11 resultados para Social structures
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
Distance and blended collaborative learning settings are usually characterized by different social structures defined in terms of groups' number, dimension, and composition; these structures are variable and can change within the same activity. This variability poses additional complexity to instructional designers, when they are trying to develop successful experiences from existing designs. This complexity is greatly associated with the fact that learning designs do not render explicit how social structures influenced the decisions of the original designer, and thus whether the social structures of the new setting could preclude the effectiveness of the reused design. This article proposes the usage of new representations (social structure representations, SSRs) able to support unskilled designers in reusing existing learning designs, through the explicit characterization of the social structures and constraints embedded either by the original designers or the reusing teachers, according to well-known principles of good collaborative learning practice. The article also describes an evaluation process that involved university professors, as well as the main findings derived from it. This process supported the initial assumptions about the effectiveness of SSRs, with significant evidence from both qualitative and qualitative data.
Resumo:
A principios del año 1820 la revolución de Rafael de Riego instauró el régimen liberal en España. La Iglesia de Lleida se adaptó correctamente al nuevo modelo político. Pero la obra legislativa de las Cortes liberales perjudicó gravemente a todas las estructuras políticas, económicas y sociales de la institución eclesiástica. Con la radicalización del gobierno liberal se produjo la ruptura de las relaciones de los con el Ayuntamiento de Lleida, quiénes al poco tiempo sufrieron la persecución y la represión de las autoridades liberales. Por tanto, el balance del período liberal fue muy negativo y su impacto enorme.
Resumo:
[spa]Este artículo analiza las estructuras sociales subyacentes a la Revolución haitiana, y cómo las aspiraciones diferentes de negros y mulatos durante la Revolución de independencia (1791-1804) se trasladaron al período postabolición. Pese a los cambios en la legislación agraria después de la independencia, el fracaso a la hora de proporcionar unas condiciones de trabajo adaptadas a las demandas de los trabajadores rurales haitianos se añadió a las dificultades y los obstáculos enfrentados por Haití en su intento por construir una nación próspera y en libertad
Resumo:
Many social phenomena involve a set of dyadic relations among agents whose actions may be dependent. Although individualistic approaches have frequently been applied to analyze social processes, these are not generally concerned with dyadic relations nor do they deal with dependency. This paper describes a mathematical procedure for analyzing dyadic interactions in a social system. The proposed method mainly consists of decomposing asymmetric data into their symmetrical and skew-symmetrical parts. A quantification of skew-symmetry for a social system can be obtained by dividing the norm of the skew-symmetrical matrix by the norm of the asymmetric matrix. This calculation makes available to researchers a quantity related to the amount of dyadic reciprocity. Regarding agents, the procedure enables researchers to identify those whose behavior is asymmetric with respect to all agents. It is also possible to derive symmetric measurements among agents and to use multivariate statistical techniques.
Resumo:
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game
Resumo:
We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. This creates an incentive to form large entities. Individuals also incur a transportation cost depending on their location and that of the facility which makes small jurisdictions advantageous. We consider a fairly general class of distributions of agents and generalize previous versions of this model by allowing for non-linear transportation costs. We show that, in general, jurisdictions are not necessarily homogeneous. However, they are if facilities are always intraterritory and transportation costs are superadditive. Superadditivity can be weakened to strictly increasing and strictly concave when agents are uniformly distributed. Keywords: Consecutiveness, stratification, local public goods, coalition formation, country formation. JEL Classification: C71 (Cooperative Games), D71 (Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations), H73 (Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects).
Resumo:
La etnografía de la comunidad mixe de Salto de la Tuxpana y del grave conflicto que se produjo entre 2005 y 2007 es el punto de partida del presente artículo. La investigación realizada arrojó como resultado más destacado el descubrimiento de un violento cacicazgo, legitimado ideológicamente en la autonomía comunitaria, la identidad étnica y el reclamo de una jurisdicción propia, y asentado firmemente sobre tres mecanismos de control social: protección a través de la Policía Comunitaria Armada, acceso a la tierra y acceso a los programas de «desarrollo». El caciquismo se define como el régimen político personalista, basado en estructuras clientelares, que monopoliza y controla recursos y votos. También se propone la hipótesis de que la mayor parte de la violencia desplegada por los caciques es el resultado del proceso de reproducción social del mismo sistema político, cuando se genera una faccionalización simétrica de la comunidad, después de un periodo de estabilidad complementaria.
Resumo:
Patients with stage-I (very mild and mild) Alzheimer's disease were asked to participate in a Dictator Game, a type of game in which a subject has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between himself and another person. The game enables the experimenter to examine the influence of social norms and social preferences on the decision-making process. When the results of treatments involving Alzheimer's disease patients were compared with those of identical treatments involving patients with mild cognitive impairment or healthy control subjects, with similar ages and social backgrounds, no statistically significant difference was found. This finding suggests that stage-I Alzheimer's disease patients may be as capable of making decisions involving social norms and preferences as other individuals of their age. Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, they do not appear to influence, at this early stage, the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social interactions.
Resumo:
El narcotráfico se instaló en la región de Tierra Caliente desde los años sesentas y se ha mantenido como una forma viable y legitima de empleo alternativo en las áreas rurales de la región. El narcotráfico es un fenómeno principalmente androcéntrico, pero ¿cuál es el papel que juegan las mujeres jóvenes en éste? Si bien la vinculación directa en las actividades de distribución de droga no es frecuente entre las jóvenes calentanas su participación a través de las relaciones que establecen con los hombres involucrados en estas actividades promueve la movilidad social y el mantenimiento de las estructuras sociales y familiares al interior de las comunidades rurales
Resumo:
Postprint (published version)
Resumo:
This paper presents a procedure that allows us to determine the preference structures(PS) associated to each of the different groups of actors that can be identified in a groupdecision making problem with a large number of individuals. To that end, it makesuse of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980) as the technique to solvediscrete multicriteria decision making problems. This technique permits the resolutionof multicriteria, multienvironment and multiactor problems in which subjective aspectsand uncertainty have been incorporated into the model, constructing ratio scales correspondingto the priorities relative to the elements being compared, normalised in adistributive manner (wi = 1). On the basis of the individuals’ priorities we identifydifferent clusters for the decision makers and, for each of these, the associated preferencestructure using, to that end, tools analogous to those of Multidimensional Scaling.The resulting PS will be employed to extract knowledge for the subsequent negotiationprocesses and, should it be necessary, to determine the relative importance of thealternatives being compared using anyone of the existing procedures