Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

How to foster sharing of educational resources?

The future of OER is highly dependent on the future of education in general. A future that will be determined by major changes in society that demand more people with a higher education and life long learning. Each vision for the long term future needs to take the qualitative and quantitative demands into account. Backcasting from a vision we arrive at useful steps to take, some of which we managed to start up in the form of pilots as part of the European research project Share.TEC.

TwHistory : Sharing History Using Twitter

In light of the fact that several studies indicate that students can benefit from deeper understandings of the processes by which historical accounts are constructed, history educators have increasingly been focused on finding ways to teach students how to read and reason about events in the same manner as professional historians (Wineburg, 2001; Spoehr & Spoehr, 1994; Hynd, Holschuh, & Hubbard, 2004; Wiley & Voss, 1996). One possible resource for supporting this development may come out of emerging web-based technologies. New technologies and increased access to historical records and artifacts posted the Internet may be precisely the tools that can help students (Bass, Rosenzweig, & Mason, 1999). Given the right context, we believe it is possible to combine such resources and tools to create an environment for students that could strengthen their abilities to read and reason about historical events. Moreover, we believe that social media, specifically, microblogging (Nardi, Schiano, Gumbrecht, & Swartz, 2004) could play a key role.

CAC controlled services sharing a link with connectionless data services in an ATM network: a performance evaluation study

In the B-ISDN there is a provision for four classes of services, all of them supported by a single transport network (the ATM network). Three of these services, the connected oriented (CO) ones, permit connection access control (CAC) but the fourth, the connectionless oriented (CLO) one, does not. Therefore, when CLO service and CO services have to share the same ATM link, a conflict may arise. This is because a bandwidth allocation to obtain maximum statistical gain can damage the contracted ATM quality of service (QOS); and vice versa, in order to guarantee the contracted QOS, the statistical gain have to be sacrificed. The paper presents a performance evaluation study of the influence of the CLO service on a CO service (a circuit emulation service or a variable bit-rate service) when sharing the same link

LdShake: learning design solutions sharing and co-edition

Two important challenges that teachers are currently facing are the sharing and the collaborative authoring of their learning design solutions, such as didactical units and learning materials. On the one hand, there are tools that can be used for the creation of design solutions and only some of them facilitate the co-edition. However, they do not incorporate mechanisms that support the sharing of the designs between teachers. On the other hand, there are tools that serve as repositories of educational resources but they do not enable the authoring of the designs. In this paper we present LdShake, a web tool whose novelty is focused on the combined support for the social sharing and co-edition of learning design solutions within communities of teachers. Teachers can create and share learning designs with other teachers using different access rights so that they can read, comment or co-edit the designs. Therefore, each design solution is associated to a group of teachers able to work on its definition, and another group that can only see the design. The tool is generic in that it allows the creation of designs based on any pedagogical approach. However, it can be particularized in instances providing pre-formatted designs structured according to a specific didactic method (such as Problem-Based Learning, PBL). A particularized LdShake instance has been used in the context of Human Biology studies where teams of teachers are required to work together in the design of PBL solutions. A controlled user study, that compares the use of a generic LdShake and a Moodle system, configured to enable the creation and sharing of designs, has been also carried out. The combined results of the real and controlled studies show that the social structure, and the commenting, co-edition and publishing features of LdShake provide a useful, effective and usable approach for facilitating teachers' teamwork.

On codes, matroids, and secure multiparty computation from linear secret-sharing schemes

Error-correcting codes and matroids have been widely used in the study of ordinary secret sharing schemes. In this paper, the connections between codes, matroids, and a special class of secret sharing schemes, namely, multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes (LSSSs), are studied. Such schemes are known to enable multiparty computation protocols secure against general (nonthreshold) adversaries.Two open problems related to the complexity of multiplicative LSSSs are considered in this paper. The first one deals with strongly multiplicative LSSSs. As opposed to the case of multiplicative LSSSs, it is not known whether there is an efficient method to transform an LSSS into a strongly multiplicative LSSS for the same access structure with a polynomial increase of the complexity. A property of strongly multiplicative LSSSs that could be useful in solving this problem is proved. Namely, using a suitable generalization of the well-known Berlekamp–Welch decoder, it is shown that all strongly multiplicative LSSSs enable efficient reconstruction of a shared secret in the presence of malicious faults. The second one is to characterize the access structures of ideal multiplicative LSSSs. Specifically, the considered open problem is to determine whether all self-dual vector space access structures are in this situation. By the aforementioned connection, this in fact constitutes an open problem about matroid theory, since it can be restated in terms of representability of identically self-dual matroids by self-dual codes. A new concept is introduced, the flat-partition, that provides a useful classification of identically self-dual matroids. Uniform identically self-dual matroids, which are known to be representable by self-dual codes, form one of the classes. It is proved that this property also holds for the family of matroids that, in a natural way, is the next class in the above classification: the identically self-dual bipartite matroids.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, weassume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assumethat countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying theirdebts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i)Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade.In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of defaultpenalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement andhamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lowerwelfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods andexplore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.

Risk sharing with the monarch: Excusable defaults and contingent debt in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

Contingent sovereign debt can create important welfare gains. Nonetheless,there is almost no issuance today. Using hand-collected archival data, we examine thefirst known case of large-scale use of state-contingent sovereign debt in history. Philip IIof Spain entered into hundreds of contracts whose value and due date depended onverifiable, exogenous events such as the arrival of silver fleets. We show that this allowedfor effective risk-sharing between the king and his bankers. The data also stronglysuggest that the defaults that occurred were excusable they were simply contingenciesover which Crown and bankers had not contracted previously.