar promoure la presència del partit en el ciberespai, però que també poden romandre indecisos perquè no és clar l'impacte electoral a la xarxa del ciberactivisme. Finalment, alguns militants tradicionals (off-line) solen ser reticents al reconeixement del ciberactivisme perquè amenaça les recompenses previstes dins del partit. Aquest article mostra com els nostres partits varen respondre al desafiament del ciberactivisme i arriba a la conclusió que la seva situació electoral, mediada per la seva ideologia, estructura organitzativa i el tipus de militància, poden ajudar-nos a comprendre el grau diferent d'institucionalització en l'organització del partit.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Complementarity between segment disclosure and earnings quality, and its effect on cost of capital

We investigate the role of earnings quality in determining the levels of segment disclosure, and whether and how better quality earnings and segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Using a large US sample for the period 2001-2006, we find a positive relation between earnings quality and levels of segment disclosures. We also find that firms providing better quality segment information, contingent upon good earnings quality, enjoy lower cost of capital. We base our empirical tests on a self created index of segment disclosure. Our results contribute to a better understanding of (1) the incentives for providing segment disclosures, and (2) how accounting quality (quality of segment information and earnings quality) is related to the cost of capital.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Integration in strategic alliances : a conceptual framework of IT use in marketing as NPD key factor

En una economia basada en el coneixement, la innovació del producte es considera un factor clau a l'hora de determinar la competitivitat, la productivitat i el creixement d'una companyia. No obstant això, l'experiència de les companyies demostra la necessitat d'un nou model de gestió de la innovació del producte: una gestió basada en el màrqueting, en què la cooperació i l'ús intensiu de les tecnologies de la informació i de la comunicació (TIC) són especialment importants. En els darrers anys, la bibliografia sobre màrqueting ha analitzat el paper de la cooperació en l'èxit del procés d'innovació. No obstant això, fins ara pocs treballs han estudiat el paper que té l'ús de les TIC en el màrqueting en l'èxit del desenvolupament de nous productes (NPD, New Product Development en anglès). És una omissió curiosa, tenint en compte que el nou entorn competitiu és definit per una economia i una societat basades principalment en l'ús intensiu de les TIC i del coneixement. L'objectiu d'aquest treball és investigar el paper que l'ús de les TIC en el màrqueting té en el procés de desenvolupament de nous productes, com a element que reforça la integració d'agents al projecte, afavorint l'establiment de relacions dirigides a la cooperació i l'adquisició d'intel·ligència de mercat útil en el procés de desenvolupament de nous productes. L'estudi d'una mostra de 2.038 companyies de tots els sectors de l'activitat econòmica a Catalunya ens permet contrastar hipòtesis inicials i establir un perfil de companyia innovadora basat en les importants relacions que hi ha entre la innovació, l'ús de TIC en el màrqueting i la integració. Sobresurten dues idees en la nostra anàlisi. En primer lloc, l'ús intensiu de les TIC en el màrqueting fa que la companyia sigui més innovadora, ja que percep que el seu ús ajuda a superar barreres a la innovació i accelera els processos, que es tornen més eficients. En segon lloc, incrementant l'ús de les TIC en el màrqueting es fa augmentar la predisposició de la companyia a integrar agents particulars en l'entorn de negoci en el desenvolupament del procés d'innovació i a col·laborar-hi, de manera que es millora el grau d'adaptació del nou producte a les demandes del mercat.

Technological convergence: a strategic perspective

The information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors are in a process of technological convergence. Determinant factors in this process are the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets and technological change. Many firms are engaged in a process of mergers and alliances to position themselves in this new framework. Technological and demand uncertainties are very important. Our objective in this paper is to study the economic determinants of the strategies of the firms. With this aim, we review some key technological and demand aspects. We shed some light on the strategic motivations of the firms by establishing a parallel with the evolution of the retailing sector

Leveraging explicitly disclosed location information to understand tourist dynamics: a case study

In recent years, the large deployment of mobile devices has led to a massiveincrease in the volume of records of where people have been and when they were there.The analysis of these spatio-temporal data can supply high-level human behaviorinformation valuable to urban planners, local authorities, and designer of location-basedservices. In this paper, we describe our approach to collect and analyze the history ofphysical presence of tourists from the digital footprints they publicly disclose on the web.Our work takes place in the Province of Florence in Italy, where the insights on thevisitors’ flows and on the nationalities of the tourists who do not sleep in town has beenlimited to information from survey-based hotel and museums frequentation. In fact, mostlocal authorities in the world must face this dearth of data on tourist dynamics. In thiscase study, we used a corpus of geographically referenced photos taken in the provinceby 4280 photographers over a period of 2 years. Based on the disclosure of the locationof the photos, we design geovisualizations to reveal the tourist concentration and spatiotemporalflows. Our initial results provide insights on the density of tourists, the points ofinterests they visit as well as the most common trajectories they follow.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies

This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on differentrationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such ascomputerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of companyaccounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronicfiling and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developmentsfavour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies incountries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhancethe value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems.Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used bycompanies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs andbenefits that should guide policy in this area.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.