Service offshoring and white-collar employment

This paper empirically studies the effects of service offshoring on white-collar employment, using data for more than one hundred U.S. occupations. A model of firm behavior based on separability allows to derive the labor demand elasticity with respect to service offshoring for each occupation. Estimation is performed with Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, to account for high degrees of censoring in the employment variable. The estimated elasticities are then related to proxies for the skill level and the degree of tradability of the occupations. Results show that service offshoring increases high skilled employment and decreases medium and low skilled employment. Within each skill group, however, service offshoring penalizes tradable occupations and benefits non-tradable occupations.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.