13 resultados para Special audit
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Este documento se presentó en la Asignatura Campus de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB) “Olimpismo, Sociedad y Deporte” durante el curso académico 1996/97. El objetivo de la autora es mostrar y describir qué es la entidad Special Olympics y cómo funciona.
Resumo:
Cada dia és més difícil convèncer al consumidor de que compri els productes d’una determinada empresa o contracti els seus serveis simplement amb la publicitat convencional. Això ha provocat l’aparició de noves tècniques per publicitar i arribar de manera mes eficient al públic objectiu. Buzz Marketing és un nou terme provinent de l’anglès i la seva traducció vindria a ser “marketing mitjançant el rumor o de tafaneria”. Hi ha noms similars com el Boca-Orella o la predicació.
Resumo:
Aquest treball es va realitzar per a l’assignatura Campus “Olimpisme, Esport i Societat” durant el curs 1996-97. En ell es proporcionen els principis de la institució Special Olympics, i es descriu l’organització de la cinquena edició dels Jocs Special Olympics de Catalunya que van tenir lloc a Reus, el 1996.
Resumo:
In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.
Resumo:
The standard one-machine scheduling problem consists in schedulinga set of jobs in one machine which can handle only one job at atime, minimizing the maximum lateness. Each job is available forprocessing at its release date, requires a known processing timeand after finishing the processing, it is delivery after a certaintime. There also can exists precedence constraints between pairsof jobs, requiring that the first jobs must be completed beforethe second job can start. An extension of this problem consistsin assigning a time interval between the processing of the jobsassociated with the precedence constrains, known by finish-starttime-lags. In presence of this constraints, the problem is NP-hardeven if preemption is allowed. In this work, we consider a specialcase of the one-machine preemption scheduling problem with time-lags, where the time-lags have a chain form, and propose apolynomial algorithm to solve it. The algorithm consist in apolynomial number of calls of the preemption version of the LongestTail Heuristic. One of the applicability of the method is to obtainlower bounds for NP-hard one-machine and job-shop schedulingproblems. We present some computational results of thisapplication, followed by some conclusions.
Resumo:
Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.
Resumo:
We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increasedaudit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Ourestimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage pointsreduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points.This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. Incontrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly providedpreventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- orcompliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".
Resumo:
Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.
Resumo:
The provision of non-audit services by auditors to their auditclients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition. Furthermore, theseservices do not necessarily damage auditor independence nor the quality of non-audit services. This assessment leads to recommending that legislative policy should aim at facilitating the development and use of the safeguardsprovided by the free action of market forces. Regulation should thus aim to enable the parties-audit firms, self-regulatory bodies and audit clients-to discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by fee income diversification and the enhancement, through disclosurerules, of market incentives to diversify.
Resumo:
This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.
Resumo:
We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.
Resumo:
No hace más de 3 años se podía leer en las revistas especializadas que España había pasado a ocupar el tercer puesto en el ranking mundial por potencia eólica instalada. La industria eólica española a su vez ha pasado a ocupar el tercer puesto en la fabricación e instalación de aerogeneradores, con una cuota de mercado del 13%, siendo así un sector con gran capacidad de exportación. Por otra parte, tras diez años de promulgación de la Ley 31/95, de 8 de noviembre, de Prevención de Riesgos Laborales, y después su desarrollo reglamentario, es un hecho incontestable que, pese a todo, y a los ingentes esfuerzos realizados por los distintos actores implicados en la prevención de riesgos laborales (Estado, Comunidades Autónomas, Agentes Sociales, Entidades especializadas, etcetera), existe un sector como el de la construcción que, constituyendo uno de los ejes del crecimiento económico de nuestro país, está sometido a unos riesgos especiales y continúa registrando una siniestralidad laboral muy notoria por sus cifras y gravedad. La legislación de prevención, los manuales sobre las distintas disciplinas preventivas, los libros especializados, los expertos... han abordado ya, con mayor o menor acierto, muchas de las cuestiones generales y específicas que afectan a la seguridad y salud: la evaluación de riesgos, las medidas higiénicas, los equipos de trabajo y equipos de protección individual, la planificación, la formación, los servicios de prevención , los sistemas de gestión de la prevención, las auditorías ... forman parte de los contenidos que se han ido creando en torno a este tema. No obstante, resulta de gran interés la elaboración de un estudio de Seguridad y Salud, en el que partiendo de un desarrollo técnico concreto, pero sobre todo integral, es decir, que comprenda todas las fases para el suministrp e instalación de aerogeneradores para un parque eólico, vayamos desgranando cada uno de los puntos desarrollados en su construcción. Entre las conclusiones más destacadas de este trabajo, se encuentra la definición de las condiciones relativas a la prevención de accidentes y enfermedades laborales durante la ejecución de los trabajos de suministro e instalación de un parque eólico y la gestión de su prevención, las características de las instalaciones preceptivas para higiene y bienestar de los trabajadores, así como directrices básicas mínimas, que deben reflejarse y desarrollarse en el Plan de Seguridad y Salud que las empresas contratistas deberán presentar para su aprobación por el director de obra, antes del comienzo de los trabajos, de forma que sea posible la disminución de accidentes laborales así como evitar las posibles sanciones administrativas y/o penales.