Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

The determinants of the prevalence of single mothers: A cross-country analysis

This paper examines the effect of public assistance, labor market and marriage marketconditions on the prevalence of single mother families across countries and over time. Amultinomial logit derived from a random utility approach is estimated using individualleveldata for 14 countries. I find evidence that increases in the level of public support are significantly and positively associated with a higher incidence of both never marriedand divorced mothers. The results also suggest that single mothers are more prevalentwhen female wages are lower. Higher male earnings and employment opportunities in awoman s marriage market appear to lead to fewer never married mothers, but more divorced mothers. Higher child support or alimony payments are associated with a higher prevalence of divorced mothers.

Single mothers and incentives to work: The French experience

This paper analyzes the effect of the 1998 reform of the French single parents allowanceon the labor supply of single mothers with very young children. The reform aimed atencouraging participation by allowing eligible single parents to accumulate benefits andlabor earnings for a limited period of time. Using data from the French EmploymentSurvey, the analysis shows that single mothers affected by the reform had experienced asignificant increase in their employment rate four years after the reform wasimplemented. During the same period, the employment rate of married mothers withyoung children did not experience a significant change, suggesting that at least part ofthe increase was a consequence of the reform. These results provide some evidence thatbenefit schedules that provide financial incentives to work can have significant effectsin getting single moms back to work, even in the presence of very young children.