Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Electronic voting system for computer supported collaborative learning

The EVS4CSCL project starts in the context of a Computer Supported Collaborative Learning environment (CSCL). Previous UOC projects created a CSCL generic platform (CLPL) to facilitate the development of CSCL applications. A discussion forum (DF) was the first application developed over the framework. This discussion forum was different from other products on the marketplace because of its focus on the learning process. The DF carried out the specification and elaboration phases from the discussion learning process but there was a lack in the consensus phase. The consensus phase in a learning environment is not something to be achieved but tested. Common tests are done by Electronic Voting System (EVS) tools, but consensus test is not an assessment test. We are not evaluating our students by their answers but by their discussion activity. Our educational EVS would be used as a discussion catalyst proposing a discussion about the results after an initial query or it would be used after a discussion period in order to manifest how the discussion changed the students mind (consensus). It should be also used by the teacher as a quick way to know where the student needs some reinforcement. That is important in a distance-learning environment where there is no direct contact between the teacher and the student and it is difficult to detect the learning lacks. In an educational environment, assessment it is a must and the EVS will provide direct assessment by peer usefulness evaluation, teacher marks on every query created and indirect assessment from statistics regarding the user activity.

The Voting Practice of the Fifteen in the UN General Assembly: Convergence and Divergence

The EU has, since the early days of the Community, had the ambition to speak with ‘a single voice’ in international fora, in particular in the United Nations’ General Assembly. This aspiration, which has become more pronounced since the inauguration of the CFSP, has not always been easy to achieve due to domestic or international level factors affecting the EU member states. However, in the last decade there has been a dramatic increase in convergence in the Fifteen’s voting record. This paper contemplates the underlying reasons for such a convergence

An electronic voting platform with elliptic curve cryptography

The future of elections seems to be electronic voting systems du to its advantatges over the traditional voting. Nowadays, there are some different paradigms to ensure the security and reliability of e-voting. This document is part of a wider project which presents an e-Voting platform based on elliptic curve cryptography. It uses an hybrid combination of two of the main e-Voting paradigms to guarantee privacy and security in the counting phase, these are precisely, the mixnets and the homomorphic protocols. This document is focused in the description of the system and the maths and programming needed to solve the homomorphic part of it. In later chapters, there is a comparison between a simple mixing system and our system proposal.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.