Las Olimpiadas desconocidas: Special Olympics

Este documento se presentó en la Asignatura Campus de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB) “Olimpismo, Sociedad y Deporte” durante el curso académico 1996/97. El objetivo de la autora es mostrar y describir qué es la entidad Special Olympics y cómo funciona.

New technologies in marketing: the special case of Buzz Marketing

Cada dia és més difícil convèncer al consumidor de que compri els productes d’una determinada empresa o contracti els seus serveis simplement amb la publicitat convencional. Això ha provocat l’aparició de noves tècniques per publicitar i arribar de manera mes eficient al públic objectiu. Buzz Marketing és un nou terme provinent de l’anglès i la seva traducció vindria a ser “marketing mitjançant el rumor o de tafaneria”. Hi ha noms similars com el Boca-Orella o la predicació.

Els jocs de la il·Iusió: la integració del disminuït psíquic a través de l’esport i del moviment Special Olympics

Aquest treball es va realitzar per a l’assignatura Campus “Olimpisme, Esport i Societat” durant el curs 1996-97. En ell es proporcionen els principis de la institució Special Olympics, i es descriu l’organització de la cinquena edició dels Jocs Special Olympics de Catalunya que van tenir lloc a Reus, el 1996.

Determinación cualitativa de los componentes del cemento portland CEM I 52,5-R endurecido

Se pretende contribuir al esclarecimiento de la causa o causas de la importante disminución de la resistencia de las pastas de cemento portland sometidas a altas temperaturas. Para ello el primer paso y el que desarrolla este trabajo final de carrera es la determinación de los diferentes componentes de las pastas de cemento portland y más concretamente las fases en las que se encuentran los C-S-H a diferentes edades ya que son los responsables de las principales resistencias mecánicas de los materiales realizados con cemento portland, como los morteros y los hormigones.

A polynomial algorithm for special case of the one-machine scheduling problem with time-lags

The standard one-machine scheduling problem consists in schedulinga set of jobs in one machine which can handle only one job at atime, minimizing the maximum lateness. Each job is available forprocessing at its release date, requires a known processing timeand after finishing the processing, it is delivery after a certaintime. There also can exists precedence constraints between pairsof jobs, requiring that the first jobs must be completed beforethe second job can start. An extension of this problem consistsin assigning a time interval between the processing of the jobsassociated with the precedence constrains, known by finish-starttime-lags. In presence of this constraints, the problem is NP-hardeven if preemption is allowed. In this work, we consider a specialcase of the one-machine preemption scheduling problem with time-lags, where the time-lags have a chain form, and propose apolynomial algorithm to solve it. The algorithm consist in apolynomial number of calls of the preemption version of the LongestTail Heuristic. One of the applicability of the method is to obtainlower bounds for NP-hard one-machine and job-shop schedulingproblems. We present some computational results of thisapplication, followed by some conclusions.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.