Efficacy of PI3K pathway inhibitors as single agents in metastatic breast cancer

L’objectiu del cribatge molecular és seleccionar pacients que es beneficiïn especialment de teràpies dirigides. S’analitza l’activitat en monoteràpia de fàrmacs inhibidors de la via de PI3K/AKT/mTOR (PI3Ki) en pacients amb càncer de mama metastàtic (CMM) i s’exploren potencials predictors de benefici clínic. La mitjana de temps a la progressió és de 2.6 mesos en 38 pacients incloses. No existeix correlació entre alteracions de la via i l’eficàcia, excepte en pacients amb mutació de PIK3CA que van millor al tractar-se amb un PI3Ki alfa-especific. Aquests resultats emfatitzen la necessitat d’un adequat cribatge molecular previ al tractament amb teràpies dirigides en CMM

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

A Characterization of single-peaked preferences

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all agents cannot contains more than 2 elements. The second property states that two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one. Classification-JEL: D71, C78

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and continuity (with respect to the social endowment). We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of continuity. Furthermore, we prove that Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun's (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, equal división lower bound, separability, and either continuity or duplication-invariance.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Incorporació del català en agent conversacional animat per computador

Dins del marc del projecte europeu HERMES, al Centre de Visió per Computador de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona s'està desenvolupant un agent conversacional animat per ordinador el qual haurà de ser capaç d'interactuar amb l'usuari a través de diferents canals de forma simultània, o, el que és el mateix, parlar, gesticular, expressar emocions... Partint, doncs, d'un software capaç de fer que un model 3D d'un cap humà expressi emocions i parli en anglès, donat un arxiu d'àudio prèviament generat, en el treball que aquí es presenta es duu a terme la recerca d'una eina sintetitzadora de parla a partir de text que permeti fer això mateix en català. En aquest document s'explica el procés seguit per a trobar aquesta eina, la investigació realitzada sobre el funcionament d'ambdues per tal d'entendre-les i poder-hi treballar, així com, finalment, les modificacions realitzades per a fer que aquestes puguin interactuar i generar parla inteligible en català a partir de textos escrits en aquest idioma.

Aplicaciones Single Program Multiple Data (SPMD) en ambientes distribuidos

Un reto al ejecutar las aplicaciones en un cluster es lograr mejorar las prestaciones utilizando los recursos de manera eficiente, y este reto es mayor al utilizar un ambiente distribuido. Teniendo en cuenta este reto, se proponen un conjunto de reglas para realizar el cómputo en cada uno de los nodos, basado en el análisis de cómputo y comunicaciones de las aplicaciones, se analiza un esquema de mapping de celdas y un método para planificar el orden de ejecución, tomando en consideración la ejecución por prioridad, donde las celdas de fronteras tienen una mayor prioridad con respecto a las celdas internas. En la experimentación se muestra el solapamiento del computo interno con las comunicaciones de las celdas fronteras, obteniendo resultados donde el Speedup aumenta y los niveles de eficiencia se mantienen por encima de un 85%, finalmente se obtiene ganancias de los tiempos de ejecución, concluyendo que si se puede diseñar un esquemas de solapamiento que permita que la ejecución de las aplicaciones SPMD en un cluster se hagan de forma eficiente.

The Division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents' participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents' shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents' voluntary participation.

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Agent based simulation to optimise emergency departments

Nowadays, many of the health care systems are large and complex environments and quite dynamic, specifically Emergency Departments, EDs. It is opened and working 24 hours per day throughout the year with limited resources, whereas it is overcrowded. Thus, is mandatory to simulate EDs to improve qualitatively and quantitatively their performance. This improvement can be achieved modelling and simulating EDs using Agent-Based Model, ABM and optimising many different staff scenarios. This work optimises the staff configuration of an ED. In order to do optimisation, objective functions to minimise or maximise have to be set. One of those objective functions is to find the best or optimum staff configuration that minimise patient waiting time. The staff configuration comprises: doctors, triage nurses, and admissions, the amount and sort of them. Staff configuration is a combinatorial problem, that can take a lot of time to be solved. HPC is used to run the experiments, and encouraging results were obtained. However, even with the basic ED used in this work the search space is very large, thus, when the problem size increases, it is going to need more resources of processing in order to obtain results in an acceptable time.