Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation (SMCE)

The main argument developed here is the proposal of the concept of “Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation” (SMCE) as a possible useful framework for the application of social choice to the difficult policy problems of our Millennium, where, as stated by Funtowicz and Ravetz, “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”. This paper starts from the following main questions: 1. Why “Social” Multi-criteria Evaluation? 2. How such an approach should be developed? The foundations of SMCE are set up by referring to concepts coming from complex system theory and philosophy, such as reflexive complexity, post-normal science and incommensurability. To give some operational guidelines on the application of SMCE basic questions to be answered are: 1. How is it possible to deal with technical incommensurability? 2. How can we deal with the issue of social incommensurability? To answer these questions, by using theoretical considerations and lessons learned from realworld case studies, is the main objective of the present article.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

La dimensió social del moviment priscil·lianista en el context de l'antiguitat tardana. Heretgia, lluita contra la institucionalització eclesiàstica i contestació social.

L'any 385, Priscil·lià i la resta del grup priscil·lianista era condemnat a la ciutat de Trèveris i, fruit de la ingerència determinant de l'usurpador Magne Màxim, es convertia en el primer heretge ajusticiat pel poder secular en nom de l'Església. Els fets de Trèveris, per bé que van significar el final de la disputa entre dos grups amb posicions antagòniques vers les característiques del nou cristianisme institucionalitzat, no van aconseguir acabar amb el priscil·lianisme. El moviment perdurà, especialment a la província de la Gallaecia, i Priscil·lià va esdevenir venerat com màrtir. L'Església, mentrestant, es fracturava per culpa de la competència jurisdiccional entre la institució clerical i el poder imperial. Aquest treball intenta ser un estat de la qüestió respecte a la dimensió social d'un moviment que, més enllà de l'eterna discussió entre la seva possible catalogació com a ortodòxia o heterodòxia, intenta contextualitzar el priscil·lianisme en el seu marc històric i els convulsos anys de les transformacions de l'antiguitat tardana.