Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

LdShake: learning design solutions sharing and co-edition

Two important challenges that teachers are currently facing are the sharing and the collaborative authoring of their learning design solutions, such as didactical units and learning materials. On the one hand, there are tools that can be used for the creation of design solutions and only some of them facilitate the co-edition. However, they do not incorporate mechanisms that support the sharing of the designs between teachers. On the other hand, there are tools that serve as repositories of educational resources but they do not enable the authoring of the designs. In this paper we present LdShake, a web tool whose novelty is focused on the combined support for the social sharing and co-edition of learning design solutions within communities of teachers. Teachers can create and share learning designs with other teachers using different access rights so that they can read, comment or co-edit the designs. Therefore, each design solution is associated to a group of teachers able to work on its definition, and another group that can only see the design. The tool is generic in that it allows the creation of designs based on any pedagogical approach. However, it can be particularized in instances providing pre-formatted designs structured according to a specific didactic method (such as Problem-Based Learning, PBL). A particularized LdShake instance has been used in the context of Human Biology studies where teams of teachers are required to work together in the design of PBL solutions. A controlled user study, that compares the use of a generic LdShake and a Moodle system, configured to enable the creation and sharing of designs, has been also carried out. The combined results of the real and controlled studies show that the social structure, and the commenting, co-edition and publishing features of LdShake provide a useful, effective and usable approach for facilitating teachers' teamwork.

Sharing and Learning= Changing. A real story at the Institute of Public Security of Catalonia

The Institute has professionals with extensive experience in training, specifically with experience in the field of police and emergencies training. Moreover, it also has very talented people. But above all, our institution has public professionals with a desire to serve, who love security and emergency responders and want to provide them with the best knowledge to make them every day better professionals. In the quest for continuous training improvement, its during 2009 when e-learning begins to have a presence at the Institute. Virtual training methodology becomes a facilitator for the training of various professionals, avoiding geographical displacement and easing the class schedule.

Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, weassume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assumethat countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying theirdebts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of defaultpenalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement andhamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lowerwelfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods andexplore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).

The Barcelona Forum: on decentralized governance and conflict prevention 6-8 july 2009

The Barcelona Forum aimed to generate both a theoretical and practical discussion on decentralized governance and its capacity to promote peace, prevent conflict, advance human security and ensure greater governmental accountability. The Forum intended to review the theoretical strength of decentralization as a political tool and discuss how it can be properly implemented. Eight case studies were selected to be covered during the two days in order to draw conclusions and offer proposals for the future implementation of decentralization. The case of Catalonia and the decentralized experience of Spain was given special attention, as an example of successful decentralization. The other cases presented achievements and challenges and prompted discussions on both the validity and universality of decentralization as a way to promote and preserve peace. Topics such as ethnic and territorial divisions, democratic accountability, financial decentralization and distribution, resource sharing, and external implementation of decentralization through peace processes were discussed.

What underlies localization and urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to analyze why firms in some industries locate in specialized economic environments (localization economies) while those in other industries prefer large city locations (urbanization economies). To this end, we examine the location decisions of new manufacturing firms in Spain at the city level and for narrowly defined industries (three-digit level). First, we estimate firm location models to obtain estimates that reflect the importance of localization and urbanization economies in each industry. In a second step, we regress these estimates on industry characteristics that are related to the potential importance of three agglomeration theories, namely, labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers. Localization effects are low and urbanization effects are high in knowledge-intensive industries, suggesting that firms (partly) locate in large cities to reap the benefits of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. We also find that localization effects are high in industries that employ workers whose skills are more industry-specific, suggesting that industries (partly) locate in specialized economic environments to share a common pool of specialized workers.

Searching for and positioning of contextualized learning objects

Learning object economies are marketplaces for the sharing and reuse of learning objects (LO). There are many motivations for stimulating the development of the LO economy. The main reason is the possibility of providing the right content, at the right time, to the right learner according to adequate quality standards in the context of a lifelong learning process; in fact, this is also the main objective of education. However, some barriers to the development of a LO economy, such as the granularity and editability of LO, must be overcome. Furthermore, some enablers, such as learning design generation and standards usage, must be promoted in order to enhance LO economy. For this article, we introduced the integration of distributed learning object repositories (DLOR) as sources of LO that could be placed in adaptive learning designs to assist teachers’ design work. Two main issues presented as a result: how to access distributed LO, and where to place the LO in the learning design. To address these issues, we introduced two processes: LORSE, a distributed LO searching process, and LOOK, a micro context-based positioning process, respectively. Using these processes, the teachers were able to reuse LO from different sources to semi-automatically generate an adaptive learning design without leaving their virtual environment. A layered evaluation yielded good results for the process of placing learning objects from controlled learning object repositories into a learning design, and permitting educators to define different open issues that must be covered when they use uncontrolled learning object repositories for this purpose. We verified the satisfaction users had with our solution

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model withcomplete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state ofnature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regionschoose pro-cyclical fiscal spending. This leads to incomplete risk sharing,despite the existence of complete markets and the absence of aggregaterisk. When a fiscal union centralizes fiscal policy, securities pricescan no longer be manipulated and complete risk sharing ensues. If regionsare homogeneous, median income residents of both regions prefer the fiscalunion. If they are heterogeneous, the median resident of the rich regionprefers the decentralized setting.

R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence

This paper provides some first empirical evidence on the relationshipbetween R&D spillovers and R&D cooperation. The results suggest disentangling different aspects of know-how flows. Firms which rate incoming spillovers more importantly and who can limit outgoing spillovers by a more effective protection of know-how, are more likely to cooperate in R&D. Our analysis also finds that cooperating firms have higher incoming spillovers and higher protection of know-how, indicating that cooperation may serve as a vehicle to manage information flows. Our results thus suggest that on the one hand the information sharing and coordination aspects of incoming spillovers are crucial in understanding cooperation, while on the other hand, protection against outgoing spillovers is important for firms to engage in stable cooperative agreements by reducing free-rider problems. Distinguishing different types of cooperative partners reveals that while managing outgoing spillovers is less critical in alliances with non-commercial research partners than between vertically related partners, the incoming spillovers seem to be more critical in understanding the former type of R&D cooperation.

Secure and Anonymous Multimedia Content Distribution in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Peer-reviewed

Mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain

El objetivo de esta investigación es aportar evidencia sobre las fuentes de las economías de aglomeración para el caso español. De todas las maneras posibles que se han tomado en la literatura para medir las economías de aglomeración, nosotros lo analizamos a partir de las decisiones de localización de las empresas manufactureras. La literatura reciente ha puesto de relieve que el análisis basado en la disyuntiva localización / urbanización (relaciones dentro de un mismo sector) no es suficiente para entender las economías de aglomeración. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre los diferentes sectores sí resultan significativas al examinar por qué las empresas que pertenecen a diferentes sectores se localizan unas al lado de las otras. Con esto en mente, intentamos explicar que relaciones entre diferentes sectores pueden explicar coaglomeración. Para ello, nos centramos en aquellas relaciones entre sectores definidos a partir de los mecanismos de aglomeración de Marshall, es decir, labor market, input sharing y knowledge spillovers. Trabajamos con el labor market pooling en la medida en que los dos sectores utilizan los mismos trabajadores (clasificación de ocupaciones). Con el segundo mecanismo de Marshall, input sharing, introducimos cómo dos sectores tienen una relación de comprador / vendedor. Por último, nos referimos a dos sectores que utilizan las mismas tecnologías en cuanto a los knowledge spillovers. Con el fin de capturar todos los efectos de los mecanismos de aglomeracion en España, en esta investigación trabajamos con dos ámbitos geográficos, los municipios y los mercados de trabajo locales. La literatura existente nunca se ha puesto de acuerdo en cual es el ámbito geográfico en el que mejor trabajan los mecanismos Marshall, por lo que hemos cubierto todas las unidades geográficas potenciales.

Sociedades cooperativas: mercantilidad y operaciones con terceros. Un comentario

En este trabajo se hace referencia a la posible consideración de las sociedades cooperativas como sociedades mercantiles, cumpliéndose determinadas circunstancias, y ello sin pérdida de sus características específicas en cuanto a la toma de decisiones, el reparto de beneficios y la búsqueda de la satisfacción de fines de interés general. Asimismo, se analizan las consecuencias de aumentar el porcentaje de operaciones realizadas con terceros no socios, respecto del total de operaciones realizadas por la sociedad cooperativa, y su incidencia en la cuantía de los fondos de la cooperativa y en la retribución del socio cooperativista. Se realiza en este punto una comparación con las sociedades capitalistas convencionales (S.A., S.L.). Finalmente, se propone una reforma legislativa al objeto de permitir aumentar el porcentaje de realización de operaciones cooperativizadas con terceros no socios, y ello sin pérdida de su tratamiento fiscal favorable. PALABRAS CLAVE: Cooperativas, mercantilidad, mutualismo, operaciones con terceros, régimen fiscal, reformas legislativas. CLAVES ECONLIT: P130, Q130, L310