85 resultados para Soft-Power
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
El proceso de asociación estratégica birregional entre la Unión Europea y América Latina y el Caribe es un ejemplo claro de un intento de cooperación encuadrado en la óptica del neoliberalismo institucional, tanto en su forma –el establecimiento de un mecanismo de acercamiento entre dos regiones del mundo- como en su contenido, manifiesto en el amplio y variado temario plasmado en los acuerdos del Compromiso de Madrid. Sin embargo, si se abordan los resultados del encuentro desde esta misma óptica encontramos que en la Cumbre se desaprovechó una oportunidad de afianzar las relaciones entre ambas regiones, poniendo en riesgo el soft power que ejerce la UE respecto a ALC, a raíz de la decepción de las administraciones latinoamericanas en función de la satisfacción de sus demandas, que ha sido baja.
Resumo:
El arbitraje del baloncesto ha experimentado numerosos cambios en los últimos diez años. El presente artículo pretende aunar algunas bases conceptuales y metodológicas a partir de las cuales definir un nuevo perfil operativo para el denominado ‘árbitro moderno’. En este sentido, se ahondará en el análisis de las nuevas competencias comunicativas asociadas e indisolubles a la tarea arbitral, capitalizadas por el diálogo, la administración de ‘poder blando’, la gestión emocional y la adopción, por parte del árbitro, de una renovada actitud empática ante todos los componentes del juego. Así las cosas, este trabajo, en su conjunto y con la ayuda de un estudio de caso, propondrá la definición teórica de nuevas lógicas de actuación arbitral propias del baloncesto del siglo XXI.
Resumo:
El establecimiento de relaciones entre países en un entorno global parece requerir nuevas estrategias que trascienden la tradicional diplomacia de Estado. La diplomacia pública deviene una renovada estrategia de proyección internacional, donde la marca de país ejerce un importante papel a modo de dispositivo aglutinador y de transmisión de identidades nacionales. De este modo, el nuevo “poder blando” de la representación geográfica parece transcurrir en el seno del debilitamiento del Estado-nación y en claro beneficio de una nueva forma de comunicar la identidad de un país más próxima a la intervención de diferentes agentes sociales que a la firma de tratados internacionales de competencia gubernamental. A partir de una revisión de la literatura existente, este artículo presenta un estado del arte relacionado con las nuevas estrategias de representatividad internacional llevadas a cabo por países y naciones.
Resumo:
The basketball refereeing has undergone many changes in the last ten years. This article claims to combine some conceptual and methodological basis to define the meanings for the so called ‘modern refereeing’. Indeed, this research is concerned to the analysis of the new communication skills as an inseparable asset to the arbitration task, characterized by the dialogue, the administration of 'soft power', the emotional management and the adoption of a renewed and empathic attitude towards all the components of the game. Finally, this paper will propose the concretion of some specific communicative characteristics of the basketball refereeing in the XXI century.
Resumo:
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.
Resumo:
We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.
Resumo:
In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del fitxer adjunt."
Resumo:
La aparición de nuevos tipos de aplicaciones, como vídeo bajo demanda, realidad virtual y videoconferencias entre otras, caracterizadas por la necesidad de cumplir sus deadlines. Este tipo de aplicaciones, han sido denominadas en la literatura aplicaciones soft-real time (SRT) periódicas. Este trabajo se centra en el problema de la planificación temporal de este nuevo tipo de aplicaciones en clusters no dedicados.
Resumo:
Recently there has been a great deal of work on noncommutative algebraic cryptography. This involves the use of noncommutative algebraic objects as the platforms for encryption systems. Most of this work, such as the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme, the Ko-Lee scheme and the Baumslag-Fine-Xu Modular group scheme use nonabelian groups as the basic algebraic object. Some of these encryption methods have been successful and some have been broken. It has been suggested that at this point further pure group theoretic research, with an eye towards cryptographic applications, is necessary.In the present study we attempt to extend the class of noncommutative algebraic objects to be used in cryptography. In particular we explore several different methods to use a formal power series ring R && x1; :::; xn && in noncommuting variables x1; :::; xn as a base to develop cryptosystems. Although R can be any ring we have in mind formal power series rings over the rationals Q. We use in particular a result of Magnus that a finitely generated free group F has a faithful representation in a quotient of the formal power series ring in noncommuting variables.
Resumo:
This article provides a fresh methodological and empirical approach for assessing price level convergence and its relation to purchasing power parity (PPP) using annual price data for seventeen US cities. We suggest a new procedure that can handle a wide range of PPP concepts in the presence of multiple structural breaks using all possible pairs of real exchange rates. To deal with cross-sectional dependence, we use both cross-sectional demeaned data and a parametric bootstrap approach. In general, we find more evidence for stationarity when the parity restriction is not imposed, while imposing parity restriction provides leads toward the rejection of the panel stationar- ity. Our results can be embedded on the view of the Balassa-Samuelson approach, but where the slope of the time trend is allowed to change in the long-run. The median half-life point estimate are found to be lower than the consensus view regardless of the parity restriction.
Resumo:
This article investigates the history of land and water transformations in Matadepera, a wealthy suburb of metropolitan Barcelona. Analysis is informed by theories of political ecology and methods of environmental history; although very relevant, these have received relatively little attention within ecological economics. Empirical material includes communications from the City Archives of Matadepera (1919-1979), 17 interviews with locals born between 1913 and 1958, and an exhaustive review of grey historical literature. Existing water histories of Barcelona and its outskirts portray a battle against natural water scarcity, hard won by heroic engineers and politicians acting for the good of the community. Our research in Matadepera tells a very different story. We reveal the production of a highly uneven landscape and waterscape through fierce political and power struggles. The evolution of Matadepera from a small rural village to an elite suburb was anything but spontaneous or peaceful. It was a socio-environmental project well intended by landowning elites and heavily fought by others. The struggle for the control of water went hand in hand with the land and political struggles that culminated – and were violently resolved - in the Spanish Civil War. The displacement of the economic and environmental costs of water use from few to many continues to this day and is constitutive of Matadepera’s uneven and unsustainable landscape. By unravelling the relations of power that are inscribed in the urbanization of nature (Swyngedouw, 2004), we question the perceived wisdoms of contemporary water policy debates, particularly the notion of a natural scarcity that merits a technical or economic response. We argue that the water question is fundamentally a political question of environmental justice; it is about negotiating alternative visions of the future and deciding whose visions will be produced.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."