Children in the welfare state. A social investment approach

Children occupy centre-stage in any new welfare equilibrium. Failure to support families may produce either of two undesirable scenarios. We shall see a society without children if motherhood remains incompatible with work. A new family policy needs to recognize that children are a collective asset and that the cost of having children is rising. The double challenge is to eliminate the constraints on having children in the first place, and to ensure that the children we have are ensured optimal opportunities. The simple reason why a new social contract is called for is that fertility and child quality combine both private utility and societal gains. And like no other epoch in the past, the societal gains are mounting all-the-while that families’ ability to produce these social gains is weakening.In the following 1 analyze the twin challenges of fertility and child development. I then examine which kind of policy mix will ensure both the socially desired level of fertility and investment in our children? The task is to identify a Paretian optimum that will maximize efficiency gains and social equity simultaneously.

The survival of the welfare state

This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfectequilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, whereagents vote over distortionary income redistribution. The key featureof the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policiesdepends positively on the current level of redistribution, since thisaffects both private investments and the future distribution of voters.Agents vote rationally and fullly anticipate the effects of their politicalchoice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfarestate policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In"anti-welfare equilibria", even a majority of beneficiaries ofredistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce the formationof a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.

Immigration and the survival of the welfare state

This paper analyzes the political sustainability of the welfare state in a model where immigration policy is also endogenous. In the model, the skills of the native population are affected by immigration and skill accumulation. Moreover, immigrants affect future policies, once they gain the right to vote. The main finding is that the long-run survival of redistributive policies is linked to an immigration policy specifying both skill and quantity restrictions. In particular, in steady state the unskilled majority admits a limited inflow of unskilled immigrants in order to offset growth in the fraction of skilled voters and maintain a high degree of income redistribution.Interestingly, equilibrium immigration policy shifts from unrestricted skilled immigration,when the country is skill-scarce, to restricted unskilled immigration, as the fraction of native skilled workers increases. The analysis also suggests a new set of variables that may help explain international differences in immigration restrictions.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

The determinants of social spending in Spain (1880-1960): Is Lindert right?

[spa] El principal objetivo de este artículo se centra en analizar los orígenes del Estado de Bienestar en España a partir del marco teórico elaborado por Peter Lindert. Con este fin, se ofrece un análisis econométrico de los factores que determinaron la evolución del gasto social público en este país entre 1880 y 1960. Utilizando nueva evidencia cuantitativa, se construyó un panel de datos por quinquenios con el porcentaje de gasto social respecto al PIB desagregado en tres partidas: sanidad, seguridad social y beneficencia. El análisis permite insertar el caso español en el debate internacional y los resultados revelan interesantes singularidades de este país.

The determinants of social spending in Spain, 1950-1980, Are dictatorships less redistributive?

[spa] La mayoría de estudios sobre el Estado del Bienestar, hasta el momento, se han centrado en países democráticos y ricos. Sin embargo, los países pobres y no democráticos han recibido mucha menos atención. Este artículo aporta nueva evidencia empírica sobre la evolución del gasto social en España y Portugal entre 1950 y 1980. A partir de ésta se ha podido analizar la relación entre dictaduras y redistribución, ya que ambos países sufrieron gobiernos no democráticos durante la mayor parte del periodo. Además del gasto social público y su clasificación por funciones, en este artículo se analiza también la forma de financiación de dicho gasto social.

The determinants of social spending in Spain, 1950-1980, Are dictatorships less redistributive?

[spa] La mayoría de estudios sobre el Estado del Bienestar, hasta el momento, se han centrado en países democráticos y ricos. Sin embargo, los países pobres y no democráticos han recibido mucha menos atención. Este artículo aporta nueva evidencia empírica sobre la evolución del gasto social en España y Portugal entre 1950 y 1980. A partir de ésta se ha podido analizar la relación entre dictaduras y redistribución, ya que ambos países sufrieron gobiernos no democráticos durante la mayor parte del periodo. Además del gasto social público y su clasificación por funciones, en este artículo se analiza también la forma de financiación de dicho gasto social.

The inequality trap. A comparative analysis of social spending between 1880 and 1933

[spa] Utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de redistribución –las transferencias sociales y el gasto social- durante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre 1880 y 1933, y utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de desigualdad –el porcentaje de explotaciones agrarias no familiares y los top income shares-, este papel muestra que, al contrario de lo que muchos estudios sobre los origines del Estado del Bienestar suelen sugerir, la desigualdad no favoreció el desarrollo de la política social ni siquiera en sus etapas iniciales. Ello significa que la política social se desarrolló más rápidamente en los países que previamente ya eran más igualitarios, lo que sugiere que los países con más desigualdad se encontraban en una especie de trampa de la desigualdad, donde la desigualdad en si misma fue uno de los obstáculos a la redistribución.

The inequality trap. A comparative analysis of social spending between 1880 and 1933

[spa] Utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de redistribución –las transferencias sociales y el gasto social- durante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre 1880 y 1933, y utilizando dos indicadores alternativos de desigualdad –el porcentaje de explotaciones agrarias no familiares y los top income shares-, este papel muestra que, al contrario de lo que muchos estudios sobre los origines del Estado del Bienestar suelen sugerir, la desigualdad no favoreció el desarrollo de la política social ni siquiera en sus etapas iniciales. Ello significa que la política social se desarrolló más rápidamente en los países que previamente ya eran más igualitarios, lo que sugiere que los países con más desigualdad se encontraban en una especie de trampa de la desigualdad, donde la desigualdad en si misma fue uno de los obstáculos a la redistribución.

Does persistence of social exclusion exist in Spain?

The aim of this paper is to analyze the causes leading to social exclusion dynamics. In particular, we wish to understand why any individual experiencing social exclusion today is much more likely to experience it again. In fact, there are two distinct processes that may generate a persistence of social exclusion: heterogeneity (individuals are heterogeneous with respect to some observed and/or unobserved adverse characteristics that are relevant for the chance of experiencing social exclusion and persistence over time) and true state of dependence (experiencing social exclusion in a specific time period, in itself, increases the probability of undergoing social exclusion in subsequent periods). Distinguishing between the two processes is crucial since the policy implications are very different.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

The Role of social institutions in inter-generational mobility

In this study we examine the role of institutions in shaping inter-generational mobility behavior. Research has traditionally emphasized the role of educational systems but cummulative evidence suggests that variations in their design offer only a very limited explanation for observed mobility differences. We examine the impact of welfare states and, in particular, how early childhood and family policies may influence the impact of economic and cultural characteristics of origin families on child outcomes.

The intra-generational redistributive effects of social security

This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the intra--cohortredistributive elements of the United States social security system in thecontext of a computable general equilibrium model. I determine how thewell--being of individuals that differ across {\sl gender, race} and {\sl education}is affected by government social security policy. I find that females, whitesand non--college graduates stand less to gain (lose) from reductions(increases) in the size of social security than males, non--whites andcollege graduates, respectively. Differences in mortality risk and laborproductivity translate into differences in the magnitudes of capitalaccumulation and labor supply distortions, that are responsible for theobserved welfare difference between types. Results imply that the currentprogram is lifetime progressive across gender and education, yet lifetimeregressive across race.

An Atkinson-Gini family of social evaluation functions

We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity. These ocial evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well-being in a population. They moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.